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Summary 
Interest in the effectiveness of tax incentives for Research and Development (R&D) 
has spurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis - and for two different reasons. 
First, the financial crisis obliged many governments to introduce tough fiscal 
consolidation measures. This has increased the urgency to balance expenditure on 
innovation policy against expenditure on other policies. Another reason is that the 
drop in economic activity put even more emphasis on the need to find new sources of 
growth. 
R&D tax incentive schemes are widely adopted in advanced economies, including 
innovation leaders like the United States and Japan. Within the EU, only Germany and 
Estonia currently do not have a tax policy aimed directly at stimulating innovation. 
Although tax incentives are common, they are far from homogeneous and differ 
substantially across the 33 countries surveyed in this report,1 with most countries 
offering more than one type of instrument. R&D tax credits are the most popular type 
of incentive (present in 21 countries), followed by enhanced allowances (sixteen 
countries) and accelerated depreciation (thirteen countries).  
The vast majority of tax incentives are based on corporate income taxes, while eight 
countries have (additional) incentives that apply to social contributions and/or wage 
taxes. Tax benefits applying to income from innovation (mostly patent boxes) are 
proliferating. At the moment of writing, eleven EU member states offered corporate 
tax reduction for income resulting from to intellectual property. 
In the past fifteen years countries have shifted from tax incentives that only apply to 
increments in a firm’s R&D expenditure (incremental schemes) towards incentives that 
apply to total R&D expenditure (volume-based schemes). Currently, only seven 
countries have incremental tax incentives, usually in combination with a volume-based 
scheme, and for two of them - Ireland and United States - this design element is 
phasing out. 
While tax incentives are essentially a generic policy instrument, targeting to specific 
groups of firms is quite common. Ten countries explicitly target small- and medium-
sized enterprises. Six countries target young companies. In ten countries, tax 
incentives are also differentiated according to the legal status of firms. For example, 
some schemes have smaller tax benefits for foreign-owned companies as is the case 
in Canada. Most countries put a ceiling on the amount that firms can receive and in 
five countries the generosity of the scheme decreases with the size of a firm’s R&D 
expenditure. 
Do R&D tax incentives work? 
The widespread use of R&D tax incentives in times of economic slowdown raises the 
question of how effective these policy instruments are. The vast majority of studies 
surveyed in this report conclude that R&D tax credits are effective in stimulating 
investment in R&D. The estimates of the size of this effect are widely diverging and 
are not always comparable across countries due to differences in methodology. 
Studies that are more rigorous find that one euro of foregone tax revenue on R&D tax 
credits raises expenditure on R&D by less than one euro.  
Whether R&D tax incentives work ultimately depends on how many innovative 
products, services, and production processes they induce. Unfortunately, the impact of 
                                           
1Besides the member states of the European Union also Canada, Israel, Japan, 
Norway, and the United States were analysed. 
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R&D tax incentives on innovation and productivity is less studied. The limited evidence 
seems to point towards a positive impact of R&D tax incentives on innovation. 
The effects of R&D tax incentives on R&D expenditure vary across sub-groups of firms, 
with most studies focusing on firm size. In some of the countries analysed, small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) tend to respond more strongly to the support for 
R&D, while the reverse was found in other countries. These seemingly contradictory 
results make it difficult to draw general conclusions. There is some evidence that the 
impact for start-up firms can exceed the average impact.  
Recent evidence suggests that knowledge spillovers of large firms exceed those of 
small firms. This finding weakens the case for targeting tax incentives towards SMEs - 
even when SMEs would increase their R&D expenditure more strongly in response to 
incentives. 
The impact of R&D tax credits may be highly sensitive to their design and 
organization, but empirical studies on the effects of design and organizational features 
are scarce. One aspect that is relatively well-studied is whether incremental schemes 
perform better than volume-based schemes. Both kinds of designs have been found to 
result in additional R&D expenditure, but the evidence on which type of scheme is 
more effective is mixed. 
Do patent boxes work? 
A large body of literature has identified that multinational firms engage in profit-
shifting activities in order to decrease their overall tax liabilities. Intangible assets, like 
patents, play an important role as their location of origin can be quite arbitrary. Tax 
incentives for income generated by R&D, mostly patent boxes, can result in large 
decreases in tax revenue for all governments, including those engaging in such a 
policy.  
Tax incentives for R&D expenditure reward firms for the societal benefits from 
innovation that they themselves are unable to appropriate. It is hard to make the 
argument that a patent box serves the same purpose: patent boxes introduce a 
preferential rate for income from innovations that are already protected by Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR’s). IPR’s enable firms to capture a large part of the societal 
benefits, such that the need for a tax incentive for protected innovations becomes 
unclear. The impact on innovation of patent boxes is difficult to evaluate empirically as 
tax planning and tax competition induce measurement error in innovation indicators. 
What is good practice? 
In the absence of comparable evidence on the performance of specific R&D tax 
incentives, more than 80 tax incentives in 31 countries have been benchmarked. The 
benchmarking is based on twenty principles of best practice, which are divided over 
three categories: 1) scope of the instrument: how does the tax incentive work, which 
expenditures are eligible, 2) targeting: does the instrument target specific types of 
firms, explicitly or implicitly, and 3) organizational practice: how does the application 
procedure work and is the tax incentive evaluated? 
One of the best practice principles proposed in this report is that volume-based R&D 
tax credits are preferred over incremental ones. Incremental R&D tax incentives may 
trigger firms to change the timing of their R&D investment plans. For example, 
incremental schemes make it more attractive for firms to gradually increase their R&D 
investment than to do a single large investment now if profits from these investments 
will materialize later in time. Also, incremental schemes result in higher administrative 
and compliance costs. As incremental schemes probably are not more effective than 
volume-based schemes, the higher costs of incremental schemes make volume-based 
schemes a better practice. The vast majority of instruments are volume-based. 
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Another good practice principle proposed in this report is that tax incentives should 
only be aimed at R&D activities that are likely to contribute to the world-wide stock of 
knowledge, rather than support activities limited to advancement in firm’s own state 
of expertise. The impact of a tax incentive on innovation will depend strongly on the 
strictness of its novelty requirement. Without any novelty requirement, a tax incentive 
could stimulate imitation, rather than innovation. Especially for countries close to the 
technology frontier, such a scheme could reduce innovation instead of promote it. 
Countries that are lagging in terms of innovation might catch up faster if they allow for 
imitation of foreign innovations. A number of R&D tax incentive schemes have strict 
novelty requirements, including in Canada and the United Kingdom.  
Tax incentives should ideally apply to those types of expenditures that bring about 
strong knowledge spillovers. Tax incentives based on the wage bill paid to researchers 
can be considered best practice in this context, for example because they are likely to 
generate higher knowledge spillovers than other types of R&D expenditure: 
researchers move from one employer to another and take their former’s employers 
knowledge with them. A practical advantage of tax incentives for R&D wages is that 
they have lower administration and compliance costs. Tax credits for researcher wages 
can be found in The Netherlands and Belgium, amongst others (see Table 5.2 for an 
overview). 
Young companies, rather than SMEs in general, are probably more likely to bring the 
innovations that challenge large incumbent firms. A favourable environment for 
entrepreneurs might not only contribute to a country’s innovativeness but also to the  
flexibility of its economy. Targeting young companies can be considered a better 
practice than targeting SMEs.  A scheme which has been identified as a good practice 
and explicitly targets young firms is the French tax credit for young innovative 
enterprises (Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes). 
As R&D expenditure may precede revenue generated by innovation by several years, 
it is good practice to provide a carry-over facility and an option to receive the benefit 
even in case a company is not profitable (cash refunds). Such features offer firms 
more flexibility and certainty for investment decisions. This is especially relevant for 
young companies that typically are not profitable in the first years of operations. While 
most of the R&D tax incentives analysed offer a carry forward facility, cash refunds are 
available only in nine countries. 
With respect to the organization of a tax incentive it is good practice to have a one-
stop, online application procedure. This is already in place in majority of the countries. 
In addition, the time it takes for tax authorities to make a decision on eligible 
expenses should be as short as possible, not exceeding a year. Several countries have 
already introduced an option to receive an immediate refund for smaller companies, as 
these firms are typically more liquidity constrained.  
Systematic evaluations are also recommended. High-quality firm-level data is 
indispensable for a rigorous quantitative evaluation and should be collected according 
to international standards. For seventeen countries no evaluation study has been 
found. Currently, only few countries have frequent evaluations, for example The 
Netherlands and France. The quality of evaluation studies is mixed and in many cases 
does not meet the standards of peer-reviewed academic journals. 
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A ranking of R&D tax incentives 
The scores of tax incentives on the twenty best practice principles are used to 
compute an overall index. The instrument that has the highest overall benchmarking 
score is the French tax credit for young innovative enterprises (Jeunes Entreprises 
Innovantes). It provides generous support to young SMEs for which R&D expenditure 
represents at least fifteen percent of total costs. The novelty requirement of R&D is 
according to best practice (“new to the world”). The immediate refund option and 
short response time means that firms can obtain the funding faster.  
The Norwegian SkatteFUNN tax credit comes second. This largely generic scheme only 
offers a preferential rate to SMEs. The application procedure of the R&D tax credit is 
quite simple: firms can apply online, one-stop agency is available and several guides 
are available. The introduction of the policy involved a public consultation and it has 
been evaluated various times. The third position is taken by the Accelerated 
amortization in Denmark, which has a good organizational practice and does not 
target specific groups of firms.  
Overall, the eighty R&D tax incentives show substantial heterogeneity in their designs 
and organizational practice. In part this reflects differences in country characteristics 
(like innovation systems and tax rates), but there are also substantial opportunities 
for improving R&D tax incentives across the European Union - in particular with 
respect to the organization and scope of the tax incentives. 
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Résumé 
L'intérêt quant à l'efficacité des incitants fiscaux en Recherche et Développement 
(R&D) a été stimulé à la suite de la crise financière - pour deux raisons différentes. En 
premier lieu, la crise financière a contraint de nombreux gouvernements à mettre en 
place des mesures de consolidations fiscales rigoureuses. Cela a accru l’urgence 
d'équilibrer les dépenses en matière d'innovation par rapport aux dépenses liées à 
d'autres domaines d'actions publiques. La seconde raison est que la baisse de l'activité 
économique souligne encore plus le besoin de trouver de nouvelles sources de 
croissance. 
Les schémas d'incitants fiscaux en R&D sont largement adoptés dans les économies 
avancées, y compris par les leaders de l'innovation comme les États-Unis et le Japon. 
Au sein de l'UE, seules l'Allemagne et l'Estonie n'ont actuellement aucune politique 
fiscale visant directement la stimulation de l'innovation. Bien que les incitants fiscaux 
soient communs, ils sont loin d'être homogènes et diffèrent beaucoup á travers les 33 
pays observés dans ce rapport,2 la plupart des pays offrant plus d'un type 
d'instrument. Les crédits d'impôts en R&D sont le type d'incitant le plus populaire 
(présent dans 21 pays), suivi par les régimes de déduction plus favorables (seize 
pays) et la dépréciation accéléré (treize pays).  
La majorité des incitants fiscaux se fondent sur les impôts sur les revenus 
professionnels, tandis que huit pays proposent des incitants (supplémentaires) qui 
s'appliquent aux cotisations sociales et/ou à l'impôt sur le salaire. Les avantages 
fiscaux s'appliquant aux revenus d'innovation (le plus souvent les patent boxes) sont 
en plein essor. Au moment de l'écriture de ce rapport, onze membres de l'UE 
proposaient une réduction de la taxe professionnelle pour les revenus attribuables à la 
propriété intellectuelle. 
Au cours des quinze dernières années, les pays sont passés d’incitants fiscaux qui 
s'appliquent uniquement aux augmentations des dépenses en R&D de l'entreprise 
(incitants incrémentaux) à des incitants qui s'appliquent aux dépenses en R&D totales 
(incitants basés sur le volume). Actuellement, seuls sept pays ont des incitants fiscaux 
incrémentaux, et dans deux d'entre eux - l'Irlande et les États-Unis - cet élément 
disparaît progressivement. Les incitants fiscaux en R&D sont également devenus plus 
généreux pendant la crise économique, plusieurs pays ayant accru le taux des 
bénéfices et élargi la définition des dépenses éligibles. 
Tandis que les incitants fiscaux sont essentiellement un instrument stratégique 
générique, cibler des groupes spécifiques d'entreprises est assez commun. Dix pays 
visent explicitement les petites et moyennes entreprises. Six pays visent les jeunes 
entreprises. Dans dix pays, les incitants fiscaux sont également différentiés en 
fonction du statut légal des entreprises. Par exemple, certains incitants ont des 
bénéfices fiscaux moins importants pour les entreprises sous contrôle étranger. La 
plupart des pays fixe une limite au montant que les entreprisse peuvent recevoir et 
dans cinq pays, la générosité de l’incitant diminue au fur et à mesure que les 
dépenses en R&D d'une entreprise augmentent. 
Est-ce que les incitants fiscaux en R&D fonctionnent ? 
L'utilisation largement répandue des incitants fiscaux en R&D, à une époque de 
ralentissement économique, soulève la question de savoir à quel point ces instruments 
politiques sont efficaces. La grande majorité des études analysées dans le cadre de ce 
rapport arrive à la conclusion que les crédits d'impôts en R&D sont efficaces pour 
                                           
2 En plus des États membres de l'Union Européenne, le Canada, Israël, le Japon, la 
Norvège et les États-Unis ont été également analysés. 
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stimuler les investissements en R&D. Les estimations de l’importance de leur impact 
sont très variées, et ne sont pas toujours comparables entre les pays en raison des 
différences de méthode. Des études plus approfondies révèlent qu'une perte de 
recette fiscale d'un euro sur les crédits d'impôts en R&D, entraine une dépense en 
R&D de moins d'un euro.  
L'efficacité des incitants fiscaux en R&D dépend surtout du nombre de produits, 
services et processus de production innovants qu’ils entraînent. Malheureusement, 
l'impact des incitants fiscaux en R&D sur l'innovation et la productivité a été moins 
étudié. Les preuves limitées semblent indiquer un impact positif des incitants fiscaux 
en R&D sur l'innovation. 
Les effets des incitants fiscaux en R&D sur les dépenses en R&D varient selon les 
classes d'entreprise. La plupart des études se concentrent sur la taille des entreprises. 
Dans certains des pays analysés, les petites et moyennes entreprises (PME) réagissent 
plus fortement à l'aide dans le domaine de R&D, alors que l'inverse a été trouvé dans 
d’autres pays. Ces résultats, apparemment contradictoires, rendent une conclusion 
générale difficile. Certains résultats montrent que l'impact pour les start-ups peut 
dépasser l'impact moyen.  
Des résultats récents suggèrent que les diffusions de connaissances de grandes 
entreprises dépassent celles de petites entreprises. Cette résultat constatation limite 
entraîne que les incitants fiscaux sont moins accordés aux PME - même si les PME 
augmentaient plus fortement leurs dépenses en R&D comme réaction aux incitants. 
L'impact des crédits d'impôts en R&D peut être très sensible à leur conception et à 
leur organisation, mais les études empiriques sur les effets des caractéristiques de 
concept et d'organisation sont rares. Un aspect relativement bien étudié est celui de 
savoir si les incitants incrémentaux sont plus efficaces que les incitants basés sur le 
volume. Il s'avère que les deux sortes d’incitants entraînent des dépenses en R&D 
supplémentaires, mais les preuves permettant de savoir quel type d’incitant est le plus 
efficace sont mitigées. 
Est-ce que les patent boxes fonctionnent ? 
De nombreux documents ont identifié que des entreprises multinationales s'engagent 
dans des activités de transfert de bénéfices afin de diminuer leur dette fiscale 
générale. Les actifs immatériels, comme les brevets, jouent un rôle important car 
l'endroit où ils ont été créés peut être arbitraire. Les incitants fiscaux pour les revenus 
générés en R&D, le plus souvent les patent boxes, peuvent résulter en des réductions 
importantes des revenus d'impôts pour tous les gouvernements appliquant une telle 
politique.  
Les incitants fiscaux pour les dépenses en R&D forment un dédommagement pour les 
entreprises des avantages sociaux de l'innovation qu'ils sont eux-mêmes incapables 
d'attribuer. Il est difficile de présenter l'argument qu'une patent box sert à la même 
chose : les patent boxes mettent en place un taux préférentiel pour le revenu des 
innovations déjà protégées par les droits de propriété intellectuelle. Ces droits 
permettent aux entreprises de profiter d'une large partie des bénéfices sociaux, de 
sorte que le besoin d'un incitant fiscal pour les innovations protégées n'est pas très 
clair. L'impact sur l'innovation des patent boxes est difficile à évaluer de manière 
empirique, car la planification et la concurrence fiscales impliquent des erreurs de 
mesure dans les indicateurs d'innovation. 
Qu'est-ce que la bonne pratique ? 
En l'absence de données de comparaison sur l'efficacité des incitants fiscaux 
spécifiques au R&D, plus de 80 incitants fiscaux ont été comparés dans 31 pays. La 
comparaison se fonde sur vingt principes de bonnes pratiques, qui sont divisés en trois 
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catégories : 1) étendue de l'instrument : comment est-ce que l'incitant fiscal 
fonctionne, quelles dépenses sont concernées, 2) cible : est-ce que l'instrument cible 
certains types spécifiques d'entreprise, explicitement ou implicitement, et 3) pratique 
organisationnelle : comment est-ce que la procédure de requête fonctionne et 
l'incitant fiscal est-il évalué ? 
L'un des principes de meilleures pratiques proposés dans ce rapport est que les crédits 
d'impôt en R&D basés sur le volume sont préférés aux incitants incrémentaux. Les 
incitants fiscaux en R&D incrémentaux peuvent pousser les entreprises à modifier le 
calendrier de leurs projets d'investissement en R&D. Par exemple, les incitants 
incrémentaux incitent les entreprises à augmenter progressivement leur 
investissement en R&D, plutôt que de faire un seul investissement important 
immédiatement, si les bénéfices de ces investissements se matérialiseront plus tard. 
De plus, les incitants incrémentaux impliquent des frais administratifs et de conformité 
plus élevés. Les frais plus élevés des incitants progressifs ne sont apparemment pas 
compensés par une efficacité plus importante comme les simulations récentes le 
montrent - même pour une croissance faible de l'entreprise. La majorité des 
instruments se fondent sur le volume. 
Une autre bonne pratique proposée dans ce rapport est que les incitants fiscaux 
doivent uniquement viser les activités R&D pouvant potentiellement contribuer aux 
connaissances mondiales, plutôt que de promouvoir les activités limitées à accroître 
l'expertise propre de l'entreprise. L'impact d'un incitant fiscal sur l'innovation dépend 
fortement de la rigueur de cette exigence de nouveauté. Sans aucune exigence de 
nouveauté, un incitant fiscal peut stimuler l'imitation plutôt que l'innovation. 
Notamment pour les pays proches de la frontière technologie, un tel incitant pourrait 
réduire l'innovation au-lieu de la promouvoir. Les pays en retard en termes 
d'innovation peuvent rattraper leur retard plus vite s'ils permettent l’imitation 
d’innovations étrangères. Quelques schémas d'incitants fiscaux en R&D comportent 
des exigences d'innovation strictes, comme au Canada et au Royaume-Uni.  
Les incitants fiscaux devraient s'appliquer idéalement aux types de dépenses qui 
entraînent de fortes diffusions de connaissances. Les incitants fiscaux basés sur le 
salaire payé aux chercheurs peuvent être considérés comme un exemple de bonne 
pratique dans ce contexte. Par exemple, parce qu'ils mènent probablement à une 
meilleure diffusion de connaissances que les autres types de dépenses en R&D : les 
chercheurs passent d'un employeur à l'autre et emportent avec eux les connaissances 
de leurs anciens employeurs. L'un des avantages pratiques des incitants fiscaux pour 
les salaires en R&D est qu'ils impliquent des frais administratifs et de conformité 
moins importants. Des crédits d'impôts pour les salaires des chercheurs sont proposés 
notamment aux Pays-Bas et en Belgique (voir tableau 5.2 pour un aperçu). 
Les jeunes entreprises, plutôt que les PME en général, ont plus de chances de fournir 
des innovations qui concurrenceront  les grandes entreprises. Un environnement 
favorable aux entrepreneurs contribuera non seulement aux innovations du pays, mais 
également à la flexibilité de son économie. Cibler de jeunes entreprises peut être 
considéré comme une meilleure pratique que cibler des PME. Un incitant qui a été 
identifié comme une bonne pratique et qui vise explicitement les jeunes entreprises, 
est le crédit fiscal français pour les Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes. 
Comme les dépenses en R&D viennent plusieurs années avant les revenus générés par 
l’innovation, ce serait une bonne pratique de fournir une facilité de crédit-pont, et une 
possibilité de recevoir une allocation, même si l’entreprise n’est pas encore rentable 
(remboursements en espèces). De telles fonctions offrent aux entreprises une plus 
grande flexibilité et une meilleure assurance pour les décisions d'investissement. Cela 
est notamment important pour les jeunes entreprises qui ne sont en général pas 
rentables aux cours des premières années d’exercice. Alors que la plupart des 
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incitants fiscaux de R&D analysés proposent un crédit-pont, les remboursements en 
espèces sont uniquement proposés dans neuf pays. 
En ce qui concerne l'organisation d'un incitant fiscal, une procédure unique de requête 
en ligne est une bonne pratique. Elle est déjà appliquée dans la majorité des pays. De 
plus, la durée de prise de décision des autorités fiscales sur les dépenses concernées 
doit être aussi courte que possible et ne pas dépasser une année. Plusieurs pays ont 
déjà mis en place l'option de recevoir un remboursement immédiat pour les petites 
entreprises car la liquidité de celles-ci est souvent limitée.  
Des évaluations systématiques sont également recommandées. Des données de haute 
qualité sont indispensables au niveau des entreprises pour une évaluation quantitative 
rigoureuse. Elles doivent être collectées en respect de normes internationales. Dans 
dix-sept pays, aucune étude d'évaluation n'a été trouvée. Actuellement, seuls 
quelques pays font l'objet d'évaluations fréquentes, par exemple, les Pays-Bas et la 
France. La qualité des études d'évaluation est mitigée et dans de nombreux cas, elle 
ne satisfait pas les normes des publications universitaires spécialisées. 
Classement des incitants fiscaux en R&D 
Les scores des incitants fiscaux sur les vingt principes de meilleures pratiques ont été 
utilisés pour mettre au point un indice général. L’instrument qui a obtenu le score le 
plus élevé lors du benchmarking est le crédit d’impôt français pour les Jeunes 
Entreprises Innovantes. il fournit un soutien généreux à de jeunes PME, pour 
lesquelles les dépenses en R&D représentent au moins quinze pourcents des coûts 
totaux. La nécessité d’innovation en R&D est conforme à la meilleure pratique 
(« nouveau dans le monde »). L’option de remboursement immédiat et de temps de 
réponse court signifie que les entreprises peuvent recevoir plus rapidement un 
remboursement. 
Le crédit d’impôt norvégien SkatteFUNN arrive en seconde position. Cet incitant, 
d’ordre surtout générique, offre un taux d’imposition préférentiel aux PME. La 
procédure de requête de crédit d’impôt en R&D est assez simple : les entreprises 
peuvent s’inscrire en ligne, une agence est disponible ainsi que plusieurs manuels. 
L’introduction de la politique a impliqué une consultation publique, et elle a été 
évaluée à plusieurs reprises. La troisième position est occupée par les amortissements 
accélérés au Danemark, qui a obtenu des scores élevés pour la pratique 
organisationnelle, et qui ne cible pas un groupe spécifique d’organisations. 
Au total, les quatre-vingt incitants fiscaux en R&D présentent une grande 
hétérogénéité dans leurs formats et leurs pratiques organisationnelles. Cela reflète en 
partie les différences entre les caractéristiques des pays (comme les systèmes 
d’innovation et les taux d’imposition) mais il y a également des opportunités 
conséquentes d’amélioration des incitants fiscaux en R&D dans l’Union Européenne – 
en particulier en ce qui concerne l’organisation et l’étendue de ces incitants. 
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1 Introduction 
Europe 2020, the strategy for growth set out by the European Commission, puts 
investment in research and development (R&D) as one of the five priorities for Europe 
to become more competitive.3 By the year 2020, European investment in R&D should 
reach at least three percent of gross domestic production (GDP). The target of three 
percent is ambitious given that expenditure on R&D was about 2.1 percent in 2012. 
However, progress has been made, as in the period before 2007 expenditure was 0.3 
percentage point smaller than it currently is.  
The financial crisis has impacted the course for reaching the target in various ways. 
First, the financial crisis obliged many governments to introduce tough fiscal 
consolidation measures, prioritizing other issues over R&D. In 2012 the share of public 
R&D expenditure in total government spending was lower than in 2007 for half of the 
EU member states4. The urgency to balance expenditure on innovation against 
expenditure on other policies, calls for clarity on the performance of the different 
innovation policy instruments. 
Second, the drop in economic activity put even more emphasis on the need to find 
new sources of growth. Innovation is such a source - and one which is underutilized in 
Europe: recent evidence suggests that European firms have significantly lower rates of 
return in R&D than American firms (Cincera and Veugelers, 2014). 
The conviction that innovation policy can reduce budget deficits by stimulating 
economic growth is part of the “smart consolidation” approach. This approach 
considers innovation policy to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem. 
For smart consolidation to work, innovation policy needs to be very effective in 
increasing innovation - otherwise other policies (including reducing taxes) might be 
preferable. In addition, innovation policy needs to be effective in the context of a 
severe recession, which raises the bar as firms are challenged by a lack of demand for 
their (new) products. The gap of innovative performance between the member states 
is closing. However, there are still significant differences. Traditionally, the most 
innovative countries - Sweden, Denmark, Germany and Finland - are performing 
around three times better than the least innovative states (European Commission, 
2014). These countries also have the highest gross domestic expenditure on R&D 
relative to GDP (see Figure 1.1 below). 
The scope for policies to support more innovation in the high-performing countries 
might be limited, but there could be substantial opportunities for the other Member 
States to catch-up, as shown by the example of Slovenia and Estonia. 
Catching-up of countries with low R&D expenditures is also crucial for Europe as a 
whole to reach the goals set out in the Europe 2020 strategy. This requires that 
especially under-performing countries need to revise their policies regarding 
innovation. Learning from the experiences of other countries can be valuable for 
upgrading innovation policy. 
 
                                           
3 The other targets relate to employment, climate change and energy sustainability, 
education, and poverty and social exclusion 
4 Eurostat data on “Share of government budget appropriations or outlays on research 
and development as % of total general government expenditure”, available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcod
e=tsc00007&plugin=0 
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Figure 1.1 Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (% of GDP) 
 
 Source: Eurostat, Gross domestic expenditure on R&D, 2014 
The foregone tax revenue of R&D fiscal incentives is substantial. Thus, understanding 
the effectiveness of this policy instrument is ever more important in times when 
governments look for ways to balance budgets and find new sources of growth. This 
study aims to facilitate this task and motive better policy by: 
1. providing insight in the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives 
2. giving an overview of existing R&D tax incentives, and 
3. identifying good practices and benchmarking policies.  
1.1 R&D tax incentives and the innovation policy mix 
Why should governments have policies that stimulate innovation? It is widely agreed 
that technological change is an important contributor to long-term growth (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990). New ideas translate in new and better products and 
improved productivity, which eventually increases general welfare. But markets left on 
their own will probably generate less innovation than would be desirable from society’s 
point of view. The reason is that knowledge is not completely excludable: ideas can be 
easily copied and used by other firms. Non-excludability discourages firms to invest in 
research since the returns to investment will not entirely accrue to the firm. The social 
rate of return on R&D is thus higher than the private rate of return. This externality 
leads to suboptimal outcomes for society (Arrow, 1962). 
A second reason why markets might fail to deliver sufficient innovation is that 
investments in research are more risky. This makes it more difficult for investors and 
banks to monitor innovative firms: information asymmetry between the innovator and 
the investor is large. As a result, firms will find it difficult to obtain funding. Especially 
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young innovative enterprises suffer from this problem as they lack collateral and track 
record.5 
R&D tax incentives are one of the most popular innovation policy tools. Essentially, 
they reduce taxes for firms that have R&D expenditure (input-related R&D tax 
incentives) or for firms that have income from commercializing intellectual property 
rights (output-related R&D tax incentives). Input-related R&D tax incentives decrease 
the price of R&D inputs faced by firms, which makes it more attractive to engage in 
R&D. Output-related R&D tax incentives increase the returns from innovative products 
that are protected by IPR. This should motivate firms to invest in innovation or to 
attract foreign R&D firms. 
In the recent years, R&D tax incentives have gained attention. Currently, 26 EU and 
27 OECD member states provide fiscal incentives for R&D.6 The advantage of R&D tax 
incentives lies in their generic nature: decisions on R&D investments are left to the 
market and are not steered by the government. In general, profit-maximizing agents 
are more likely to make more efficient allocations than central authorities (a general 
reference is Hart et al. (1997)).  
A drawback of R&D tax incentives is that firms will first invest in projects with highest 
private, rather than social returns (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). Public research and 
subsidies for private research do not have this bias towards private returns as the 
government can directly influence the type of supported projects. 
Public research and subsidies for private research could also be more effective than 
R&D tax incentives when the commercialization of products is extremely difficult to 
keep exclusive to the firm, like education or health. These types of projects do not 
provide attractive investment opportunities, no matter how low the offered tax rate 
would be. Innovation of this kind can be considered a public good7 and will only be 
provided if it is financed directly by the government.8  
Direct government funding for private research has several disadvantages vis-à-vis 
R&D tax incentives. First, it results in substantially larger administrative costs. 
Furthermore, government do not have an information advantage as to which projects 
will succeed or potentially bring highest social returns. Besides, the quality of 
decisions on subsidies can be eroded by short-term political goals and impacted by 
lobbying (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000).  
More pragmatically, R&D tax incentives can be effective tools to reach the targets set 
under the Europe 2020 strategy as foregone tax revenue accounts is considered 
government expenditure on R&D policy. They can also be used to attract international 
footloose R&D (OECD and World Bank, 2014).9   
Yet, innovation does not happen in a closed system but in an open environment. Thus, 
whether instruments targeted at raising the level of R&D, like R&D tax incentives, will 
result in more innovation depends on framework conditions. Framework conditions 
include the availability of skilled labour, infrastructure, universities, competition 
                                           
5 Although tax incentives and subsidies might reduce the need for external finance, 
they do not mitigate the underlying problem of information asymmetry 
6 Based on the finding of this report and OECD (2013) OECD Science, Technology and 
Industry Scoreboard 2013, OECD Publishing. 
7 A good that is both non-rival and non-excludable is known as a public good (Cornes 
and Sandler, 1986). 
8 Alternative ways to finance public goods are advertising and crowd-sourcing. 
9 World Bank and OECD: Innovation Policy Platform: Fiscal Measures. Available at: 
https://www.innovationpolicyplatform.org/ipp/filters/result-page?topic-filters=12308 
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environment, as well as the strength of intellectual property rights. Policies targeted to 
those elements can have a very strong impact on the type and amount of R&D 
performed by firms. 
1.2 Main findings from the overview of R&D tax incentives 
The overview of R&D tax incentive schemes presented in this report shows that 26 EU 
member states currently have some type of fiscal encouragement for R&D 
investments. The OECD countries selected for this study (Canada, USA, Japan, Israel 
and Norway) offer fiscal advantages for R&D activities as well. Most of the countries 
surveyed have more than one R&D tax incentive in place. The design and 
implementation of policy instruments varies substantially across countries – and 
sometimes within countries as well.  
The majority of tax incentives apply to corporate income taxes, yet in eight countries 
benefit is (additionally) set against social contributions and/or wage taxes. R&D tax 
credits are the most popular type of R&D tax incentive (introduced in 21 countries), 
followed by enhanced allowances for expenditure on R&D (sixteen countries) and 
accelerated depreciation (thirteen countries). In the past years tax benefits for income 
from innovation, patents boxes, have also gained popularity: currently, eleven EU 
member states offer such an incentive.  
In the past fifteen years R&D tax incentives that apply to the total R&D expenditure 
(volume-based schemes) have become considerably more common than tax benefits 
that apply only to the increment of R&D expenditure (incremental schemes). As of 
today, only seven countries offer incremental tax incentives in addition to volume-
based, and in Ireland and the United States the ‘incremental’ part of the design is 
phasing out.  
R&D tax incentives are frequently targeted to specific groups of firms. The most 
widespread form of targeting, is to offer a more generous tax advantage to  SME’s: 
currently ten countries have such a practice. In six countries the benefit is higher for 
young firms and in several countries the legal status of the applicant is important (in 
Canada, for example, foreign-owned companies receive a less generous tax 
reduction). In order to limit the government costs and indirectly provide more 
generous (marginal) support to smaller firms,  five countries have the generosity of 
the scheme decreasing with the size of a firm’s R&D expenditure. In addition, most 
countries put a ceiling on the amount that firms can receive. In terms of organization 
of the R&D tax incentives, most countries offer firms an online application procedure 
and a one-stop agency (one institution, where all relevant matters can be settled). 
Evaluations of the tax instruments have been carried out in fourteen countries, yet 
only in six countries they are embedded in the legal system. 
1.3 Main findings from the literature survey 
The report covers a large body of literature assessing the impact of R&D tax credits. 
The vast majority of studies surveyed concludes that R&D tax credits spur investment 
in R&D. The estimates of the size of this effect are widely diverging and not always 
comparable across methodologies. The wide range of results probably reflects 
differences in methodology as well as differences between countries and policies, but 
is difficult to disentangle those effects. Studies that are more rigorous econometrically 
and yield more precise estimates find that one euro of foregone tax revenue on R&D 
tax credits raises expenditure on R&D by less than one euro (Cornet and Vroomen, 
2005; European Commission, 2008; Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012; Mulkay and Mairesse, 
2013). 
The impact of R&D tax credits on R&D expenditure is informative on the effectiveness 
of R&D tax credits, but this is only a part of the puzzle. A second piece of the puzzle is 
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the answer to the question whether R&D tax credits make firms more innovative and 
productive. The impact of R&D tax incentives on innovation and productivity by firms 
receiving those benefits, however, is less studied. R&D tax incentives appear to have a 
positive impact on innovation, although none of the studies has used exogenous 
variation to verify the causality of the relation. 
Payroll withholding tax credits may have an upward effect on the wages of R&D 
workers Cornet and Vroomen (2005) and Lokshin and Mohnen (2013). Goolsbee 
(1998) found the same effect for the total government expenditure on R&D in the 
United States. This is additional evidence of the effectiveness of tax credits: a rise in 
demand is expected to lead to higher prices in most markets.  
The effects of R&D tax incentives vary across sub-groups of firms, with most studies 
focusing on firm size. The results seem to differ across countries, which makes it 
difficult to draw clear conclusions. In some of the countries analysed, SME’s tend to 
respond more strongly to the support for R&D, while the reverse was found in other 
countries. It is not clear whether differences in outcomes are due to tax incentive 
characteristics, other country characteristics, methodology, or something else. There 
is some evidence that the impact for start-up firms can exceed the average impact, 
but in general, there is not much evidence on how effectiveness of tax incentives 
varies with firm age. There is a clear literature gap in identifying whether the impact 
differs across firms with different legal status.  
Estimates of the social rate of return to R&D are variable and imprecise but tend to 
exceed estimates of the private rate of return to R&D (Hall et al., 2009). This indicates 
that there is a scope for innovation policy to raise welfare. Recent evidence suggests 
that knowledge spillovers of large firms exceed those of small firms (2013). This 
finding provides an argument against targeting tax incentives towards SMEs. On the 
other hand, SMEs tend to respond more strongly to R&D tax incentives. This suggests 
that targeting on SMEs still could be efficient. 
Social cost-benefit analyses for The Netherlands, Canada and Japan showed that R&D 
tax credits can have positive welfare effects but that this outcome is highly sensitive 
to assumptions (Parsons and Phillips, 2007; Russo, 2004; Ghosh, 2007; Mohnen and 
Lokshin, 2008; Cornet, 2001; Diao et al., 1999). 
The impact of R&D tax credits may be highly sensitive to their design and 
implementation. The different results found for SMEs across countries are indicative of 
this. However, evidence on the effects of design features is inconclusive for some 
features, while for evidence is lacking altogether for other features. An important 
aspect of R&D tax credits is whether they apply to incremental R&D expenditure or 
whether they are “volume-based”. Both kinds of designs have been evaluated, and 
both of them have been found to result in additional R&D expenditure. The variation in 
estimates across studies is too large to be able to conclude that there is a statistically 
significant difference between the effectiveness of incremental and volume-based 
schemes. 
Lester and Warda (2014) oppose the general perception that only volume-base R&D 
tax schemes result in dead-weight loss. They simulate different policy scenarios on 
different types of firms and find that even at low levels of growth the cost 
effectiveness of the two types of schemes will be the same.  
Whether R&D tax incentive schemes targeted at cooperation between firms or public 
research institutes lead to higher additionality, is understudied. Research cooperation 
between competitor companies is shown to lead to collusive outcomes in the product 
market (Duso T. et al., 2014). 
A large body of literature has identified that multinational firms increasingly engage in 
profit-shifting activities in order to decrease the overall tax liabilities. Intangible 
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assets, like patents, play an important role as they are relatively easy to move from 
one location to other. In addition, for large firms innovation often is an international 
activity: firms may perform R&D in one country, patent the product in another and 
commercialize it in a third one. Studies show that a strong negative relation persists 
between corporate income tax and the number of patents registered in a country. 
Patents with a higher potential profitability appear to be especially sensitive to 
corporate income taxes. 
Patent boxes can result in large decreases in tax revenue for all governments 
engaging in such a policy (Griffith et al., 2014). Furthermore, it is hard to make the 
argument why a patent box would reduce market failure caused by knowledge 
spillovers: patent boxes introduce a preferential rate for income from innovations that 
are already protected by IPR. The impact on innovation of patent boxes is difficult to 
evaluate empirically as tax planning and tax competition induce measurement error in 
innovation indicators. 
Comparing the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives across countries is a challenging 
task. Most R&D tax incentives have not been evaluated quantitatively, making it 
impossible to compare them directly. When an evaluation study is available, it is 
difficult to compare the results with other evaluations as evaluation studies differ 
wildly in their methodology. Moreover, similar R&D tax incentives might have very 
different impacts due to differences in framework conditions. 
1.4 Main findings on best practices 
In the absence of comparable evidence on the performance of specific R&D tax 
incentives, more than 80 tax incentives in 31 countries10 have been benchmarked. The 
benchmarking is based on twenty principles of best practice, which are divided over 
three categories: 1) scope of the instrument: how does the tax incentive work, which 
expenditures are eligible, 2) targeting: does the instrument target specific types of 
firms, explicitly or implicitly, and 3) organizational practice: how does the application 
procedure work and is the tax incentive evaluated? 
One of the best practice principles proposed in this report is that volume-base R&D tax 
credits are preferred over incremental ones. Incremental R&D tax incentives may 
distort optimal investment planning and result in higher administrative and compliance 
costs. These higher costs of incremental schemes are probably not offset by a greater 
effectiveness of incremental schemes as recent simulations indicate - even for low 
levels of firm growth. The vast majority of instruments are volume-based. 
Another principle proposed in this report is that tax incentives should only be aimed at 
R&D activities that are likely to contribute to the world-wide stock of knowledge, 
rather than support activities limited to advancement in firm’s own state of expertise. 
The impact of a tax incentive on innovation will depend strongly on the strictness of its 
novelty requirement. Without any novelty requirement, a tax incentive could stimulate 
imitation, rather than innovation. Such a scheme could reduce innovation instead of 
promoting it. A number of R&D tax incentive schemes have strict novelty requirements 
(see Table 5.3 for an overview of novelty requirements across countries).  
Tax incentives should ideally apply to those types of expenditures that bring about 
strong knowledge spillovers. Tax incentives based on the wage bill paid to researchers 
can be considered best practice in this context, for example because researchers move 
from one employer to another. A practical advantage of tax incentives for R&D wages 
                                           
10 Note that in total 33 countries were included in the analysis of the report. However, 
two EU countries- Estonia and Germany- do not offer R&D tax incentives. Thus, those 
two countries were not included in the benchmarking 
 
 
 A Study on R&D Tax Incentives 
 
November 2014  23 
is that they have lower administration and compliance costs. Tax credits for researcher 
wages can be found in The Netherlands and Belgium, amongst others (see Table 5.2 
for an overview). 
Young companies, rather than SMEs in general, are probably more likely to bring the 
innovations that challenge large incumbent firms. Targeting young companies can be 
considered a better practice than targeting SMEs. A scheme that explicitly targets 
young firms is the French Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes. An overview of all countries 
can be found in Figure 5.4. 
As R&D expenditure may precede revenue generated by innovation by several years, 
it is good practice to provide a carry-over facility and an option to receive the benefit 
even in case a company is not profitable (cash refunds). Such features offer firms 
more flexibility and certainty for investment decisions. This is especially relevant for 
young companies that typically are not profitable in the first years of operations. While 
most of the R&D tax incentives analysed offer a carry forward facility, cash refunds are 
available only in nine countries (see full list in Table 5.5). 
With respect to the organization of a tax incentive it is good practice to have a one-
stop, online application procedure. This is already in place in majority of the countries. 
In addition, the time it takes for tax authorities to make a decision on eligible 
expenses should be as short as possible, not exceeding a year. Several countries have 
already introduced an option to receive an immediate refund for smaller companies, as 
these firms are typically more liquidity constrained.  
Systematic evaluations are also recommended. High-quality firm-level data is 
indispensable for a rigorous quantitative evaluation and should be collected according 
to international standards. Currently, only few countries have frequent evaluations, for 
example, The Netherlands and France.  
The scores of tax incentives on the twenty best practice principles are used to 
compute an overall index. The instrument that has the highest overall benchmarking 
score is the French tax credit for young innovative enterprises (Jeunes Entreprises 
Innovantes), due to high scores on scope and organizational practice. The Norwegian 
SkatteFUNN tax credit comes second, mainly because of its first place for organization. 
The third position is taken by the Accelerated amortization in Denmark, with high 
scores on targeting and organization. 
Overall, the eighty R&D tax incentives show substantial heterogeneity in their designs 
and organizational practice. Tax credits distinguish themselves from enhanced 
allowances and facilities for accelerated depreciation primarily because of their higher 
score on scope. Patent boxes have the smallest average score on scope. The 
heterogeneity of practices not only is present between types of tax incentives; 
differences among schemes of the same type are also large. 
Heterogeneity in the features of tax incentives is likely to reflect differences in country 
characteristics (like innovation systems and tax rates), but also within countries there 
is sometimes a large discrepancy between the highest ranked instrument and the 
instrument with the lowest rank. This suggests that there are substantial opportunities 
for improving R&D tax incentives across the European Union - in particular with 
respect to the organization and scope of the tax incentives. 
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1.5 Earlier surveys 
Several reports and academic articles provide overviews of R&D tax incentives and 
their effectiveness.11 Köhler et al. (2012) conclude that R&D tax incentives have a 
positive impact on R&D expenditure, although estimates vary substantially and mostly 
represent schemes that were in place in the 1980s and 1990s. They note that a 
positive impact is found for all types of R&D tax incentives and that volume-based 
incentives and R&D tax credits appear to have the largest effects on R&D expenditure. 
Köhler et al. indicate that the impact on outcomes other than R&D expenditure are 
less studied and little can be said about the long-run welfare effects of R&D tax 
incentives.  
Köhler et al. make several policy recommendations: schemes should be differentiated 
by firm size or the amount of R&D expenditure (e.g., by introducing caps). This report 
surveys new evidence that questions the targeting of SMEs: Bloom et al. (2013) which 
suggest that large firms generate larger spillovers than small firms. Köhler et al. 
further propose that for firms that have used the the R&D tax scheme for some time, 
a lower rate should be applied. 
Ientile and Mairesse (2009) also conclude that the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D 
investment is quite heterogenous, likely sensitive to the country analysed and 
methodology used. They noted that while the R&D tax incentives appear to be efficient 
in Norway and France, evaluations for Spain and The Netherlands provide less 
convincing results. They also encourage more research on the impact on second- and 
third-order effects, like impact on productivity, innovation outputs and the welfare 
effects. Ientile and Mairesse further suggest that a comparability between the studies 
should be enhanced through aligning on the addressed questions, methodologies used 
and ways the results are presented. 
More technical surveys of the empirical evidence and methdologies used in the 
evaluations of R&D tax incentives are provided in Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and the 
European Commission (2008). Both explain the different approaches undertaken in 
the evaluations, their advantages and benefits. The survey by Hall and Van Reenen is 
the only one that gives a quantitative assessment of how much additional R&D 
expenditure is induced by R&D tax credits. They conclude that one dollar spent on 
R&D tax credits translates in about one additional dollar spent in private R&D. Based 
on evidence presented in more recent studies this report concludes that the impact of 
R&D tax credits probably is smaller. 
The report of European Commission (2008) discusses the advantages and 
shortcomings of each evaluation method. They conclude that there is no one ‘perfect’ 
way how to assess the effectiveness of the schemes and that the evaluation is 
challenged by various data and methodological limitations. To increase our 
understanding about the impact of R&D tax incentive designs, comparability across 
studies should be promoted through exploiting similar data and methodologies.  
Lokshin and Mohnen (2008) and Hall and Van Reenen (2000) note that measuring the 
bang-for-the-buck (BFTB) is important, but that this does not replace social cost-
benefit analysis. Even if the BFTB lies below one, the scheme may still result in 
generating higher welfare due to the positive spillover effects. 
                                           
11See Hall (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000), Ientile and Mairesse (2009), Köhler et al. 
(2012), Mohnen et al. (Mohnen and Lokshin, 2011), Parsons and Phillips (2007), 
Lester and Warda (2014), OECD (2013b), Deloitte (2014), and European Commission 
(2008). 
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OECD is providing overviews of R&D tax incentive schemes in OECD and selected 
other countries on a frequent basis. The most recent report that focuses on 
investment in knowledge capital, growth and innovation, concludes that R&D tax 
incentives are effective in promoting more R&D investment, but that the impact is 
sensitive to policy design and implementation (OECD, 2013b). For example, the 
positive impacts can be largely diminished, if schemes are changed frequently. Young 
firms can be supported by cash-refunds and carry-over provisions. Direct subsidies 
may be more beneficial for young firms since they usually need upfront funding to 
start a project. Incremental schemes are advocated by the OECD, as they result in 
lower government cost and dead-weight loss. In this report we do not find clear 
evidence favouring incremental schemes above volume-based schemes. 
The OECD report criticizes the usage of patent boxes. They argue that firms can use 
patent boxes for profit-shifting operations and that it leads to tax competition between 
the countries. All this may result in overall lower welfare. The conclusion by the OECD 
is compatible with studies surveys in this report. 
1.6 Outline 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Chapter two reviews the evidence 
on the effects of R&D tax credits on R&D expenditure, innovation, productivity and 
welfare. It also compares R&D tax incentives with direct subsidies. Chapter 3 
considers the relation between corporate taxation and the location of R&D activity and 
patents. Here, the effects of patent boxes are also discussed. In Chapter 4 challenges 
for future evaluation studies are discussed. An overview of R&D tax incentives in EU 
and selected OECD countries can be found in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 principles for 
good practices regarding R&D tax incentives are discussed and both instruments and 
countries are ranked according to those principles. Chapter 7 concludes. For ten tax 
incentives, a detailed assessment is provided in the Annex on good practice cases 
(separate document). An overview and discussion of R&D tax incentives for each 
country can also be found in the Annex (separate document). 
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2 Impact of R&D tax credits and allowances 
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives is concentrated on 
the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D expenditure. The reason for this probably is that 
R&D tax credits are the most prevalent R&D tax incentive and that its impact on R&D 
expenditure is much easier to identify than its impact on innovation and economic 
growth. 
Nevertheless, there are plenty of challenges to overcome when studying the effect of 
R&D tax credits on R&D expenditure and as a consequence there is a wide range of 
estimation results to consider. The next sections will provide an in-depth discussion of 
this literature, in order to give the interested reader insight in which results are more 
probable. 
2.1 Impact on R&D expenditure 
The literature on the quantitative evaluation of R&D tax credits usually is divided into 
two strands. Both approaches estimate an equation that predicts R&D expenditure 
through different firm-, time- and location- specific factors. The two approaches 
broadly differ in the way the information about the presence of R&D tax incentives is 
introduced. The first approach assesses the response in a firm’s R&D expenditure to 
changes in the user-cost of R&D capital. The user cost of capital can be defined as the 
‘actual costs’ of R&D faced by firm, where an R&D tax credit is one of the 
determinants, next to the wage rate of researchers and the price of equipment (Hall 
and Van Reenen, 2000).  
The coefficient that is usually estimated with this strategy is the elasticity of R&D 
expenditure with respect to the user cost of capital. For a tax credit to be effective in 
increasing R&D expenditure the expected sign of the elasticity is negative; ‘other 
things being equal’ a decrease in the costs of R&D is expected to lead to an increase in 
expenditure on R&D. We will refer to this estimation strategy as the “structural 
approach” because it relies on an explicit economic model. 
Sometimes also estimates of “input additionality” are published, which are calculated 
after estimation using the user cost elasticity. Input additionality (or bang-for-the-
buck, BFTB) is defined as the firm’s R&D expenditure that can be attributed to the 
policy intervention relative to the size of the tax credit itself. If a firm spends every 
euro it saves on taxes on R&D, then input additionality is equal to one; if the firm 
spends ten percent more than it receives as a tax credit, input additionality is 1.1. 
With the second approach, R&D expenditure is regressed directly on a variable that 
accounts for the presence or strength of the R&D tax credit. The estimated coefficient 
on the tax incentive usually can be directly interpreted as the input additionality of the 
R&D tax credit. We will refer to this estimation strategy as the “direct approach”. 
Besides the apparent differences in the interpretation of the estimated coefficients 
between the two approaches, there are other, more fundamental, differences. Each 
approach has its own set of assumptions on which the demand equation for R&D is 
based and each approach has its own econometric challenges. For these reasons, we 
present the results from the two approaches separately. We start by reviewing key 
studies, followed by a discussion of the wider literature. 
2.1.1 Structural approach 
The structural approach models R&D expenditure as a function of different firm-
specific explanatory variables and a price index of R&D inputs - the user cost of R&D 
capital. In some studies R&D tax incentives are explicitly incorporated in the price 
index, whereas in other studies only more general factors like the wage rate for 
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researchers are included (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). If the input price index 
includes the firm’s R&D tax incentive, then the effect of a change in the incentive can 
be directly calculated using the estimated coefficients and the data used for 
estimation. A complete incorporation of R&D tax policy into the user cost of R&D 
capital can be difficult when, for example, carry back and carry forward are possible. 
If no information on R&D tax incentives has been included in the user cost of capital, 
measuring their effectiveness involves two steps. First, the elasticity of the user cost 
of R&D capital to R&D expenditure is measured. Second, the impact of an R&D tax 
incentive on R&D expenditure can be inferred from the estimation results and the 
calculated change in user costs of R&D capital due to the tax incentive. 
The advantage of the structural approach is that it allows for a more complete 
understanding on how changes in tax incentives impact R&D expenditure since it is 
integrated with other R&D costs faced by firms. It also permits estimation of short and 
long run effects, where the short-run typically refers to one year and the long-run 
refers to five to fifteen years. 
A difficulty of the structural approach is that the user cost is determined 
simultaneously with the R&D level. Depending on the context, there can be various 
reasons why the R&D level affects the user cost of R&D capital, such that the causality 
runs both ways. In particular, a number of R&D tax credit schemes share the 
characteristic that the size of the tax credit is dependent on the amount of R&D 
performed. The user cost of R&D capital thus increases with the level of R&D 
expenditure, which leads to potential underestimation of the effectiveness of the tax 
credit.  
Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) avoid this endogeneity problem by using instrumental 
variable (IV) estimation techniques in a study of the Dutch payroll withholding tax 
credit (WBSO). On average, they find that a ten percent decrease in the user-cost of 
R&D capital induced by the tax credit leads to four percent more R&D capital in the 
short run (after one year) and six percent more in the long run (after fifteen years).  
They also calculated the input additionality by simulating a removal in the incentive 
scheme using their estimates of the user cost of R&D capital elasticities. As firms need 
time to adjust their R&D capital to the new optimum, they will first reduce their R&D 
expenditure strongly and then slowly increase their investment levels until the new 
desired level of R&D capital has been reached. Over the first four years after the 
removal the input additionality was about one, while after fifteen years the 
additionality declined to 0.5 and was not statistically different from zero. The tax 
credit had a positive long-term impact on small firms, but not on larger companies.  
Mulkay and Mairesse (2013) studied the R&D tax credit in France in the period 
between 2000 and 2007. They apply three different techniques (fixed effects, first-
differences and GMM) and find a long-run elasticity of R&D capital with respect to the 
user cost of R&D capital of -0.2. This means that a decrease in the user cost of ten 
percent will induce a level of R&D capital that is two percent higher. In addition, they 
simulated the expected effects from the 2008 reform in the French incentive 
programme12 and concluded that in the long-run the reform would stimulate R&D 
expenditure by twelve percent. This corresponds to a long-run input additionality of 
0.7. 
                                           
12 French R&D tax credit (CIR) was incremental until 2003, when the volume based 
part was introduced alongside. It was then reformed to be fully volume based in 2008.  
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In an older paper Bloom et al. (2002) analyzed the impact of changes in R&D tax 
credits on R&D expenditure at the industry level for a panel of nine OECD countries13. 
They found that, on average, a ten percent decrease in the user cost of R&D capital 
increased the R&D capital stock by around one percent in the short run and ten 
percent in the long run. 
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the estimated effects found in studies that use the 
structural approach. The negative estimates shown in this table imply a positive effect 
of R&D tax incentives on R&D expenditure. Although estimated elasticities range from 
-4.4 to -0.03, the more reliable studies (see below) tend to report elasticities between 
-0.6 and -0.1. The results obtained in the studies suggest that R&D tax incentives lead 
to an increase in the level R&D expenditure of firms with a long-run input additionality 
that probably lies below one (Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), Mulkay and Mairesse 
(2013)). 
The long-run effects reported in Table 2.1 tend to be substantially larger than the 
short-run effects (i.e. long-run elasticities are smaller). The reason for this is that it 
takes time for firms to adjust their R&D capital stock to the new user cost. The 
relation between the (long-run) user cost of R&D capital elasticity and input 
additionality is not straightforward and requires a numerical simulation. The numerical 
simulation by Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) suggests an input additionality that lies 
below one in the long run given their long-run elasticity estimate of -0.63. Similarly, 
Mulkay and Mairesse (2013) find an long-run elasticity of -0.28 and conclude from a 
simulation of a policy reform that the input additionality of the new policy would be 
0.7. 
Table 2.1 also summarizes the methodological characteristics of studies. Studies using 
GMM tend to produce the largest estimated effects (typically elasticities smaller than 
minus one), while studies using a fixed effect estimator lead to the smallest effects 
(elasticities around -0.2). 
Chapter 4 discusses reasons why estimates of effectiveness can be biased. Some of 
the studies could be substantially affected by one or more of these estimation 
problems, especially failure to take reverse causality into account and selection bias. 
Studies that adopt econometric strategies to avoid these problems include Lokshin and 
Mohnen (2012) and Mulkay and Mairesse (2013). In these studies, instrumental 
variable techniques are applied in a credible way, yielding robust results with small 
standard errors. 
 
  
                                           
13 The countries included: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, 
United Kingdom, and United States. 
  
Table 2.1 Estimates of the user cost of R&D capital elasticity (negative estimate implies positive effect) 
Study Published
c 
Country Period Scheme Obs. 
level 
Method Dependent 
variable 
Mean result 
short-run long-run 
Baghana and Mohnen (2009) yes Quebec 1997-2003 incremental, volume firm OLS log R&D level -0.08 -0.12 
Bloom et al. (2002) yes OECD 1979-1999 incremental, volume industry IV log R&D level -0.25 -0.97 
Caiumi  (2011) no Italy 1998-2005 Volume firm matching; GMM log R&D level  -0.30 -0.60 
Corchuelo, Martinez-Ros 
(2009) 
no Spain 1990-1998 incremental, volume firm selection model; IV log R&D level -1.09
a
  
Corchuelo, Martinez-Ros 
(2009) 
no Spain 2002 incremental, volume firm selection model; IV log R&D level -0.47
a
  
Dagenais et al. (1997) no Canada 1975-1992 Volume firm IV log R&D level -0.07
a
  
Harris et al. (2009) yes North. Ireland 1998-2003 Volume firm GMM log R&D level -0.53 -1.37 
HMRC (2010) no United Kingdom 2003-2007 enhanced allowance, 
volume 
firm  GMM log R&D level Total: 
-0.91
b
 
SME scheme: 
-2.32 
Large: 
-2.41 
 
Total: 
 -2.60
b
 
SME scheme: 
-2.16 
Large: 
-3.65 
Koga (2003) yes Japan 1989-1999 incremental firm IV log R&D level -0.61
a
  
Lokshin and Mohnen (2012) yes Netherlands 1996-2004 volume firm IV log R&D level -0.38 -0.63 
Mulkay and Mairesse (2003) no France 1982-1996 incremental firm fixed effects log R&D level -0.14 -0.05 
Mulkay and Mairesse (2008) no France 1983-2002 incremental firm fixed effects R&D intensity -0.14 -0.28 
Mulkay and Mairesse (2013) yes France 2000-2007 incremental, volume firm fixed effects; GMM log R&D level  -0.16 
Parisi and Sembenelli (2001) no Italy 1992-1997 volume firm Tobit, rand. eff. log R&D level -4.36
a
  
Poot et al. (2003) no Netherlands 1997-1998 volume firm OLS log R&D level -0.11 -1.12 
Rao (2013) no United States 1981-1991 incremental firm IV R&D intensity -1.64  
Westmore (2013) no OECD 1983-2008 incremental, volume country  OLS log R&D level -0.03 -0.88 
Wilson (2009) yes United States 1981-2004 incremental firm OLS log R&D level -1.21 -2.18 
a
 Short-run or long-run not specified; 
b
 Estimates that assumed endogenous user-cost elasticity; 
c 
Study has been published in peer-reviewed journal 
 
 
 2.1.2 Direct approach 
The studies that follow the direct approach rely less on economic theory for 
identification of the impact of R&D tax credits than the structural approach. Usually, 
they explicitly compare the R&D expenditure of a ‘treatment’ group with that of a 
‘control’ group. Studies differ primarily with regard to how those two groups are 
defined. Some studies simply compare firms that received and did not receive the R&D 
tax incentive (binary regression). Other studies use more elaborate identification 
strategies, like matching or difference-in-difference (DID). 
Matching techniques first estimate a model that predicts the usage of tax incentives 
given firm characteristics. In a second step recipient companies are matched with non-
recipient companies that share similar observable characteristics or have 
approximately the same probability ratio of being an R&D tax recipient firm. The effect 
of the tax incentive is then estimated by comparing the R&D performance between the 
matched companies.  
Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2009) introduced such approach in their study on 
Spanish R&D tax credits. They find that that the impact was positive only for large 
firms and firms in high to medium technology sectors. Caiumi (2011) combined 
matching techniques and structural modelling to estimate the effects of R&D tax 
credits in Italy. She first analyzes the characteristics of firms using the tax credits and 
then matches beneficiary and non-beneficiary firms to compare the results obtained 
through a model introduced by Mulkay and Mairesse (2003). The estimated BFTB 
showed that 1 euro of tax foregone resulted in an additional 0.86 Euros spent of R&D.  
By itself, matching techniques do not explain why some companies receive a tax 
incentive while other apparently similar companies do not. The (unknown) reason for 
receiving treatment might also have consequences for firm performance. For example, 
a talented entrepreneur might run an innovative company, but might also be more 
inclined to apply for a tax credit. Matching techniques by themselves do not correct for 
this self-selection of firms into the treatment group. 
A strategy that exploits natural experiments in order to account for self-selection is 
the difference-in-differences (DID) estimator. It focuses on firms that had very similar 
R&D behaviour (and company characteristics) before an introduction or change of a 
policy that affected only part of this group of firms. If unaffected firms (the control 
group) spend less on R&D than the firms that were affected by the policy change (the 
treatment group), it can be concluded that the (change in) policy is effective. 
DID was applied by Cornet and Vroomen (2005) to the reform of the Dutch WBSO 
program in 2001. This reform involved the introduction of a special tax credit for start-
up firms and an extension of the first tax-credit bracket. They use these policy 
changes and the specific discontinuous design of the instrument to define the control 
and treatment groups.  
They found that the introduction of the start-up scheme induced an increase in the 
R&D wage bill of between ten and twenty percent. They also calculated the BFTB that 
showed that on average a euro spent in terms of foregone tax revenue induced 
between 50 to 80 eurocents of additional labour expenditure. The extension of the tax 
bracket, however, showed that every tax euro lost resulted in only 10 to 20 eurocent 
spent on labour costs (Cornet and Vroomen, 2005). 
Even though studies that estimate the effect of R&D tax credits directly use a wide 
variety of methods, the literature seems to agree that R&D tax credits tend to increase 
R&D expenditure. Table 2.2 gives an overview of these studies. The magnitude of the 
estimated effects is difficult to compare. We can only compare studies that report an 
estimate of the BFTB. Among these studies the BFTB range from 0.15 to 3.5. The 
highest estimates are found by Dumont (2013). The outcomes of this study are 
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probably biased upwards because of an endogeneity problem in the regression 
specification as the level of R&D expenditure is regressed on the level of the benefit 
received. 
Various econometric techniques have been used for direct estimation of the effect of 
R&D tax credits. Matching techniques clearly are the most popular. Most of these 
studies, however, do not exploit exogenous variation and are therefore sensitive to 
the selection bias discussed earlier.14 The study by Cornet and Vroomen (2005) is a 
good (and rare) example of a study that uses difference-in-difference with properly 
defined control group.  
Taken together, both structural and direct studies provide evidence that R&D tax 
incentives induce more R&D expenditure. However, the studies that better correct for 
econometric problems, including endogeneity bias and selection effects, tend to find 
an input additionality below one (Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), Mulkay and Mairesse 
(2013), Cornet and Vroomen (2005)).  
A more formal assessment of literature requires a meta analysis. The tentative meta 
analysis by Ientile and Mairesse (2009) shows that studies with low standard errors 
have an input additionality below one (see Figure 2 in their paper). The meta analysis 
by Castellacci and Lie (2013) find a corrected elasticity of the user costs of R&D capital 
of -0.23 and a corrected additionality ratio of 0.03. Meta analysis by Gaillard-Ladinska, 
Non and Straathof (2014) shows that reported estimates are often inflated 
substantially due to publication selection bias15. When accounting for this bias, the 
effect on R&D expenditure is positive but modest. 
                                           
14 See also Chapter 4. 
15 Stanley (2008) define Publication selection bias or the “file drawer problem” as “the 
consequence of choosing research papers for the statistical significance of their 
findings”. Publication bias also applies to individual estimation results when they are 
not reported by researchers because of their statistical insignificance or magnitude. 
  
Table 2.2 Direct estimates of treatment effects of R&D tax incentives 
Study Published
b 
Country Period Scheme Obs. 
level 
Method Dep. variable Measure Mean result 
Aralica et al. (2013) yes Croatia 2007-2009 volume firm matching   Treatment effect 0.14 
Aralica et al. (2011) no Croatia 2007-2009 volume firm survey/tax record 
analysis 
R&D level BFTB 1.19 
Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros 
(2009) 
no Spain 2002 mixed firm matching log R&D level Treatment effect 0.66 
Cornet and Vroomen (2005) no Netherlands 1994-2004 volume firm diff-in-diff, first diff. log R&D 
wages 
BFTB 0.15 
startups: 0.65 
De Jong et al. (2007) no Netherlands 2001-2005 volume firm fixed effects log R&D 
wages 
BFTB 1.72 
Duguet (2012) yes France 1993-2003 incremental firm binary; matching R&D growth BFTB 1 
Dumont (2013) yes Belgium 2001-2009 volume firm panel, selection model log R&D level BFTB research coop.: 2.22 
young innov.: 0.79 
PhD: 3.50 
master: 0.82  
Hægeland and Moen (2007a) no Norway 1993-2005 volume firm diff-in-diff log R&D level Treatment effect 1.34 
Hallépée and Garcia (2012) 
a
 no France 2002-2005 volume firm matching employment Treatment effect >1 
Ho (2006) no United States 1963-1999 incremental firm matching; diff-in-diff log R&D level Treatment effect 0.07 
Kasahara et al. (2013) yes Japan 2000-2003 volume firm selection model; GMM log R&D level Elasticity pooled 1.58 
Klassen et al. (2004) yes United States, 
Canada 
1991-1997 incremental, 
volume 
firm fixed effects log R&D level Elasticity pooled 1.81 
Lee (2011) yes Japan, Canada, 
Korea, Taiwan, 
China, India 
1997 incremental, 
volume 
firm GMM, IV R&D intensity Elasticity pooled 0.18 
Lhuillery et al. (2013) no France 1993-2009 volume firm matching R&D level Treatment effect small firms: -1.10 
medium firms: -0.71 
large firms:  0.50 
Verhoeven et al. (2012)  no Netherlands 2006-2010 volume firm GMM log R&D 
wages 
BFTB 1.77 
Yohei (2011) no Japan 2006-2009 mixed firm matching R&D intensity Treatment effect 1.25 
a
 standard errors and econometric specifications are not published; 
b 
Study has been published in peer-reviewed journal 
 2.1.3 Incremental and volume-based schemes 
Tax credits are implemented in two different ways: volume-based or incremental. The 
volume-based scheme applies to all qualified R&D expenditure, while an incremental 
scheme only applies to increases in R&D expenditure. In the latter case, the base 
amount on which the increment is calculated is a firm’s average expenditure either in 
some fixed period of time (for example between 2010 and 2012) or during the past 
few years (for example the last 3 years). 
As incremental schemes only apply to increases in a firm’s R&D activity, one might 
expect that the additional R&D expenditure induced by one euro of tax credit is larger 
for incremental schemes than for volume-based schemes (Lokshin and Mohnen 2012). 
This line of reasoning does not take into account that firms consider the net present 
value of a tax credit rather than the tax credit they receive for the current year when 
they decide on investment in R&D. Firms that did not perform R&D before will be 
indifferent between an incremental and volume-based scheme as long as long as the 
expected net present value of the tax credit per extra euro spend on R&D today is the 
same. Incremental tax credits will only save government expenses by decreasing the 
effective tax credit for firms that performed R&D at the time the scheme was 
introduced. 
Table 2.3 Mean user cost elasticities for volume-based and incremental schemes 
Scheme Short-run elasticity Long-run elasticity Number of studies 
 mean (sd) mean (sd)  
Volume -0.90 -1.48 8 
 (0.78) (1.06)  
Incremental -0.50 -0.84 3 
 (0.62) (1.17)  
All -0.78 -1.29 11 
 (0.73) (1.07)  
Note: the standard deviation across studies is given in parenthesis. 
 
Table 2.3 summarizes estimates of the elasticity of R&D expenditure to the user cost 
of R&D capital for both incremental and volume-based schemes. The mean elasticity 
for volume-based schemes is smaller than the mean elasticity found for incremental 
schemes, both in the short and long run. The difference in means is not statistically 
significant as standard deviation of estimates across studies is large. In particular, if 
we would remove the study by HMRC (2010) then the mean for volume-based 
schemes exceeds the mean for incremental schemes. Altogether, there does not seem 
to be systematic evidence that elasticities for incremental schemes differ from those 
for volume-based schemes. 
There does not appear to be a consensus in the literature on this topic either. In a 
testimony for the United States Senate Committee on Finance, the OECD concluded 
that incremental schemes have an input additionality of above one, while volume-
based schemes have an additionality of below one (OECD, 2011). Also this conclusion 
was based on a small number of studies of different schemes. Lester and Warda 
(2014) arrive at a different conclusion. They show that for firms with a modest 
autonomous growth in R&D expenditure, the cost-effectiveness of incremental 
schemes is similar to volume-based schemes. As incremental schemes are more costly 
to administer, they conclude that “the case for incremental credits is far from 
compelling”. 
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2.1.4 Impact on wages 
The literature on input additionality discussed above evaluates the impact of R&D tax 
incentives on R&D expenditure. When R&D expenditure increases this can be due to 
more R&D but it can also be caused by an increase in prices of R&D inputs. Several 
studies have been concerned with such a price effects, focusing on the question by 
how much an increase in R&D spending is in part a reflection of an increase of the 
wages for R&D personnel. 
First to identify this phenomenon was Goolsbee (1998), who analyzed the total 
government expenditure on R&D in the United States during the period from 1968 to 
1994. He found that a rise in R&D expenditures by ten percent results in an immediate 
rise in the wages of researchers by one percent and by another two percent in the 
following four years. He concluded that by ignoring this effect, the additionality of 
public support for R&D may be overestimated by 30% to 50%. This effect was 
measured during a period with substantial variation on government expenditure, 
which might explain part of the size of the effect. 
More recently, Lokshin and Mohnen (2013) estimated that the elasticity between the 
effective rate of the Dutch payroll tax withholding R&D tax credit and average R&D 
wage is 0.2 in the long run. Such a positive relation was also found for the Norwegian 
SkatteFunn Scheme, where for every 100.000 Kroner per R&D man-year that a firm 
received through the tax credit, each R&D worker received about 33.000 as a wage 
increase (Hægeland and Møen, 2007a).  They also noted that this effect is largely 
driven by small and medium-sized companies, where the subsidy of 100.000 Kroner 
resulted in an average wage increase of 53.000 Kroner. 
Dumont (2013) confirmed the relationship between R&D tax credits and R&D wages 
for Belgium. One euro spent on a subsidy or partial exemption from advance payment 
is associated with a wage rise ranging from 0.15 to 0.45 euros. 
As most of the evidence discussed above applies to payroll withholding tax credits, it 
might be that the impact on wages of corporate income tax credits is different. As 
corporate income tax credits usually apply to both capital expenditure and researcher 
wages, it could be that researcher wages are less strongly affected by this type of tax 
credit and that the reverse applies for the prices of other types of R&D-inputs. 
The price effect of R&D tax incentives is not an undesirable feature, but a normal 
reaction in a market where demand becomes larger. The supply of specialized 
researchers and equipment needed to meet the rise in demand is not available 
overnight. Higher wages for R&D personnel will induce a larger supply of high-skilled 
workers, but will take years before supply is fully adjusted. 
Changes in R&D input prices are not taken into account with existing estimates of the 
effectiveness of tax credits, such that estimates of input additionality and the elasticity 
of the user cost of R&D capital discussed above overestimate the impact on R&D 
activity. The impact on wages is not unique to R&D tax incentives, but applies 
government expenditure on R&D in general. 
2.1.5 Behavioural impact 
Do R&D tax incentives motivate firms to start doing R&D or change their 
organizational practices in ways are more related with psychological factors than with 
cost-benefit analysis? Ernst (2011), analyzing a set of European firms, found that R&D 
tax incentives motivate firms to start investing in R&D. Others confirm the positive 
impact only among specific sub-populations of firms. Caiumi (2011) showed that 
medium-sized, start-ups and credit-constrained firms in Italy were more likely to 
invest in R&D in the presence of the R&D tax credit. In the evaluation of Norwegian 
 
 
 A Study on R&D Tax Incentives 
 
October 2014  36 
SkatteFUNN, the authors indicated that the strongest impact on behaviour was for 
firms without or with limited previous R&D activity (Hægeland and Møen, 2007). 
2.1.6 Impact heterogeneity  
Even though R&D tax incentives are generic in nature, they tend to have distinct 
impacts on different types of companies. The most widely studied firm characteristic in 
this context is firm size. In most countries small (and liquidity constrained) firms tend 
to respond more strongly to the R&D tax incentives (Kasahara et al. (2013) and Yohei 
(2011) for Japan; Lokshin and Mohnen (2012), for The Netherlands; Baghana and 
Mohnen (2009) for Canada; Bloom et al. (2002) for OECD countries). 
The opposite conclusion can be drawn for Spain (Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros, 2009), 
Belgium (Dumont, 2013) and France (Lhuillery et al., 2013). Here large firms tend to 
be more responsive to R&D tax incentives than small firms. For Italy the evidence is 
mixed. Caiumi (2010) finds that the impact on SMEs is stronger, while Cerulli and Poti 
(2012) conclude that large firms are more responsive. 
To complicate the overall picture, Streicher, Schibany and Gretzmacher (2004) found 
for Austria that small and large firms had higher input additionality than medium-sized 
enterprises. In contrast again, Lokshin and Mohnen (2007) found that the strongest 
impact on R&D expenditure was for medium-sized firms. They did not find an 
additional effect for large firms. 
A partial explanation for these contrasting findings is that in Spain and Italy small 
firms were less likely to know (and apply) for tax incentives (Corchuelo and Martínez-
Ros, 2009; Caiumi, 2010). 
The apparent disagreement amongst the studies on which type of firm is most 
responsive to R&D tax incentives, could reflect the importance of differences in the 
implementation and design of policy instruments as well as variation in general 
framework conditions. Also, failure to separate the effects on young firms from the 
effects on small firms could provide an explanation for these paradoxical findings: the 
proportion of innovative firms is likely to be larger among start-ups than the 
proportion of innovators among firms that are older but did not manage to grow. 
Targeting on young firms might be more efficient than targeting in small firms. 
However, few papers contain evidence on whether the impact of tax credits is related 
to firm age. Cornet and Vroomen (2005) evaluate the impact of the introduction of a 
more generous treatment for start-up firms in the Dutch payroll tax withholding credit 
(WBSO). They found that the start-up scheme induced between 50 to 80 eurocents of 
additional labour expenditure, which was substantially larger than the impact of the 
WBSO for medium-sized and large companies (10 to 20 eurocents). 
The impact of R&D tax credits might vary across sectors. Few studies, however, report 
estimates per industry. Deriving industry effects from differences in samples across 
studies is risky and requires a meta-analysis to be able to take into account other 
study-specific characteristics. Castellacci and Lie (2013) perform such an analysis and 
find that high-tech industries tend to be less responsive. Their conclusion, however, 
hinges on a very small number of observations on high-tech industries. 
It seems probable that the effectiveness of R&D tax will also vary across countries: 
this and other reports show that the differences in organization across countries can 
be substantial. In addition, countries have different economic characteristics and have 
different innovation systems. Harris et al. (2009), for example, study the effectiveness 
of an R&D tax credit for Northern Ireland, which can be considered a disadvantaged 
region within the United Kingdom. They conclude that the tax credit would have to be 
increased substantially in order to have a substantial impact on regional production 
and that such an increase would not be very cost-effective. 
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An assessment of differences across countries would require that a study be repeated 
in several countries. We have not found such a study. Also, we number of studies that 
are highly comparable in terms methodology is too small to be able to make a 
distinction between differences in results that are caused by methodology from 
differences caused by country characteristics. Another complication is that evaluations 
have only been performed for a small number of countries. Countries with poorly 
designed and implemented R&D tax incentives tend not to have been evaluated 
econometrically. 
2.2 Impact on innovation and productivity 
2.2.1 Innovation 
R&D expenditure is positively related to innovation (see Danguy et al., 2009 for a 
review), but this does not automatically imply that R&D tax incentives that raise R&D 
expenditure will also stimulate innovation. Several econometric studies have focused 
on the question whether R&D tax incentives indeed also induce firms to innovate 
more. The estimation strategies that have been followed are similar to the strategies 
found in the literature focusing on direct estimation of the impact on R&D expenditure. 
Innovation or another output indicator is regressed on an indicator for the R&D tax 
incentive and firm-, time-, and location-specific characteristics. 
Even though the effect of R&D tax incentives on innovation and other second-order, or 
“output”, effects can be estimated using the same approaches as with R&D 
expenditure, there are additional complications. First, one needs to define the 
‘innovative output’, which can be very broad set of outcomes. Most studies use patent 
applications, introduction or sales of new products. Second, the impact on output will 
take longer to materialize and might arrive more gradually than the impact on R&D 
expenditure. Third, the output of an R&D project is fundamentally uncertain: the 
intended innovation might not materialize or might not be a commercial success. 
These complications imply that the risk of biased or imprecise estimation results is 
larger than for studies focusing on R&D expenditure. 
Czarnitzki et al. (2011) examines the effect of R&D tax credits on innovation by 
Canadian manufacturing firms for the period from 1997 to 1999. They used a non-
parametric matching technique to compare firms that used the tax credit with firms 
that did not use it. As the authors acknowledge this approach is sensitive to selection 
bias on unobserved characteristics. Canadian firms Tax credit recipients realize a 
higher number of product innovations, as well as increased sales shares of new and 
improved products. The study finds that firms receiving a tax credit have a higher 
probability to introduce new products, both to the national Canadian market and to 
the world market. 
Ernst and Spengel (2011) use firm-level data from multiple European countries. They 
combine financial data on firms with firm-level patent data in order to test how a 
firm’s patenting activity responds to a change in R&D tax incentives and corporate tax 
burdens. R&D tax incentives are found to have a positive effect on patenting. The 
statutory corporate income tax rate has a negative impact on patenting. 
Westmore (2013) shows that R&D tax incentives are positively related with patenting 
in a country-level analysis of 19 OECD states. He estimated that a decrease in the B-
index16 of 0.05 raises the number of patents per capita by around 2.5 percent. Other 
                                           
16 The B-index is defined as the net present value of after-tax costs of spending one 
euro on R&D divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate. If the after-tax 
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evidence on a positive relation between R&D tax incentives and innovation is found by 
Aralica (2013) for Croatia, by De Jong and Verhoeven (2007) for The Netherlands. 
In contrast, Ernst et al. (2014) finds that R&D tax credits and tax allowances have a 
negative impact on patent quality17 for European corporations between 1998 and 
2007. This last study could indicate that while R&D tax incentives appear to be 
effective in increasing incremental innovations, they might not result in more radical 
innovations. For patent boxes they find a positive impact on the quality of patents. 
Overall, studies on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives tend to find a positive 
impact on innovation. Although the literature is not very large, this outcome appears 
to be relatively robust as various methods and data sources lead to similar 
conclusions. None of the studies reviewed has used exogenous variation to verify the 
causality of the relation. 
2.2.2 Productivity 
R&D can improve the efficiency of firms through process and product innovation. 
Process innovation can lead to more efficient production processes, while product 
innovation can increase the demand for the company’s products. Doraszelski and 
Jaumandreu (2013) conclude that R&D is a major determinant of variation in output 
productivity across firms and for the evolution of productivity of individual firms over 
time. 
The direct evidence on the impact of R&D tax incentives on productivity is limited. 
Caiumi (2011) found that the Italian R&D tax incentive program did overall raise the 
productivity of firms. The impact is, however, very heterogeneous across less and 
more productive firms. Caiumi notes that the impact was stronger for firms on the 
lower bound of the productivity distribution. 
Hallépée and Garcia (2012) present many results on the effects of the French R&D tax 
incentive for Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes (JEI). Using matching techniques they find 
an 8.4 percentage point increase in employment for treated firms, an increase of 
survival rate of firms, higher wages, and an input additionality exceeding one. The 
reliability of these findings, however, is unclear as estimation results and econometric 
specifications are not documented. 
Is the impact on productivity of R&D induced by tax incentives smaller than the impact 
of other R&D? Firms will pursue the most profitable R&D projects before they engage 
on less promising ones, such that the marginal returns to R&D are decreasing. This 
has implications for the expected impact of R&D tax incentives on productivity: 
additional R&D expenditure induced by the incentive is likely to be less productive 
than the firm’s average (Ientile and Mairesse, 2009). Empirical evidence does not 
seem to support this hypothesis. Cappelen et al. (2007) show that R&D induced by the 
Norwegian R&D tax incentives contributes in the same way to productivity as other 
R&D. 
                                                                                                                               
costs per euro R&D expenditure are equal to the income tax rate, the B-index is equal 
to one. The interpretation of this case is that R&D expenditure is not treated 
differently from other costs. A B-index smaller than one indicates that R&D 
expenditure is treated more favourably than other costs. 
17 Measured as combined index of forward citations, family size and the number of 
technical fields that serves as an indicator for the product’s potential profitability 
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2.3 Tax incentives versus direct subsidies 
2.3.1 What policy instruments do firms choose? 
Even when a firm is eligible for both a subsidy and a tax credit, it might not apply for 
both with the same probability. The take-up rates for subsidies and R&D tax incentives 
might differ with the type of firms (Busom et al., 2012; Duguet, 2012; Corchuelo and 
Martinez-Ros, 2009). In Spain small and financially constrained firms were more likely 
to use R&D subsidies than tax incentives. SMEs that had innovative products (and that 
used IPR to protect them) were more likely to use R&D tax incentives than subsidies 
(Busom et al., 2012). Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros (2009) showed that in Spain R&D 
tax incentives and subsidies also are complements since firms that receive a grant are 
more likely to also apply for an R&D tax incentive.  
In France the opposite seems to be true. Duguet (2012) noted that in France R&D tax 
credit recipients tend to be smaller and have a higher R&D intensity in comparison to 
companies using R&D subsidies. Whether firms apply for a subsidy or tax incentive 
probably is largely determined by the way these instruments are designed and 
implemented. 
2.3.2 Effectiveness of direct subsidies 
There is a long standing discussion on whether direct subsidies generate more R&D 
than tax incentives, or vice versa. Governments should in principle be able to target 
these projects with the highest marginal social rates of return via direct subsidies 
(David et al., 2000). With tax incentives this is more difficult, since the general nature 
of tax incentives allows firms to expand their R&D activity in areas with high private 
rates of return (in the short-run). On the other hand, firms might lobby successfully 
for subsidies that are in their interest, possibly diverting subsidies in ways not 
conducive to innovation - an argument made by Hall and Van Reenen (2000). 
The empirical literature comparing the effectiveness of grants and tax incentives 
directly is limited in size. A firm level study of Norwegian firms suggests that tax 
credits appeared to have a slightly larger effect than direct support measures 
(Hægeland and Møen, 2007b). Empirical findings from a panel of 19 OECD countries 
indicate that direct support seems to have a larger impact than (volume-based) R&D 
tax incentives (Westmore, 2013). Instrument design and implementation might be 
more important determinants of additionality than whether the instrument is a direct 
subsidy or a tax incentive. 
David et al. (2000) review the literature on the effectiveness of public expenditure on 
R&D in general. They conclude that findings in the literature are ambiguous and that 
more sound econometric studies are needed to find a definitive answer to this 
question. A recent survey by Zuniga-Vicente et al. (2012) confirms the heterogeneity 
in outcomes also for recent studies. They report that 71 studies report 
complementarity between public subsidies and private R&D, while 23 studies point 
towards crowding out. 24 studies did not find a significant effect. The majority of 
studies (sixty percent) points to effectiveness of R&D subsidies. 
In a meta-analysis of this literature García-Quevedo (2004) could not explain the 
heterogeneity in results by methodological differences in studies. Zuniga-Vicente et al. 
(2012) arrive at the same conclusion. This means that the heterogeneity in the 
effectiveness of R&D subsidies probably is due to differences in policy instruments and 
country characteristics. 
The outcomes of recent studies fit within the pattern that instrument and country 
characteristics are likely to be crucial for effectiveness. Takalo, Tanayama, and 
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Toivanen (2013) estimate the expected welfare effects of Finnish R&D subsidies. They 
find that the social rate of return on the subsidy program is between thirty and fifty 
percent. The authors note that spillover effects and application costs vary widely 
between firms and the spillover effects are somewhat smaller than the private benefits 
accruing to subsidized firms. Czarnitzki and Lopes-Bento (2013) reject the hypothesis 
that Flemish R&D subsidies completely crowds out investment in private R&D.  
Another recent study does not find clear evidence on the effectiveness of R&D 
subsidies. Cerulli and Poti (2012) find that Italian public subsidies hardly affect R&D 
intensity and R&D per employee, while the evidence for an impact on R&D expenditure 
is mixed. 
2.3.3 Multiple treatments 
Frequently, firms will be able to use both subsidies and tax incentives, but studies that 
evaluate the returns to R&D tax incentives rarely take into account multiple 
treatments. Ignoring multiple treatments might lead to biases in estimation results as 
other evidence suggests that there are notable differences between firms that use only 
one and firms that use more measures (Corchuelo and Martinez-Ros, 2009; Dumont, 
2013).  
Dumont found that firms who used just one of the policy tools had the highest 
additional effect. Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) find that Canadian firms benefiting from 
both tax incentives and direct grants introduced more new products to the market 
than firms that only benefited from R&D tax incentives. The limited empirical evidence 
indicates that interactions between different policy measures probably exist. The 
importance and direction of interaction effects depends off course on the national 
setting and the characteristics of specific instruments, but policy makers should be 
aware of unintended side effects when multiple treatments are provided to firms. 
2.4 General welfare effects 
2.4.1 Evidence on private and social rates of return to R&D 
Even if the evidence that R&D tax incentives lead to more innovation would be clear, 
this does not automatically imply that R&D tax incentives are good policy. Direct 
effectiveness of tax incentives are just a first requirement for having a positive impact 
on welfare.  
Another requirement is that firms actually innovate insufficiently from society’s 
perspective i.e. that markets fail. In a review of the literature Hall et al. (2009) find 
that, although estimates of the social rate of return to R&D largely apply to the 
manufacturing sector and are “variable and imprecisely measured in many cases”, 
they tend to exceed estimates of the private rate of return to R&D. They do not offer a 
quantitative estimate of the relationship, indicating that “there is nothing like a single 
private “rate of return” that is close to a cost of R&D capital”. Parsons and Phillips 
(2007) report a specific number: the median social rate of return found in the 
literature they surveyed is 56 percent. 
A recent study by Bloom et al. (2013) on firms in the United States between 1981 and 
2001 confirms the conclusion that the social rate of return exceeds the private rate. 
They show that the social returns to R&D are at least twice as high as private returns. 
Depending on the methodological approach, the private returns aggregated across all 
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firms are between 21 percent and 39 percent. While social returns vary between 55 
percent and 59 percent.18  
The gap between social and private returns to R&D is more profound for large firms 
than small firms. They divide firms in quartiles according to their size and find that the 
private returns of largest firms are around 21 percent, while social around 67 percent. 
For smallest firms, private returns similarly make 21 percent, while social are only 
around 27 percent. Large firms are active in technological fields in which many other 
firms are active as well. Small firms tend to focus to ‘niche’ markets and generate less 
knowledge spillovers (Bloom et al., 2013). 
2.4.2 Social cost-benefit analysis 
It is informative to know how much R&D a euro spent on R&D tax incentives induces, 
but it is only part of the analysis required to draw conclusions on their social impact. 
Even when input additionality is below one, the social rate of return on R&D could be 
such that the net welfare gain of the policy is positive.  
Whether an R&D tax incentive should be introduced or continued or not, requires the 
social benefits of the incentive exceeding the social costs. Only few authors have 
attempted such a complete assessment and their results are rather inconclusive, 
reflecting the intrinsic methodological difficulties. One example of social cost-benefit 
analysis is by Parsons and Phillips (2007) who analyzed the Canadian tax credit 
system. They evaluated the program, taking into account four aspects: (1) 
relationship between firm R&D expenditure and the R&D price; (2) the spillover effects 
from additional R&D expenditure; (3) the costs of the increased tax burden; and (4) 
the administrative and compliance costs of the tax credit. They conclude that the tax 
incentive has a positive welfare effect of eleven cents for every dollar spent in terms 
of lost tax revenue. However, they also show that the results are highly sensitive to 
model specification.  
A social cost-benefit analysis by Cornet (2001) shows that the welfare effects of Dutch 
WBSO program are rather unclear and can be negative, depending on the model 
specification and the target group analyzed. Another social cost-benefit analysis for 
WBSO was performed by Lokshin and Mohnen (2009). They showed that even if the 
BFTB falls below one, the general welfare effect can still be positive due to spillover 
effects. Following Parsons and Phillips (2007), they estimate the net welfare effect and 
conclude that the Dutch WBSO program resulted in a 16 percent net welfare gain.  
They also simulate several marginal policy changes and show that a 2 percent 
increase in first bracket rate would result in an increased R&D expenditure for small 
firms by 2.5 percent in the short-run and then would decline to around 1.3% in the 
long-run. The effect for large companies would be very minimal. Atkeson and Burstein 
(2011) analyzed the long run impact of a change in innovation policies. They identified 
that the federal R&D support was positively associated with innovative activity. 
However, they also find very strong negative relation between corporate income tax 
and innovation, additionally demonstrating that in case of too high corporate tax 
system the positive impacts of the R&D support diminishes. 
2.4.3 Aggregate impact and stability 
A few studies focused on the aggregate impact of (changes in R&D tax incentives). 
Westmore (2013), for example, showed that an increase in the generosity of R&D tax 
                                           
18 Private and social returns are defined as the return to a marginal United States 
dollar spent on R&D. 
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incentives by six percent - reflecting an increase of the benefit level in the United 
States to the level of Japan in 2008 - would increase aggregate R&D expenditure by 
around six percent in the long run. 
In a recent OECD study, Bravo-Biosca et al. (2013) conclude that more generous R&D 
fiscal support is correlated with lower productivity and on aggregate lower 
employment growth. The only subgroup whose employment growth is positively 
related with more generous R&D tax incentives is incumbent firms. More generous 
R&D tax incentives were strongly negatively related with high-growth firms.  
They also compared the impact of R&D tax benefits in the most and least R&D-
intensive industries (computers and construction, respectively) in the countries with 
the most and least generous R&D tax credits (Spain and Italy, respectively). More 
generous benefits turned out to be positively associated with growth of companies 
operating in less R&D-intensive sectors. The results of Bravo-Biosca et al. indicate that 
the studied R&D tax incentives are supporting incumbent firms and raise barriers for 
innovative entrants.  
Decisions on R&D are characterized by long-term commitment and investments. In 
such setting, the predictability of a policy instrument is crucial for its effectiveness. 
Westmore (2013) demonstrated for the panel of OECD countries that the beneficial 
effects of R&D tax credits were greatly reduced when an instrument was modified 
frequently. 
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3 Corporate taxation and the location of R&D activity 
and patents 
3.1 Sensitivity of location to corporate taxation 
A large body of literature has documented that differences in corporate taxes are 
important for the location of a firm’s capital and profits (see a survey of empirical 
literature in Devereux and Maffini (2007), De Mooij and Ederveen (2003).19  Countries 
offering lower corporate tax rates attract more capital and profits from multinationals. 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) performed a meta-analysis of studies on the impact of 
corporate taxes. They find that a decrease by one percentage point in the host-
country tax rate leads to an increase of foreign direct investment by around 3.3 
percent. Devereux and Maffini (2007) do not quantify the relationship between tax 
rates and the location of capital and profit since the results varied widely across 
countries and periods, as well as across methodologies.  
Several studies identified that R&D activities and related income are especially 
sensitive to corporate taxes (Desai et al., 2006; Stöwhase, 2002; Grubert and 
Slemrod, 1998). (Grubert, 2003) studied parent companies from the United States 
and their manufacturing subsidiaries and found that R&D related intangible assets 
were responsible for around half of the income that was shifted from high-tax to low-
tax countries. Transactions among the affiliations of a firm are hard to tax properly as 
it is difficult to assess the price of services within a firm. The reason for this is that 
intangible property transferred within a firm is very firm-specific. A comparable 
transfer may not exist in the market, and its price is therefore not observed (see for 
more discussion on this and firms’ profit-shifting strategies in Griffith et al. (2014), 
Ernst and Spengel (2011), Dischinger and Riedel (2011) and OECD (2013a; 2013a).  
Bloom and Griffith (2001) affirm the ‘footloose’ nature of R&D activities by looking at a 
panel of European countries. Within a multinational group, R&D activities are not only 
sensitive to domestic user-cost but also to one at foreign affiliates, shifting to places 
with lower user-cost20. For states in the United States, Wilson (2009) finds that R&D 
tax incentives attract R&D from other states, while the overall amount of R&D is not 
affected. He concludes that incentives are “a zero-sum game among states”. 
Dischinger and Riedel (2011) provide evidence that European multinational companies 
do involve in profit-shifting activities. They show that the intangible asset investment 
flows to those affiliates that, relative to other subsidiaries, have lower tax rate. 
Quantitatively, “a 1 percentage point decrease in the average tax rate differential with 
the other subsidiaries21 translates in 1.7% increase in the stock of intangible assets in 
the lower-tax subsidiary” (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011).  
The location of patent applications by European corporations is also responsive to 
corporate income tax rates (OECD, 2013b). Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) estimated 
that an increase of one percentage point in the corporate tax rate results in a fall in 
the number of patent applications of 3.5 to 3.8 percent. Griffith et al. (2014) analyze 
variations in tax rates across countries. They find that the share of patent locations in 
Luxembourg is most responsive to tax rates, while in Germany they are least 
                                           
19Earlier surveys of the impact of taxes on the location of FDI  include Devereux and 
Griffith (2002), Newlon (2000) and Hines (1997, 1999). 
20 they instrument user-cost with corporate tax rate 
21 “Average tax difference to all other affiliates calculated as: corporate tax rate of the 
considered subsidiary minus the unweighted average corporate tax rate of all other 
group” (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011) 
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affected.22 A one percentage point increase in the corporate tax rate in Luxembourg 
leads to a 3.9 percent decrease in the share of patent applications, while in Germany 
this is only 0.5 percent.  
The number of patents registered in a country is not necessarily indicative of a 
country’s innovativeness for two reasons. First, patents are very heterogeneous in 
terms of the novelty and value of the underlying invention. Scherer et al. (2000) show 
that roughly ten percent of inventions are responsible for the majority of the total 
economic value of innovation. Harhoff et al. (1999) find that the commercial value of 
patents differs extensively and also identifies the skewness of the value distribution.  
Patents are also heterogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to corporate taxation. 
The valuable patents were found to be the more sensitive to corporate tax rates than 
patents that are not valuable. Ernst et al. (2014) find a negative relation between the 
corporate tax rate and the patent quality. Similarly, Griffith et al. (2014) show that the 
elasticity between the corporate tax and number of patent applications is largest for 
patents with higher potential profitability. 
The second reason why the number of patents registered in a country does not reflect 
its innovativeness is that the country from which a patent is applied for not necessarily 
the country (or countries) where the invention originated. For patents applications at 
the European Patent Office (EPO) the country of the inventor also is not a reliable 
source as applicants are not legally required to inform the EPO about the addresses of 
inventors. Especially larger companies might apply for patents from countries other 
than those where they perform their R&D as they tend to have a subsidiaries 
dedicated to IP-issues and because it is sometimes more advantageous to apply for a 
patent from a country with a patent box (see below). 
Corporate income taxes, of course, are not the only determinant of location of 
intangible assets. The strength of intellectual property rights, market size and degree 
of technological innovativeness23 were also found to play an important role. All these 
factors are found relate positively with the share of patent applications in most of the 
subgroups analysed (Griffith et al., 2014).  
The possibilities for tax planning not only lead to a loss of tax revenue, but might also 
distort competition. Large firms tend to have broader opportunities to shift operations 
across different affiliates. Mutti and Grubert (2009) document indirect evidence that 
American parent companies more frequently earned royalty income in foreign low-tax 
affiliates. Small firms usually do not have the same possibility for tax planning as large 
firms do, which puts them at a disadvantage and might reduce their incentives for 
innovation. 
Tax planning might also distort markets as some industries are more responsive to 
differences in corporate tax rates and rules than others. Griffith et al. (2014) conclude 
that electrical and engineering industries are more sensitive to changes in corporate 
tax than the chemical industry. 
It could be that tax planning has a smaller impact in Europe than in the United States. 
European firms appear to be more reluctant to shift the profits from headquarters than 
American firms. Dischinger et al. (2014) found that the profits of European 
multinationals tend to concentrate in their headquarters. They showed that the 
volume of profit-shifting from a higher-tax subsidiary to a lower-tax headquarter was 
                                           
22The analyzed countries included: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kindom 
and United States. 
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around seventy percent larger than the volume running from a high-tax headquarter 
to a low-tax subsidiary. This is consistent with the results of a study by Dischinger and 
Riedel (2011), which shows that the headquarters of European multinational firms are 
around thirty percent more profitable than their subsidiaries. This gap in profitability 
is, nevertheless, decreasing over time. 
In part, European companies could be more reluctant to shift profits due to controlled 
foreign company (CFC)24 rules. Various countries have implemented these rules in 
order to restrain the scope of profit shifting to tax havens. Bohm et al. (2012) found 
that CFC rules indeed limit the extent of profit-shifting and reduce the probability of 
patent relocation. As barriers to exit a country, also imply barriers to entry, CFC rules 
might make a country less attractive for foreign investment - also in R&D. 
3.2 Patent boxes 
A patent box is a tax incentive that offers a reduced corporate income tax rate for 
income derived from patents (it is called a box because there is a box to tick on the 
tax form). For most countries patent boxes are a relatively new scheme. So far a 
range of countries have adopted patent boxes, amongst them the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Luxemburg, Malta and Hungary. 
Patent boxes are a distinct category of R&D tax incentives because they offer a large 
scope for tax planning by firms. They are also part of the strategy of at least some 
countries to increase tax revenues from foreign companies. Especially for companies 
with many patents, it can be very difficult to assess what part of a company’s income 
is derived from which patent. This leaves much room for companies and governments 
to bargain on how much tax has to be paid. 
The rationale for patent boxes as a means to stimulate innovation seems to be absent 
as it is not clear which market failures patent boxes address. Once patented, an 
invention is protected from imitation, such that firms no longer have a disincentive to 
innovate. It is not clear why especially innovations for which clear property rights are 
defined should receive a tax incentive. By subsidizing inventions that do not need a 
subsidy, patent boxes would induce inventions that are difficult to patent (and 
therefore might have high spillovers) relatively less attractive. 
In the European context it has been discussed whether such special tax regimes could 
mainly benefit highly mobile businesses without triggering significant additional R&D 
activity. In the spring of 2014 the European Commission has probed into those 
schemes and requested information from several member states to analyze the true 
potential of patent boxes.25 
Griffith et al. (2014) have performed simulations of how the introduction of patent 
boxes in Benelux countries and United Kingdom would change the registered origin of 
patents. After the introduction of patent boxes in Benelux countries, all three countries 
would experience a substantial increase in the share of new patents, in particular for 
patents with higher expected payoffs. Without a patent box, the United Kingdom 
would see a decrease in the share of new patents. After the United Kingdom would 
have introduced a patent box as well, its share of new patents rises at the expense of 
the Benelux countries.  
                                           
24 CFC rules that are implemented in sever “high-tax” countries to limit the income 
shifting from their residence country to affiliates in low-tax countries 
25 Press release: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-309_en.htm 
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Regardless of the increase in the number of new patents registered domestically, all 
four countries would face a substantial net tax loss. Belgium and Luxembourg see a 
decrease of seventy percent, the United Kingdom sixty percent and The Netherlands 
fifty percent. 
Evers et al. (2014) analyze the interaction between input-related R&D tax incentives 
and patent boxes in twelve EU member states. They point out that enhanced 
allowances of R&D expenditure that are applied to the normal tax in combination with 
a patent box that offers a reduced rate, can lead to negative effective average tax 
rates. This has the effect of providing a subsidy to unprofitable projects. 
 
These results are consistent with the observation that in some countries firms can use 
the patent box regardless of the country in which the underlying R&D has been 
performed. Depending on the specific tax rules of countries, profits induced by an R&D 
tax credit in one country might be taxed in another country through a patent box. This 
does not make the R&D tax credit less effective as long as its goal is to compensate 
firms for knowledge spillovers. 
Patent boxes seem more likely to relocate corporate income than to stimulate 
innovation. Unfortunately, tax planning and tax competition also complicate the 
possibilities for evaluation of the effectiveness of patent boxes with respect to 
innovation. 
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4 Challenges for evaluation 
Despite the sizable literature on the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, two broad 
challenges for researchers remain. A first challenge is to make evaluation studies more 
reliable by more use of natural and social experiments for identifying the impact of tax 
policies. In the absence of experiments, more use can be made of quasi-experimental 
methods like difference-in-difference. Most of the suggestions listed below have been 
made earlier. In particular, a report prepared by Expert Group on R&D Tax Incentives 
Evaluation contains a number of insights on how innovation policy can be evaluated 
reliably (European Commission, 2008). 
A second challenge for the literature on the evaluation of R&D tax incentives is that 
many relevant topics are unstudied. First, almost all studies are on the effect of tax 
credits on expenditure. There are hardly any studies on other R&D tax instruments. 
Second, only very few studies consider the impact of R&D tax incentives on firm 
performance or beyond. 
4.1 Challenge 1: methodology 
The golden standard for policy evaluation compares the actual behaviour of a firm 
experiencing a tax incentive with the counterfactual situation in which the firm would 
not have had this incentive. Such a setting can be simulated using a social 
experiment, where R&D tax incentives are randomly allocated to firms. The causal 
effect of the policy is then captured by the differences in R&D performance between 
the recipients (the treatment group), and the non-recipients (the control group).   
A similar strategy exploits unintended randomization of tax incentives given to firms. 
This is called a natural experiment. Natural experiments usually do not lead to an 
unbiased randomization of treatment with tax incentives, but still can be useful to 
assess the causal effect. 
Due to the generic nature of the R&D tax incentives, which gives very little (if any) 
scope for randomization, social experiments are not available for assessing the 
effectiveness of these incentives. Natural experiments that lead to well-defined control 
groups are not common. R&D tax incentives are therefore assessed through various 
other techniques that seek to account for methodological challenges that arise from 
not being able to construct a random control group. 
4.1.1 Reverse causality 
One methodological challenge is how to separate the causal effect of tax incentives on 
the behaviour of firm’s from causal relations that run in the opposite direction. For 
example, most studies assume that tax incentive policy is independent from the R&D 
performance of firms. However, R&D tax incentives can be introduced or amended 
precisely because of an underinvestment in R&D. This introduces correlation between 
tax incentive adoption and firm performance. A similar case occurs when R&D 
intensive countries are more inclined to spend money on innovation policy. 
Similarly, the characteristics of an R&D tax incentive instrument itself introduce a 
correlation between the size of the incentive and the amount of R&D. For example, 
firms with a large expenditure on R&D might benefit relatively less than firms that 
spend less. Simply regressing R&D expenditures on firm characteristics and the tax 
incentive measure will underestimate the causal effect of the incentive.  
In response to these problems with reverse causality, researchers have applied 
instrumental variable (IV) techniques that use a third variable which is informative on 
the causal relation of interest. However, this approach comes at the costs of  less 
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precise estimates and the inherent difficulties in finding a suitable instrumental 
variable (Hall and Van Reenen, 2000). The use of invalid instruments will increase, 
rather than decrease, estimation bias. In practice, studies using IV regression analysis 
are very heterogeneous in terms of their reliability. 
4.1.2 Selection bias  
Usually any firm that carries out R&D is eligible for R&D tax incentives. This implies 
that the group of firms using a tax incentive is very different from the group of firms 
that do not use that tax incentive. Comparing the performance of these two groups of 
companies will lead to biased estimates of the effect of the incentive: the difference in 
performance is not just driven by treatment with the tax incentive, but also by 
differences in company characteristics. This type of bias is known as selection bias: 
firms self-select into the treatment group, based on their characteristics. 
There are various strategies to reduce selection bias. One approach is to control for 
the differences between the two groups using control variables. Examples of this 
approach are regression analysis and matching estimators. The assumption underlying 
these methods is that all relevant differences between firms are observed. These 
measures are still sensitive to selection bias when part of the differences between 
firms is unobserved. 
A second approach to selection problems is to compare firms that just meet the 
criteria for eligibility with firms that do not satisfy the criteria, but only barely. This is 
called a regression discontinuity design (RDD). RDD is only applicable when 
information on eligibility is available and if the eligibility criteria are continuous, which 
often is not the case for tax incentives. RDD only allows for estimation of the causal 
effect for firms that are barely eligible. So far this method has not been applied in the 
context of R&D tax incentives.26 
A third strategy is to compare the performance of firms before an R&D tax incentive is 
introduced with their performance afterwards. This can be done with a simple panel 
regression. If one also includes firms that do not receive treatment in the sample 
while controlling for firm level time trends, then this approach is know as difference-
in-difference (DID). A drawback of this strategy is that it is sensitive to other 
(unobserved) events taking place in the sample period that affect the treatment group 
in a different way than the control group. 
4.1.3 Adjustment costs 
R&D processes are characterized by high-adjustment costs (Hall et al., 1986; Lach and 
Schankerman, 1989). As a consequence, the effect from a change in the cost of R&D 
due to a tax incentive might take several years to reveal itself. Researchers that only 
consider the short term impact of a change in R&D tax incentives are likely to 
underestimate the overall impact of the policy change. Another issue is that when 
studying the long-term impact, many other events will have occurred since the policy 
change. This will make it more difficult to get a precise estimate of the impact. 
4.1.4 Re-labelling and changes in input prices 
Introduction of R&D tax incentives can induce firms to re-label already existing 
activities to be defined as R&D expenditure. Re-labelling might be completely 
appropriate: before the policy change, some firms might have had no reason to be 
                                           
26 The DID study by Cornet and Vroomen (2005) has some characteristics of an RDD 
as some of the control groups are “close” to the treatment group in terms of their size.  
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very precise about which activities can be classified as R&D and only after the policy 
change they start to care about this. Re-labelling itself does not change the firm’s R&D 
activities, but time-series on R&D expenditure might show a sudden increase around 
the moment of the policy change. 
Another response to the introduction of an R&D tax incentive is that the demand for 
the inputs of the R&D process increases. This increase in demand for researchers, lab 
equipment, etc. is not likely to be met by a proportional increase in supply as these 
inputs tend to be highly specialized. Especially in the short term, a new or more 
generous R&D tax incentive might therefore lead to higher input prices, including 
higher wages for researchers. R&D expenditure might increase in the short term, while 
R&D activities might lag behind as the supply of research inputs has to adapt.27 
Re-labelling and changes in input prices could lead to overestimation of the impact of 
R&D tax incentives in the short-run. Accounting for long-term effects of R&D tax 
incentives is essential for understanding their overall impact. 
4.1.5 Multiple treatments 
Usually R&D tax incentives are not the only policy instrument targeted to innovation 
support. This makes it difficult for the policy evaluator to separate the impact of the 
R&D tax incentive from the impact of the other instruments. In particular, there are 
three issues: First, not all subsidies and tax incentives are observable in firm level 
data. Second, many firms will benefit from multiple instruments, which makes it more 
difficult to define control groups. Third, there can be interactions between R&D tax 
incentives and other policy instruments. Probably only well-designed social 
experiments are robust to these three problems. 
4.1.6 Publication bias 
Several meta studies have found strong indications of publication bias in papers 
analyzing the effects of R&D tax incentives (Castellacci and Lie, 2013; Ientile and 
Mairesse, 2009). This means that researchers tend to report only significant results. 
Especially researchers using less precise estimation methods or more noisy data are 
likely to report only large effect of R&D tax incentives. Meta analysis can help to 
uncover the true effect by correcting for publication bias. 
4.2 Challenge 2: gaps in the literature 
The focus of the literature is primarily on the impact of R&D tax credits on R&D 
expenditure. The impact on innovation, productivity and other aspects of firm 
performance is hardly studied. Also very few studies are devoted to the aggregate 
impact of R&D tax incentives and the performance of the economy. 
The emphasis of the literature on the impact of tax credits on expenditure is well-
grounded. Tax credits are the most popular tax incentive aimed at promoting 
innovation and if they do not induce more R&D spending to start with, they will not 
lead to more economic growth. However, there is a lack of evidence on other types of 
incentives and outcomes. In particular, researchers may consider the following gaps 
for future studies: 
                                           
27 If the introduction of an R&D tax leaves input prices unaffected, this can be 
considered an indication that the incentive will not be effective in the long-run either - 
unless the supply of all R&D inputs is perfectly elastic (which is improbable in 
general). 
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 Studies on the impact of tax incentives on R&D expenditure do not take into 
account that R&D input prices (notably the wages of researchers) can change in 
response to the tax incentives. This can lead to overestimation of their 
effectiveness. 
 It is hardly studied whether tax incentives result in more innovation and how 
different types of innovation are affected (European Commission, 2008). 
 Evidence on the social return to R&D tax incentives is almost non-existent. 
 There is little knowledge about the impact of tax incentives of firm behaviour. 
 The particular design features of an instrument and the way it is implemented 
remain outside the scope of most studies, but could be decisive for their 
impact.  
 Very few studies take into account both direct subsidies and tax incentives at 
the same time, while multiple treatments are very common. 
 It is not clear what the effect of firm age is on the impact of R&D tax 
incentives. In particular, start-ups should be considered separately from other 
SMEs. Do R&D tax incentives stimulate the entry of new innovative firms? 
 Evidence is also lacking on the effect of R&D tax credits on attracting R&D 
activities from abroad. The same holds for its effect on extramural R&D in 
cooperation with other firms or public research institutes. Whether the 
company’s legal status matters for the impact of R&D tax credits has also not 
been researched. 
 Natural and social experiments are almost never used. The number of studies 
employing quasi-experimental identification strategies is small. These 
strategies can be combined with the structural modelling, but to our knowledge 
this has not been done. 
Most of the studies focus on R&D tax credits. Evidence is lacking for other types of 
popular R&D tax incentives, enhanced allowances and accelerated depreciation. The 
few studies on patent boxes do not provide evidence that firms become more 
innovative. 
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5 R&D tax incentives in the EU and selected OECD 
countries 
The vast majority of countries included in this study28 provide a favourable tax 
treatment of R&D expenditures.29 At the moment of writing, only two out of the thirty-
three countries analysed- Estonia and Germany- do not offer any tax incentive for 
R&D activities.  
Countries have introduced the R&D tax incentives at different points in time and have 
shaped them in various ways. Even for such a generic policy instrument, the specific 
design, type and number of R&D tax incentives differ substantially across countries. 
These differences can be divided into three main categories: 
1) scope of the policy, including the type of R&D tax incentive and costs covered 
2) targeting of specific groups of firms, according to their size, age, region, etc. 
3) organization, including administrative practices and generosity 
We discuss each of these categories and present an overview of the practices in EU 
member states and selected OECD countries. 
5.1 Scope 
The scope of an R&D tax incentive defines how the instrument works conceptually: 
how the incentive is applied and what type of expenditure and income qualify. R&D tax 
incentives can be applied in at least four ways: as a tax credit, as an enhanced 
allowance, by allowing accelerated depreciation, and through reduced rates (patent 
boxes, for example). The incentive can be “volume-based” and apply to all R&D 
activity or it can be “incremental” and only apply to new R&D activity. The tax benefit 
can refer to different sorts of R&D expenditures. Usually, an R&D tax incentive applies 
to specific inputs that are used in R&D processes (incentive base) and requires some 
degree of novelty for the intended outcome (requirement of novelty).  
5.1.1 Type of R&D tax incentive 
Different approaches coexist in the way countries shape R&D tax incentives. Every 
scheme might have some particularities, but broadly four approaches can be 
distinguished: tax credits, enhanced allowances, accelerated depreciation and reduced 
rates (see Figure 5.1 for a brief description of each type). 
 
                                           
28Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States. 
29 The data in this chapter is collected from official national government sources, the 
OECD (http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm), and ERAWATCH 
(http://erawatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). Detailed information on sources is provided in the 
Annex with country studies. 
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• Tax credit decreases the corporate income tax rate 
a firm has to pay 
• Rate can be applied to either corporate tax, payroll 
tax paid for R&D workers or personal income in case 
the incentive is targeted to self-employed 
Tax credits 
(R&D 
expenditure) 
• An enhanced allowance effectively decreases the 
base amount that is taxed by allowing to 'inflate' the 
R&D expenditure base  
• Example: if R&D expenditure is EUR 100 and the 
rate of enhanced allowance 1.5 then the total R&D 
expenditure will be increased to EUR 150. This will 
decrease the base of taxable income.  
Enhanced 
allowances 
(R&D 
expenditure) 
• Accelerated depreciation scheme permits to 
depreciate the purchased fixed assets at higher rates 
in the first years of the asset's life. This allows, 
therefore, to decrease the overall taxable income in 
the specific periods. 
Accelerated 
depreciation 
(R&D 
expenditure) 
• Reduced corporate tax rate on intellectual property 
income ("Patent Box") are an outcome related 
incentive 
• It reduces the corporate income that firms pay on 
commercialization of innovative products that are 
protected by intellectual property (IP) rights 
Reduced 
corporate tax 
rate 
(IP income) 
Figure 5.1 Description of different types of R&D tax incentives 
 
Table 5.1 gives an overview of which tax incentives are used in which country. While 
some countries have only one type of instrument, several others use a mix of different 
types. Tax credits are the most widely used tax incentive (in 21 countries), but also 
enhanced allowances (in 16 countries) and accelerated depreciations (in 13 countries) 
are used in a substantial number of countries30. Patent boxes are a relatively new 
policy instrument, which has been introduced in eleven countries: first the Benelux 
states, followed by United Kingdom and others. 
  
                                           
30Note that various countries have more than one type of R&D tax incentive 
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 Table 5.1 Popularity of R&D tax incentive instruments 
Countries Tax 
credits 
Enhanced 
allowance 
Accelerated 
depreciation 
Patent Box 
Austria x    
Belgium x  x x 
Bulgaria x  x  
Canada x  x  
Croatia  x   
Cyprus  x  x 
Czech Republic   x
a
 x   
Denmark x x x  
Estonia     
Finland  x x  
France x   x 
Germany     
Greece  x  x 
Hungary   x  x 
Ireland x    
Israel   x
a
 x x  
Italy x  x  
Japan x x x  
Latvia  x   
Lithuania  x x  
Luxembourg    x 
Malta x   x 
Netherlands x x  x 
Norway x    
Poland   x
a
 x   
Portugal x   x 
Romania  x x  
Slovak Republic x    
Slovenia  x x  
Spain x   x 
Sweden x    
United Kingdom x x x x 
United States x  x  
a
Reduced corporate income tax rate 
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5.1.2 Incremental and volume-based schemes 
Another aspect of the design of R&D tax incentives is the way their base is calculated. 
There are two approaches: a volume-based approach that applies to all qualified R&D 
expenditures and an incremental approach that only applies to the incremental part of 
R&D expenditure. The base amount on which the increment is calculated is an average 
amount that the firm had in either some specified period of time (e.g., between 2010-
2012) or some specified number of (previous) years (e.g., last three years). 
Currently, almost all countries have volume-based R&D tax incentives (see Figure 
3.1.). Some countries have moved from incremental to volume-based schemes, one 
such example being France which moved to a fully volume-based scheme in 2008. 
Several countries operate both incremental and volume-based schemes (Belgium, 
Czech Republic, Spain, Ireland, Japan, Portugal and the United States). These 
schemes usually work as volume-based up till some threshold, after which an 
incremental scheme applies. Italy is the only European country in our sample that 
currently has only an incremental scheme.  
Figure 5.2 Use of incremental and volume-based schemes across countries 
 
Note: Estonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax 
incentives (see annex with country fiches for more details)  
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5.1.3 Incentive base 
R&D tax incentives also differ by the nature of the incentive base. In particular, some 
of the schemes are related to the income generated by R&D rather than its costs. R&D 
tax incentives that are based on costs can be targeted to different expenditure sub-
categories. They are as follows:  
 R&D costs: this category includes a variety of eligible expenditures. Some 
countries limit the type of costs and expenditures that qualify as R&D 
expenditures to machinery and equipment. Other countries restrict the 
qualifying expenditures to R&D costs that are carried out domestically. 
 R&D wages: incentive is based on wage bill tax (payroll-withholding tax) 
 IP expenditures: this category includes the costs and expenditure for acquiring 
patents, investments in intangible assets, or the purchase of new technologies 
 R&D and IP expenditures: this is a combination of the first two categories 
 Discretionary: a limited number of countries provide lower corporate tax rates 
for qualified R&D firms as such 
 IP income: incentive is applied to profits gained from commercialization of 
products that are protected by intellectual property rights 
Table 5.2 shows that most countries have incentive schemes that apply to R&D costs 
(23 countries), followed by R&D and IP income (12 countries). Three countries 
(Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Israel) provide a reduced corporate tax rate for those 
firms that obtain the status of being an “R&D firm”. Incentives based on IP income 
(mostly patent boxes) are in place in twelve countries. 
The category R&D costs and expenditures can be divided into different sub-categories. 
For instance, in some countries only R&D wages are eligible costs, while other 
countries employ a much broader definition including buildings and overhead costs. 
Table 5.3 provides an overview of eligible costs at a more detailed level. Most 
countries (24) include wages in eligible expenses. In 18 countries also machinery is 
included and in 12- buildings. Prototyping costs are in eligible only in France, which 
has a special scheme that is targeted to such activities.  
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Table 5.2 Incentive bases used across countries 
Country
c
 R&D costs  Wages R&D, IP costs IP costs IP income Discretionary 
Austria x  
   
 
Belgium 
 
x x 
 
x  
Bulgaria x  
 
x 
 
x 
Canada x x 
   
 
Croatia 
 
 x 
  
 
Cyprus 
 
 
 
x x  
Czech Republic 
 
 x 
  
x 
Denmark x  
 
x 
 
 
Finland x x 
   
 
France 
 
x x 
 
x x 
Greece x  
  
x  
Hungary  x x 
  
x  
Ireland x  x 
  
 
Israel x  
   
x 
Italy x x x 
  
 
Japan x  
   
 
Latvia 
 
x     xb 
  
 
Lithuania x  
   
 
Luxembourg 
 
 
  
x  
Malta x  
 
x x  
Netherlands x x 
  
x  
Norway x  
   
 
Poland x  x 
 
 xa   
Portugal x  
  
x  
Romania x  
   
 
Slovak Republic x  
   
 
Slovenia x  
   
 
Spain x x x 
 
x  
Sweden 
 
x 
   
 
United Kingdom x  
  
x  
United States x  
   
 
a
Entities having R&D Centre status can deduct up to 20 percent of R&D revenues from tax base 
b
To be phased out 
c
Estonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax incentives (see Annex 
with country fiches for more details) 
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Table 5.3 Detailed incentive base across countries 
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Austria x x x x      
Belgium x x x    x   
Bulgaria x x        
Canada  x x x      
Croatia x x x x   x   
Cyprus          
Czech Republic   x    x   
Denmark  x x  x x    
Finland x x x       
France   x  x x x  x 
Greece          
Hungary    x  x x x x  
Ireland x x x x x x x x  
Israel x x        
Italy  x x       
Japan x  x x   x   
Latvia   x x    x  
Lithuania   x x      
Luxembourg          
Malta x x x     x  
Netherlands x x x x  x    
Norway  x x  x x  x  
Poland x x x       
Portugal  x x  x x    
Romania   x x   x   
Slovak Republic          
Slovenia  x   x     
Spain  x x  x x    
Sweden   x       
United 
Kingdom 
x x x  x x  x  
United States   x  x x    
a
Estonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax incentives (see Annex 
with country fiches for more details) 
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5.1.4 Tax base 
The benefit can be set against different tax liabilities. The most popular one is 
corporate income that is present in schemes in all countries, except for Sweden (see 
Table 5.4). A number of countries have R&D tax incentives also for personal income, 
which benefits micro-enterprises (Austria, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
and Slovenia). Sweden and France have tax incentives that are based on social 
security contributions and Belgium, Canada, Finland, Hungary, and Netherlands have 
tax schemes that are set against wage tax.  
Table 5.4 Tax bases used across countries 
Country
a
 Corporate income Personal income Wage tax Social security 
Austria x x x 
 Belgium x 
  
x 
Bulgaria x 
   Canada x x x x 
Croatia x 
   Cyprus x 
   Czech Republic x 
   Denmark x 
   Finland x 
  
x 
France x x x 
 Greece x 
   Hungary  x 
  
x 
Ireland x 
   Israel x 
   Italy x 
   Japan x 
   Latvia x 
   Lithuania x 
   Luxembourg x x x 
 Malta x 
   Netherlands x x 
 
x 
Norway x 
   Poland x 
   Portugal x 
   Romania x 
   Slovak Republic x 
   Slovenia x x 
  Spain x 
   Sweden 
    United Kingdom x 
   United States x 
   
a
Estonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax incentives (see 
Annex with country fiches for more details) 
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5.1.5 Novelty of R&D outcome 
Innovation is essentially about bringing new ideas to the market. If the purpose of 
R&D tax incentives is to foster innovation, it is not only relevant what type of R&D 
costs are eligible, but also whether R&D is primarily intended for true innovation or 
primarily for learning from other firms. In the strictest sense, the ‘market’ is the global 
arena. Countries have been somewhat looser on defining the size of this ‘market’.  
Four types of novelty requirements were encountered: (1) new to the world; (2) new 
to the country; (3) new to the product market; (4) and new to the firm. Figure 5.3 
gives an overview of the novelty requirements per country.31 The most stringent one -
“new to the world”- is used in thirteen countries. This novelty requirement is also the 
norm formulated in the Frascati Manual: “The basic criterion for distinguishing R&D 
from related activities is the presence in R&D of an appreciable element of novelty and 
the resolution of scientific and/or technological uncertainty, i.e. when the solution to a 
problem is not readily apparent to someone familiar with the basic stock of common 
knowledge and techniques for the area concerned.” p. 34 (OECD, 2002).32  
A less strict definition- “new to the country”- is used for a different scheme in France 
and in Japan. It is also the condition for novelty used by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). 
The most widely used novelty requirement “new to the firm” is used in thirteen 
countries. In contrast to more stringent requirements, this definition is easier to 
administer but reduces the focus of the instrument, such that a larger budget will be 
needed.  
Figure 5.3 Definition of novelty for R&D tax incentives across countries 
 
Note: (a) Estonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax 
incentives (see Annex with country fiches for more details); (b) Countries may have different novelty 
requirements for different schemes 
 
                                           
31Note that all tables and figures in this chapter show results per country, while the 
underlying observations are at the country/instrument level. This implies that a 
country could be listed in different rows, if different tax incentives in that country have 
different characteristics. 
32Many patent offices, including the European Patent Office (EPO), use a similar 
novelty condition for patentability. 
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The definition of novelty used will have implications for the expected impact of an R&D 
tax incentive. If R&D is targeted to products that are new to the world, the incentive 
promotes pure innovation. If new to the country is sufficient, then the incentive also 
stimulates imitation from abroad. Finally, if there is hardly any novelty requirement, 
also domestic imitation is encouraged, having a risk to provide disincentives for firms 
to invest in radical innovations. The category ‘ambiguous’ contains those countries, for 
which the definition was ambiguous, unclear and/or not available. 
5.2 Targeting 
5.2.1 Explicit targeting 
Beyond generic design characteristics that are relevant to all firms, R&D tax schemes 
can be shaped in a way to address particular target groups. This focus is usually part 
of more general policy goals or reflects the government’s view on parts of economy 
needing extra support and/or having the strongest innovative activities. The scope and 
type of targeting can, therefore, depend on the specific policy issue at hand. 
Targeting can be defined over different aspects that are usually overlapping to specify 
a very particular target group. One starting point is to define the beneficiary subjects 
that can either include all legal entities or specify a particular group (e.g., limited 
companies and co-operatives, self-employed, entities having an R&D status, and 
others).  
SMEs and especially start-up companies may face increased difficulties in attracting 
finance that is needed to invest in R&D activities. Many countries try to alleviate these 
capital market imperfections by offering a preferential tax treatment to SMEs (France, 
Greece, Hungary, among others) and/or young start-up companies (Belgium, France, 
Netherlands, among others). 
Similarly, tax incentives can have a geographical focus that can be determined by the 
central government (the case of Greece, Israel and Poland) or by regional authorities 
(Canada, United States and Spain).  
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Figure 5.4 Targeting of schemes across countries 
 
 
Note: Estonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax 
incentives (see Annex with country fiches for more details) 
 
Some tax instruments are designed to promote R&D in specific industries that are 
considered either to be of strategic importance or face increased challenges. In some 
cases, it proves to be very hard to find a clear-cut definition of a specific industry or 
sector. In some countries R&D tax incentives have been tied to certain types of 
technologies (for example environmentally friendly technologies in Belgium) or fields 
of R&D (for example biotechnology and nanotechnology in Israel) that are indirectly 
associated to the specific industries. See Figure 5.4 for an overview of targeting in 
countries analysed. 
According to EU Competition Law R&D tax incentives may constitute State aid. In 
principle, State aid is forbidden by the EC Treaty. However, in some cases where 
market failures exists, State aid will be considered compatible with the common 
market under specified conditions. State aid for R&D and innovation (R&D&I) is such 
an example and the framework for State aid for R&D&I and the provisions under the 
Block Exemption Regulations describe the conditions under which State aid is allowed. 
Region 
•Canada 
•Greece 
•Israel 
•Poland 
•Spain 
•United States 
Field of activity / 
type of technology 
•Belgium 
•Bulgaria 
•Canada 
•Greece 
•Israel 
•United States 
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•France 
•Greece 
•Hungary 
•Japan 
•Malta 
•Norway 
•Poland 
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•United Kingdom 
•United States 
Age 
•Belgium 
•France 
•Israel 
•Netherlands 
•Portugal 
•United States 
Legal status 
•Austria 
•Bulgaria 
•Canada 
•Czech Republic 
•Finland 
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•Netherlands 
•Poland 
•Slovenia 
•Sweden 
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5.2.2 Implicit targeting 
Brackets and ceilings 
Instead of explicitly targeting special groups of firms, countries implement tax 
brackets with different rates (see summary of implicit targeting in Table 5.5). All 
countries that have different tax brackets apply more generous deduction rates for 
expenditures below a certain amount. De facto, this makes schemes more generous 
for smaller firms with lower R&D expenditures. Such brackets are introduced in four 
countries (Canada, France, The Netherlands and the United States). Another way to 
limit the benefits for large firms is to put a ceiling on the amount that firms can claim, 
which allows governments to limit their costs. Most countries have adapted maximum 
deductions on one or more of their R&D tax incentives. 
Carry back, carry forward and cash refunds 
Small and startup firms often lack taxable income on which the tax-cut would apply, 
making it impossible to fully benefit from most R&D tax incentives (OECD, 2010). 
Thus, the provision to carry back and forward the expenditure, together with an option 
to receive the tax benefit in a form of cash refunds in case of losses, can be used as 
another type of indirect targeting. 
Carry back and carry forward are not available for all R&D tax incentive schemes. For 
instance, with a payroll withholding tax credit a carry back, carry forward, or cash 
refund is implausible. Carry-over provisions are introduced in most of the countries 
studied. Cash refunds are less widespread and have been introduced only in nine 
countries. 
  
 
 
 A Study on R&D Tax Incentives 
 
October 2014  63 
Table 5.5 Implicit targeting 
Country
e
 Brackets Ceilings Carry back 
(CB) 
Carry forward 
(CF) 
Cash 
refunds 
Austria  x    
Belgium  x  indefinite x 
Bulgaria    x  
Canada x x 3 years 20 years
a x 
Croatia  x  5 years x 
Cyprus      
Czech Republic    3 years  
Denmark  x  x x 
Finland  x  10 years  
France x x  3 years x 
Greece    x  
Hungary   x    
Ireland   1 year indefinite x 
Israel  x  5 years  
Italy  x    
Japan x x    
Latvia    indefinite  
Lithuania  x  indefinite  
Luxembourg      
Malta  x    
Netherlands x x 1 or 3 years
d 9 years  
Norway  x   x 
Poland  x  3 years
b  
Portugal  x  8 years
c  
Romania  x    
Slovak Republic  x    
Slovenia  x  5 years  
Spain  x  18 years x 
Sweden      
United Kingdom  x  indefinite x 
United States x x  20 years  
a 
Some regional tax incentives provide 10 year carry forward; 
b
 For “New tax Relief”; 
c
 SIFIDE II; 
d
 RDA tax 
incentive: For self-employed carry-back possible for 3 years, companies 1 year; 
e 
Estonia and Germany 
were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax incentives (see Annex with 
country fiches for more details 
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5.3 Organization 
Every policy needs to be set against the actual budget costs and administrative 
capacities. A key aspect from a budgetary perspective is the preferential rate that will 
be offered; we have summarized this under “generosity”. Administrative capacities 
determine the operational efficiency of the instrument, which also affects the 
compliance costs of firms. This is presented under “administration”.  
5.3.1 Generosity 
Government expenditure on private R&D varies substantially across countries. Figure 
5.5 shows the relation between business expenditure on R&D (BERD) and government 
support for BERD. In addition, the size of the bubbles reflects the share of the 
governments R&D support budget that is spent on R&D tax incentives. It shows that in 
France, The Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, Japan and, especially, Canada 
R&D tax incentives play a major role in government funding for R&D, varying between 
68.4 percent (in France) to 85.5 percent (in Canada).   
The figure shows that more support to R&D (as a percentage of GDP) is somewhat 
related with higher levels of BERD (as a percentage of GDP).  
There are notable exceptions, however. Finland, Japan, Sweden, Denmark, 
Switzerland and Germany that have high BERD but relatively low total government 
support to business R&D (as percentage of GDP) and no R&D tax incentives in 2011. 
Across all countries in the sample there appears to be no relation between the tax 
incentive share of total government funds to R&D and BERD (correlation coefficient of 
0.04). While the figure is only illustrative and the data experimental33, these trends 
indicate that while tax incentives may be beneficial to support private R&D, it appears 
not to be a necessary condition in several countries. 
                                           
33Data taken from OECD, 2014, Summary description of R&D tax incentive schemes 
for OECD countries and selected economies, 2013. www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm, 
accessed on 18.06.2014. 
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Figure 5.5 Business R&D intensity and government support to R&D, 2011 
 
Source: OECD, 2014, www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm, accessed on 18.06.2014 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 Tax subsidy rates on R&D expenditure for OECD countries, 2013 
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Source: OECD, www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm, accessed on 18.06.2014 
The generosity of a scheme depends, among other things, on the corporate tax rate in 
a country. One way to compare the generosity of tax incentives between countries, 
while taking differences in corporate tax rates into account, is to calculate the B-index. 
Figure 5.6 shows tax subsidy rates across OECD countries, measured as one minus 
the B-Index. The B-index shows how much before-tax income is needed for a firm to 
break even on one euro of R&D costs (Warda, 2001). The tax subsidy rates are 
distinguished by firm size and profitability status. However, note that B-index does not 
take into account ceilings- it assumes a ‘representative firm’ whose expenditure does 
not exceed the maximum allowed level of benefit. 
The most generous R&D tax incentives appear to be in Portugal, France and Spain. As 
noted in the section on targeting, countries differentiate the level of generosity across 
firm types. This is reflected in the table, where Portugal, France, the Netherlands, 
Canada, Great Britain, Korea, Norway, Australia and Japan offer a more generous 
treatment for SMEs than for large enterprises. SMEs that do not have profits enjoy the 
same level of tax generosity as profitable SMEs in France, Canada, Great Britain, and 
Norway. 
At the level of instruments, a different picture arises. We have computed the tax 
subsidy rate for volume-based R&D tax credits at the most detailed level.34 A first 
observation is that the most generous tax credits, the American special tax credit 
schedules, the French scheme for Young Innovative Companies (J.E.I.), and the 
Maltese tax credit are very generous as they imply a tax subsidy exceeding one 
hundred percent. 
Figure 5.7 Tax subsidy rates volume-based R&D tax credits 
 
                                           
34 We calculated the tax subsidy as 1 – B-index = 1 - (1–u-c)/(1-u) = c/(1-u), where c 
is the rate of the tax credit and u is the corporate income tax rate, see Warda (2001) 
p. 205. 
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Figure 5.8 compares the generosity of volume-based R&D tax credits that are not 
targeted to specific types of firms. These untargeted schemes are less generous on 
average. Except for the Maltese scheme, the tax subsidy now is below fifty percent. 
The opposite is true for R&D tax credits targeted at SMEs and startups (Figure 5.9). In 
this category, four instruments have a tax subsidy rate that exceeds sixty percent. 
Figure 5.8 Tax subsidy rates for untargeted volume-based R&D tax credits 
 
Patent boxes offer reductions of the corporate income tax rate that firms have to pay 
on their IP income. Figure 5.10 summarizes the effective corporate tax rate that firms 
pay on profits generated from intangible assets eligible for patent boxes. In Malta and 
France income from intellectual property is completely exempted from the corporate 
income tax in the first year. For France the effective rate increases to 15 percent in 
subsequent years, offering the highest rate amongst the patent boxes. Spain follows 
with 12 percent and Hungary with 9.5 percent. 
Tax subsidy rates and effective tax rates only offer partial information on the 
generosity it ignores the scope of the instrument. As a further indication of how 
schemes differ in terms of generosity, Table 5.6 shows government expenditure per 
R&D tax incentive for a subset of instruments. The largest scheme in absolute value is 
the French Crédit Impôt Recherche, with 4.8 bln euro, followed by the Canadian 
SR&ED, 2.6 bln euro. The instrument ranked last is the Maltese R&D tax credit.  
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Figure 5.9 Tax subsidy rates for R&D tax credits targeted at SMEs and start-ups 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Effective corporate tax rates for income derived from patents 
 
Source: own calculations (see Annex with country fiches for detailed sources) 
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Table 5.6 Government expenditure on R&D tax incentives (mln EUR) 
Instrument name Budget 
(EUR mln) 
Year Source 
Crédit d'Impôt Recherche (FR) 5800 2014 Loi Finances pour 2014 
SR&ED (CA) 2591 2012 Budget 2013 
Credit for Incr. Res. Act. (US) 997 2011 US Office of Management and 
Budget’s  
WBSO (NL) 765 2014 Netherlands Enterprise Agency 
The Patent Box (UK) 747 2013-14 Budget 2013 
Section 174 tax deduction (US) 663 2011 US Office of Management and 
Budget’s  
Innovatiebox (NL) 625 2012 Ministry of Finance 
Forschungsprämie (AT) 550 2013 Austrian Research and Technology 
Report 2013 
New Tax Relief  (PL) 440 2012 Ministry of Finance 
Payroll tax deduction for R&D (BE) 339 2011 Belspo 
RDA (NL) 302 2014 Netherlands Enterprise Agency 
Crédit d'Impôt Innovation (FR) 300 2014 Loi Finances pour 2014 
SkatteFUNN (NO) 282 2013 SkatteFunn Arsrapport 2013 
R&D Relief (UK) 280 2014-15 Budget policy costings 2013 
R&D Tax Credit (IE) 261 2011 Review of Ireland's R&D tax credit 
2013 
Deduction for R&D wages (FI) 155  Finnish Tax Administration ( VERO 
SKATT) 
Patent Income Deduction  (BE) 114 2011 Research and Documentation 
Department & High Council of 
Finance 
Patent box (FR) 112 2014 Loi Finances pour 2014 
Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes (FR) 112 2014 Loi Finances pour 2014 
Skattekreditordningen (DK) 40.3 2013 The Danish Ministry of Taxation ( 
Skatteministeriet)  
Reduced soc. sec. contrib. (SE) 46 2014 Skatteverket 
R&D tax credit (MT) 36 2010 Erawatch 2012: Malta 
 
5.3.2 Administration 
An effective application procedure is crucial for the pool of beneficiary firms. Table 5.7 
shows that most countries offer the possibility of online application and a ‘one-stop’ 
application process for at least one of the R&D tax incentives in their country. Those 
two aspects of the administrative procedure enhance the efficiency of the schemes 
since they reduce both the administrative burden for governments and compliance 
costs for firms. 
R&D tax incentives require substantial government expenditure. Therefore, assessing 
whether the scheme has reached its intended policy goals is essential. Only six 
countries have planned evaluations for at least one of their R&D tax incentives. Yet, 
regardless of whether there was a legal obligation, schemes were evaluated in 14 
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countries. Part of the evaluations carried was academic, others- organized by the 
responsible ministries.  
Table 5.7 Administrative features among countries 
Country
a
 E-application One-stop Evaluation planned Evaluation 
performed 
Austria x x  x 
Belgium x x x x 
Bulgaria     
Canada x x  x 
Croatia    x 
Cyprus     
Czech Republic x x   
Denmark x x x  
Finland x x x  
France x  x x 
Greece x    
Hungary      
Ireland x x  x 
Israel x x   
Italy x x  x 
Japan  x  x 
Latvia x x   
Lithuania     
Luxembourg     
Malta  x   
Netherlands x x x x 
Norway x x x x 
Poland  x   
Portugal x x  x 
Romania     
Slovak Republic x x   
Slovenia x x   
Spain x x  x 
Sweden x x   
United Kingdom x x  x 
United States x x  x 
aEstonia and Germany were included in the analysis but they do not offer any type of R&D tax incentives 
(see Annex with country fiches for more details) 
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5.4 Clustering analysis 
As outlined above, R&D tax incentives vary considerably in terms of their scope, 
targeting and organization features. This is also the case for different instruments 
used in the same country. Nevertheless, the “instrument mix” in one country can be 
similar to the instrument mix in another. To identify the level of clustering among the 
countries’ instruments, the different identified characteristics across 30 countries35 
were summarized in a country- design features matrix36 (see Figure 5.8). 
Figure 5.11 Dendrogram of country similarity for R&D tax incentives 
 
Source: own Hierarchical Clustering Model, on basis of data collected for this report 
 
The clusters shown by different colours in the dendrogram illustrate relationships 
between the identified features of the R&D tax incentive schemes offered in different 
countries. The lower the bar (the closer to zero), the more similar are the countries 
grouped together. On this basis, six groupings of countries can be identified (indicated 
by different colours).  From the left- France and Belgium; Spain, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Portugal and the United States; Israel, Slovenia, Finland, The Netherlands, Canada, 
Austria, Slovak Republic, Norway, Denmark, United Kingdom and Malta. Those three 
groups are also more similar with each other than with the group of Bulgaria, Greece, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Croatia and Czech Republic, Poland; Sweden; and 
Luxembourg, Cyprus.   
Within those groups, Portugal and the United States have the most similar tax 
incentive schemes37, followed by the pair Norway-Denmark, and at a somewhat lesser 
                                           
35The method is restricted to 30 units. Latvia was not included in this analysis, whose 
R&D tax incentive is very similar to Lithuania’s. Estonia and Germany are also not 
included as they do not offer any type of R&D tax incentives (see annex with country 
fiches for more details) 
36 Based on the hierarchical clustering method. Described in more detail in Appendix  
37 The strong commonality between the R&D tax incentives schemes of Portugal and 
United States is grounded in both featuring: the incentive base is R&D costs  and 
expenditures (direct and/or indirect); tax base is corporate income; type of tax 
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degree, Spain-Ireland, Slovenia-Finland, Canada-Austria (which are also close to 
Netherlands), and Lithuania-Romania.  
Sweden appears to have the most ‘unique’ R&D tax incentive system, as it does not 
match with any other one country.  
  
                                                                                                                               
incentive being tax credits; that is both volume and incremental; that target according 
to  firm size and firm age; that has ceilings on the amount claimed; that may only be 
carried forward; and that offer firms both electronic application in a one-stop-shop 
setting. 
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6 Benchmarking R&D tax incentive designs 
What are good designs for R&D tax incentives and which properties are to be avoided? 
The literature survey provided in earlier chapters yields general conclusions on the 
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives, but does not offer direct guidance to which 
incentive schemes are recommendable and which not. In order to identify good 
practices among R&D tax incentive schemes, we have rated them by comparing their 
observed characteristics with a set of principles for good practice. Altogether over 
eighty such instruments are offered in 31 countries.38 
The benchmarking procedure involves three steps. First, a set of twenty principles for 
good practice was established using both empirical and theoretical insights. These 
principles fall into the categories scope, targeting and organization. For most good 
practices also a corresponding non-recommendable practice was identified. Next, all 
R&D tax incentives were compared with these principles. With the third step, the 
scores on individual principles were used to rate the different R&D tax incentive 
schemes. 
The rating of an instrument gives an indication of its potential to foster more R&D and 
innovation in a country, but does not reflect direct evidence that might be available for 
this instrument. Direct evidence on economic outcomes of these instruments – which 
may include, the take-up of tax instruments, the costs of administration and 
compliance, and overall evaluation – is outside the scope of this particular exercise as 
for many countries no direct evidence is available. Also, evaluations are performed 
differently across countries, which make it difficult to compare results. Benchmarking 
requires that the availability of information across countries is as equal as possible. 
Besides the ranking of R&D tax incentives schemes, we also provide an overview of 
whether data is available that allows for their evaluation. Here, we benchmark 
countries rather than instruments as data availability is difficult to assess at the 
instrument level. 
6.1 Principles of good practice 
Identified design and administrative elements of R&D tax incentives are assessed 
according to theoretical considerations and findings of the econometric studies in 
chapter two.39 As a general principle, larger weight is given to empirical evidence. The 
different features have been assessed for three categories of features (see also the 
overview of incentives in Chapter 5):  
1. scope of the policy, including the type of R&D tax incentive and costs covered 
2. targeting of specific groups of firms, according to their size, age, region, etc. 
3. organization, including administrative practices and evaluation 
We here present the discussion on the different elements of each category and provide 
‘best’ and ‘not recommended’ practices for each element. Most of these principles of 
good practice will be used in the benchmarking analysis. Table 6.1 summarizes the 
principles of good practice. 
                                           
38 The number of instruments depends on the definition of an instrument: what is 
known as a single instrument in one country might be known as two separate 
instruments in another country. Our approach is detailed in Section 6.2. 
39 Principles for best practices were suggested earlier by the European Commission 
(2007). Most of the principles proposed in this report are deducted independently from 
the literature survey, but they are largely consistent with the principles suggested 
earlier. 
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Table 6.1. Summary of principles of good practice 
Category Practice Best practice Not recommended 
Scope Input related vs. output 
related R&D tax incentive 
Input related Output related 
Tax credits vs. enhanced 
allowances 
Tax credits  
Volume-based vs. 
incremental 
Volume-based Incremental 
Novelty requirement New to the country (world) Explicit incentive for imitation 
Expenditure covered R&D wages IP costs 
Targeting Region Common rate for the 
country 
Very specific design elements in 
different regions 
Legal form Common rate for all legal 
entities 
Exclusion of firms with foreign 
owner 
Firm size No targeting Targeting at large firms 
Brackets and ceilings No brackets Lower rate for small amounts 
Firm age Young firms Incumbents 
Field of activity/type of 
technology 
No targeting Targeting 
Minimum No minimum High threshold 
Negative tax Yes, for young firms No negative tax 
Carry-over provisions Yes, for young firms No carry-over provision 
Collaboration
a
 With public research 
institutes 
Upstream R&D cooperation 
between large competitors  
Generosity
b
 Ambiguous Over-subsidizing 
Organization Decision time/refund Minimum possible Longer than 1 year 
Electronic application Yes No 
One-stop application Yes No 
Public consultation Yes No 
Evaluation Yes, planned No 
Synergy
a
 Complimentary Overlapping 
Stability
a
 Fixed design and rates for 
at least 5 years 
Large and unexpected changes in 
the budget 
a
Best practise principle is described, but not included in benchmarking due to lack of data. 
b
Evidence on optimal generosity is insufficient for identification of best practices; descriptive information on the generosity 
of schemes is provided in Section 5.3.1. 
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6.1.1 Scope 
Input related versus output related 
Best practice: Input related 
Not recommendable: Output related 
Input-related tax incentives (tax credits, enhanced allowances, accelerated 
depreciation) apply to expenditure on R&D, while output-related incentives (patent 
boxes, tax benefits for IP-related expenditure) apply to the income or assets 
generated from R&D. The evidence discussed in Chapter 2 shows that input-related 
R&D tax incentives are inducing more R&D expenditure. Studies of output-related 
incentives show that these incentives are related with higher number of registered 
patents (Chapter 3). Yet, for output-related incentives there are indications that this 
was due to reallocation of intellectual property, rather than due to creation of new 
innovative products (Griffith et al., 2014; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Ernst and 
Spengel, 2011; Bohm et al., 2012). In addition, these incentives lead to a substantial 
drop in the government revenue (Griffith et al., 2014). The empirical evidence 
suggests that input-related incentives are more likely to be effective than output-
related incentives.  
Input-related incentives are also to be preferred from a theoretical perspective for two 
reasons. First, inventions protected by patents are much less likely to generate 
externalities, such that the case for fiscal support of income derived from patents is 
weak. Second, as not all innovation is patented supporting products protected by IPR 
can result promoting sectors or types of firms that generate smaller spillovers. This 
may increase market failure rather than reduce it. 
Tax credits versus enhanced allowances 
Best practice: Tax credits 
Neutral: Enhanced allowances 
The vast majority of empirical studies have analyzed R&D tax credits. Therefore, it is 
difficult to draw detailed conclusions on how the impact on firm R&D behaviour varies 
with the type of tax incentive. From an economic point of view there is little difference 
between corporate income tax credits and enhanced allowances. From an 
administrative point of view, Lester and Warda (2014) argue that tax credits are 
preferred over enhanced allowances because the former vary with the corporate tax 
rate. Whenever there is a change in the corporate income tax rate, the rate of 
enhanced allowance should follow to adjust for this change. This is not the case with 
tax credits. 
Volume-based versus incremental tax scheme 
Best practice: Volume based incentives 
Not recommendable: Incremental incentives 
It is often argued that incremental schemes are more efficient than volume-based 
instruments. This is because the benefit is applied only to the incremental part of the 
R&D expenditure, rather than the total as with volume-based schemes. Presence of 
dead-weight losses were found in studies analyzing volume-based R&D tax incentive 
schemes (Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012 and 2008 for Netherlands; Baghana and 
Mohnen, 2009 for Canada; Lee, 2011 for Taiwan; Bloom et al., 2002 for OECD 
countries.) The presence of dead-weight losses for volume-based schemes does not 
imply that incremental schemes are more efficient. Lester and Warda (2014) show 
that even at low levels of firm growth, the cost-effectiveness of the incremental 
scheme will be the same as for the volume based.  
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A theoretical argument against incremental schemes is that they distort R&D 
investment planning (see Section 2.1.3): if firms plan their R&D investment 
expenditure several years ahead, then an incremental scheme will impose a restriction 
on the optimal time path whereas a volume-based will not. Due to this distortion, 
incremental schemes could result a higher dead-weight loss when firms are forward-
looking. 
A practical argument against incremental schemes is that they are more complicated 
to administer than volume-based schemes: there can be problems with defining the 
baseline and there are choices to be made on whether to move the baseline or not. 
This results in higher compliance costs. All this makes volume-based schemes a better 
practice. 
Novelty requirement of the intended outcome 
Best practice: New to the world; new to the country 
Not recommendable: Explicit incentive for imitation 
The novelty requirement ‘new to the world’ supports R&D with potentially largest 
social returns. It provides beneficial treatment to those firms investing in more radical 
innovation, rather than promote imitation (see Section 5.1.5). One drawback of strict 
novelty requirements is that it involves high administrative and compliance costs. A 
second argument can be that for countries that are far away from the technological 
frontier, it might have some merit to stimulate adoption of foreign technologies. The 
strength of this argument is limited as such a policy might also deter foreign 
investment in R&D activity. 
A novelty requirement ‘new to the country’ can be considered second best practice. It 
does not support imitation between firms located in the same country and is easier to 
implement. 
Offering fiscal benefits to R&D that is targeted at imitation is not an advisable practice. 
Particularly in case of weak IPR, such design element promotes the negative 
externalities on innovation. It may work against investment in radical innovation and 
increase the gap between socially desirable and observed levels of innovation. 
Expenditure covered 
Best practice: R&D wages 
Neutral: Expenditure on R&D inputs 
Not recommendable: IPR costs 
From the viewpoint of economic theory, tax incentives should apply to those types of 
expenditures that have strong externalities. Of all types of expenditure related to R&D, 
wages paid to researchers are likely to have the strongest externalities as (former-) 
employees are an important channel through which knowledge diffuses unintentionally 
to other firms. A practical advantage of tax incentives for R&D wages is that they have 
low administration and compliance costs. In particular, it may be more straightforward 
to distinguish R&D and non-R&D labor than R&D and non-R&D investment. For these 
reasons, it can be considered good practise to have tax incentives for R&D wages.  
As other types of expenditure on R&D, like capital expenditure, might also become 
less attractive due to knowledge spillovers caused by researchers, tax incentives for 
these types of expenditure can also be justified - although capital-intensive R&D 
activities might be difficult to replicate because of entry barriers. 
Expenditure on intellectual property rights reduces externalities as IPRs prevent the 
unintended diffusion of technology. Although IPRs can stimulate innovation, it is not 
clear why tax incentives are an efficient way of reducing a firm’s barriers to obtaining 
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IPRs. In particular, tax incentives for IPR acquisition are biased against technologies 
that are difficult to patent. We consider tax incentives for expenditure on R&D in 
general as neutral. See also Chapter 3. 
6.1.2 Targeting 
Region 
Best practice: No targeting on regions 
Not recommendable: Very specific design elements in different regions 
In order to spur innovative activity, a more preferential rate could be applied in less 
advantaged regions. These types of policy are not likely to be efficient for two main 
reasons. First, the impact of R&D tax incentives in a targeted region will be 
interrelated with the broader innovation system in that region. If framework conditions 
in that region are not satisfactory, simply offering a higher rate of support is unlikely 
to have an effect on innovation. Second, offering different rates of benefits for 
different regions creates an uneven playing field, which might trigger firms to move 
their R&D activities to targeted regions. This could work against economies of scale 
offered by R&D intensive regions and will lead to less innovation at the national level. 
An uneven playing field also introduces moral hazard since firms can administratively 
base some of their units in the preferential tax zone purely for tax reasons. This 
complicates the system and results in additional compliance and administrative costs.  
Legal form 
Best practice: Common rate for all legal entities 
Not recommendable: Exclusion of firms with foreign ownership 
Innovation can arise in various forms and from different actors in the economy. 
Targeting to particular legal forms will create uneven playing field that can hamper the 
dynamics of economic activity and overall innovative performance. Excluding firms 
with foreign owners can be particularly to counterproductive as it discourages R&D-
related FDI inflows and knowledge spillovers from foreign affiliates. Access to foreign 
knowledge is especially important for countries that are catching up in their innovation 
performance. 
Firm size 
Best practice: No targeting on firm size 
Neutral: Targeting of SMEs 
Not recommendable: Targeting on large multinational firms  
There is no clear empirical reason why a scheme’s generosity should vary with firm 
size. The evidence on whether small firms respond more strongly to R&D tax 
incentives than large firms is mixed (see Section 2.1.6). In addition, knowledge 
spillovers are not stronger for small firms as the gap between social and private 
returns to R&D is more profound for large firms (Bloom et al. 2013). 
Not recommendable practice is to provide stronger incentives for large multinational 
firms. Those companies have wide access to finance and cross-border tax planning 
possibilities that put them at an advantageous position with respect to domestic firms. 
Additional support to multinationals could result in large dead-weight losses and a 
distorted competition environment. Targeting of SMEs is treated as a neutral practice 
(the targeting young firms is discussed below). 
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Brackets and ceilings 
Best practice: No brackets 
Neutral: Ceilings 
Not recommendable: Lower rate for small amounts 
Brackets and ceilings indirectly target tax incentives based on firm size as small firms 
tend to have smaller R&D budgets than large companies. As has been argued above, 
there is no clear empirical reason to vary the generosity of a scheme with firm size. 
Besides clear evidence on the benefits of brackets and ceilings, they have the 
disadvantage of distorting the optimal R&D investment planning of firms, as they have 
an incentive to distribute the expense in a way to obtain the maximum tax benefit, 
spreading R&D budgets over time and over subcontractors. Ceilings are treated as 
neutral as they have the practical advantage of maintaining control over the budget 
allocated to the tax incentive. 
Firm age 
Best practice: Targeting on young firms 
Neutral: No targeting on firm age 
Not recommendable: Targeting on incumbents 
Highest level of uncertainty is in the very early stages of innovation processes. In 
particular, potential investors have less information about innovation projects than 
entrepreneurs have. This uncertainty restricts the access of innovative firms to 
external funding. Obtaining finance is especially difficult for start-ups as they lack 
collateral and a track of record that can provide more certainty to financiers. These 
entry barriers result in overall lower competition and possibly less pressure on 
incumbents to innovate. Young firms could be provided with more favourable rates to 
lower those barriers and to stimulate competition. 
Not recommended is preferential treatment of large incumbent firms as this 
discourages innovation by new entrants and reduces the competitive pressure on 
incumbent firms to innovate. 
Field of activity/type of technology 
Best practice: No targeting  
Not recommendable: Targeting  
A reason to target specific sectors would be that knowledge spillovers are stronger in 
some sectors than in others. The evidence on heterogeneity in knowledge spillovers, 
across sectors have is not clear, such that it is not clear which sectors should be 
targeted. Targeting specific sectors or technologies has the potential drawback that it 
could discourage innovations that arise from a combination of different technologies. 
Tying fiscal support to specific fields can restrict recombination and can result in less 
innovation.  
Minimum 
Best practice: No minimum 
Not recommendable: A very high threshold, equivalent to targeting at large firms 
Setting a minimum expenditure can have the practical advantage of avoiding 
administration costs that are high compared to the fiscal incentive, but they are also 
biased against young firms as they tend to have lower R&D budgets. Any requirement 
to invest a specific amount in R&D before a tax benefit can be received puts firms at a 
disadvantageous position that are potentially important for the innovativeness of an 
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economy in the long run. A high minimum requirement works in favour of large 
incumbents and can distort competition. 
Negative tax 
Best practice: Yes, for young firms  
Not recommendable: No negative tax  
Innovative firms are not likely to make profits in the first years of operation. A 
‘negative tax’ option provides firms with cash refunds in case they do not have profits. 
In the absence of a ‘negative tax’, young firms cannot benefit from the tax incentive 
simply because they have no taxable income. This could have adverse effects on 
competition and might result in overall lower innovative activity.  
Carry-over provision 
Best practice: Yes 
Not recommendable: No carry over provision 
There can be a considerable time lag between expenditure on R&D and the profits 
generated by innovation. The option to carry forward all or part of tax benefits based 
on R&D expenditure to other years is likely to be important for the effectiveness of 
R&D tax incentives: it enables firms to take full advantage of corporate income tax 
credits and provides firms with more flexibility in their investment decisions. This 
option is especially important for young firms when a cash refunds are not available as 
they have limited possibility to pre-finance R&D tax benefits they will receive tin the 
future.  
Collaboration 
Best practice: Yes, for collaboration with public research institutes 
Not recommendable: Upstream R&D cooperation between large competitors  
Cooperation between firms and public research institutes, like universities, can 
facilitate innovation based on scientific research. Studies show that more connected 
firms are also more innovative (see Nooteboom and Stam (2008) for a review). As 
public research institutes publish at least part of their results, it can be argued that 
the results of cooperation between firms and public research institutes have stronger 
knowledge spillovers. A study by Dumont  (2013) on Belgium’s R&D tax credits 
showed that a scheme focusing on research cooperation had a larger positive impact 
than other schemes. 
While R&D cooperation amongst firms can produce innovations that are less likely to 
have been generated by a single firm, these activities should not receive additional 
support because 1) there are few reasons to expect that this type of cooperation will 
generate stronger knowledge spillovers than other private R&D activities and 2) also 
cooperation on R&D can reduce the competitive pressure on incumbents. Duso et al. 
(2014) showed that upstream R&D cooperation between large competitors create 
distortions in the product market that results in the loss of consumer welfare. 
6.1.3 Organization 
Stability 
Best practice: Fixed design and rates for at least 5 years 
Not recommendable: Large and announced changes in the budget 
Frequent and substantial policy changes are likely to strongly reduce the effectiveness 
of policies - regardless of their design (Westmore, 2013). Predictability of the policy is 
crucial for firms to integrate the tax benefit in their R&D investment plans, which can 
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span many years. If a policy instrument is changed frequently and on irregular basis, 
a tax incentive will not be fully taken into account when firms make their investment 
decisions. This decreases the effectiveness and efficiency of the policy. 
Generosity 
Best practice: Uncertain 
Not recommendable:  Over-subsidizing 
The optimal generosity of a scheme is difficult to determine. On the one hand, 
generous fiscal R&D support is correlated with a higher share of incumbent firms and a 
narrower growth distribution in R&D-intense sectors (Bravo-Biosca et al., 2013). On 
the hand, small incentives are unlikely to have an impact on the behaviour of firms. 
The impact of generosity is likely to be nonlinear and related to the specific design of 
the policy, target groups and the framework conditions in place. Evidence on optimal 
generosity is lacking, making it uncertain what the best practice is. 
Decision/refund time  
Best practice: Minimum decision time possible 
Not recommendable:  More than 1 year after investment  
For young, liquidity constrained firms access to external finance is crucial for growth. 
Especially for these firms, the decision time and the reimbursement of the benefit 
should be as short as possible. If the decision on the refund comes long after the 
investment has been made, young firms may not respond to the policy. This will 
distort competition as more mature firms have less binding liquidity constraints. 
Electronic application and one-stop agency 
Best practice: Yes 
Not recommendable: No 
Electronic application and a one-stop agency where firms can settle all relevant 
questions substantially reduce the administrative burden for governments as well 
compliance costs for firms. In particular startups might be discouraged to apply for a 
tax incentive when they face uncertainty about compliance costs. Online application 
improves the take-up rates and the efficiency of administrative process.  
Public consultation 
Best practice: Yes 
Not recommendable: No 
Routine public consultations can help government to acquire the information 
necessary for an effective design and organization of tax incentives. Public 
consultations also improve the transparency of policy decisions and give all interested 
parties to give their views before decisions are made. When using public consultations, 
policymakers should bear in mind that not all relevant parties will participate - think 
about next year’s startup for example. 
Evaluation 
Best practice: Yes, preferably planned and regular 
Not recommendable: No 
Probably no invention will work as intended when tried the first time - and the same 
holds for new government policies. Without rigorous and unbiased evaluations, it will 
not be likely that policies will work as intended. For a policy to become and remain 
effective, it is necessary to organize evaluations on regular basis. If the organization of 
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evaluations is embedded in the legal system, this will also motivate governments to 
organize the availability of high-quality data. 
Synergy 
Best practice: Complimentary policy instruments 
Not recommendable: Overlap between different policy instruments 
Combining R&D tax incentives with direct support can help to address funding to 
projects with higher social returns. Policy instruments should not be overlapping as 
that would unnecessarily increase the bureaucratic apparatus and provides firms with 
a ‘double’ subsidy for one and the same activity. This reduces the overall policy 
efficiency. 
6.2 Methodology 
In order to be able to benchmark the tax incentives, we systematically collected 
information on scheme characteristics. The unit of observation for data collection is 
formed by unique combinations of the country, the name of the instrument, the type 
of tax incentive and the target group. For each unit of observation information was 
collected on the nineteen variables discussed above. This procedure enables a 
quantitative assessment of each individual instrument, which is summarized into a 
combined rating score that takes the variables evaluated into account.  
The nineteen variables used for benchmarking address the scope of the instruments 
(five variables), features related to the targeting of instruments (nine variables), and 
organization characteristics (five variables). Three other variables, namely 
collaboration between companies and other organizations (an aspect of targeting), 
stability of tax instruments offered over time and synergy between policy instruments 
in individual countries (both concerning organization) were not readily amenable to 
the benchmarking procedure described below because of a lack of data. Another 
variable, generosity was not included as there is insufficient evidence on optimal levels 
of generosity for identification of best practices. Descriptive information on the 
generosity of schemes is provided in Section 5.3.1. 
For each variable a unit of observation (sub scheme) was classified as either “Best 
practice”, “Non-recommended”, or “Neutral”. This basic information was in turn 
transformed into a 3-point scale: “1” for best practice; “-1” for non-recommended 
practice; and “0” for “neutral”. From these scores, means were taken for the 
categories “Scope”, “Targeting”, and “Organization”. The overall score per unit of 
observation was subsequently calculated as the mean over the three categories.  
Two adjustments were made with this last step: First, scores on scope are 
systematically larger than those on targeting and organization. We corrected for 
differences in the mean score between these categories by dividing each category 
score by the mean for that category. In addition, we rescaled the overall score by 
multiplying it by the overall mean score. The second adjustment is that the score on 
“Organization” gets a double weight. The reason for doing this is to give equal weights 
to theoretical and practical aspects of the incentive design: both the categories 
“Scope” and “Targeting” are of a theoretical nature, while “Organization” is concerned 
the practical aspect.40 
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Next, all sub schemes were aggregated by taking means across target groups for each 
variable. The resulting unit of observation is formed by unique combinations of the 
country, the name of the instrument, and the type of tax incentive. 
This coding gives rise to the overall rating of instruments by the 3r score (“3-point 
rating”).41 If the number of best practice ratings outweighs (is outweighed by) the 
number of non-recommended ratings, then the 3r score will be positive (negative) and 
lie between zero and one (minus one).  
Not all information on every variable is available for each instrument in the database. 
Missing values were coded as zeros, which has the effect of ‘discounting’ the results.42 
Thus the more reliable the estimated score – i.e. the higher the number of valid 
benchmarks on which it is based – the less is the discount factor.43 This approach was 
undertaken as the vast majority of the missing values were a result of a lack of 
available information. This may indicate compliance costs that firms face when 
applying to an R&D tax incentive- if information is not clear and easily accessible, 
compliance costs for firms will be high. High compliance costs will, in turn, lead to 
lower policy effectiveness, as described previously. 
The overall result of the benchmarking of R&D tax incentive instruments in the 
countries analysed is a summary value, the ‘3r score’. For most of the schemes, ‘best 
practice’ outweighs the ‘not recommendable’ practice, so that scores range between -
0.5 and 0.8, and they are distributed around a midpoint of about 0.3. This can be seen 
from Figure 6.1, which shows the distribution of the scores. Only four schemes 
obtained a score that was below zero, three in Poland and one in Malta. 
                                                                                                                               
Here, it  is the overall score of instrument i , and , ,  s t o  are the scores on scope, 
targeting, and organization. Variables with a bar are mean values over instruments. 
41 The 3r rating score obtained is a rudimentary measure of the best practices of the 
tax instruments. Unfortunately, the collected information and empirical evidence on 
the R&D tax incentives do not admit further differentiation, thus making any more 
detailed modelling inappropriate. Nevertheless, the 3r score provides a marked 
differentiation between the R&D tax instruments and hence can be applied for 
benchmarking.  
42 If missing values are excluded from the calculation of the mean, then the result is 
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score based on valid variables is ‘discounted’ by 1/20th  for each of the m  missing 
variables ( 20v m  ). The score calculated is reduced by 5% for each missing value. 
The effect of missing values on the calculations is not large: data on at least 15 out of 
a possible 20 variables is available for more than 84% of R&D tax instruments, and a 
third of instruments are benchmarked on the basis of 18 or more variables. 
43 If such ‘discounting’ is not applied, the results seem to be overly inflated. For all but 
four of the  tax instruments the 3r score was greater than zero. 
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Figure 6.1 Histogram of benchmarked 3r scores 
 
6.3 Benchmarking results 
In order to get a first impression of best practices within countries, Figure 6.3 shows 
the scores for each instrument by country (most countries have more than one R&D 
tax incentive). When there are several instruments that have the same score, this is 
indicated. As can be seen fromFigure 6.3, the scores vary greatly within some 
countries. France and Poland, for example, have instruments that score very high and 
they have instruments that have a score of zero or even smaller. The figure also 
shows that countries could also improve by adopting good practices from their own 
country. 
When the benchmarking scores are averaged by countries, almost all countries have a 
positive average score, which indicates that good practices are more prevalent than 
non-recommended practices.  The country with the overall highest average ranking is 
Norway, which has one instrument- the SkatteFUNN. It has high scores on the scope 
and organization. Second comes Denmark (two instruments), which is mainly driven 
by its high score on organization of the tax incentive schemes, and Ireland (one 
instrument- the R&D tax credit) that performs well in terms targeting and 
organization. The better performing countries score about 0.5 or higher, while the 
least performing countries have scores below 0.1 (more detail on the benchmarking 
results for countries is provided in the Annex). 
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Figure 6.2 Dispersion of benchmark scores per country 
 
Note: Estonia and Germany were not included in benchmarking as they do not offer any type of R&D tax 
incentives (see Annex with country fiches for more details) 
 
The ten R&D tax incentives with the best overall benchmarking scores are displayed in 
Table 6.2 (a ranking of all instruments can be found in the Annex). The French tax 
credit for young innovative enterprises (Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes, JEI) tops the 
list. This tax incentive has the highest score on scope and ranks third in terms of 
organization. The JEI scheme is targeted towards young innovative firms that are less 
than eight years old, that are legally independent, and for which R&D expenditure is at 
least fifteen percent of the total expenses. 
For JEI, R&D is defined according to OECD Frascati Manual, and includes basic and 
applied research, as well as experimental development. The novelty requirement is 
“new to the world”, which is considered best practice. A wide range of expenditures, 
including R&D personnel costs, a fixed share of operating costs, qualified outsourced 
activities and costs of obtaining and maintaining IPR, qualify as R&D expenditure.44  
The scheme does not differentiate in terms of sectors and geography. Firms can 
receive an immediate refund and benefit from the scheme even if they operate with no 
taxable income, which is especially important aspect for the target group of the 
instrument. Currently, an application form can be downloaded from a website and 
then it must be sent by post to a specific department. The response time for an 
application is set at maximum of three months. A more detailed description of the JEI 
scheme can be found in the Annex.  
 
                                           
44 Senat, Projet de loi de finances pour 2014 : Recherche et enseignement supérieur. 
Accessed on August, 2014. Availabe at: www.senat.fr/rap/l13-156-322/l13-156-
32221.html#fn90 
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Table 6.2 Ranking of R&D tax incentives - top 10 
Instrument name Country Overall  rank 
(score) 
Scope     rank 
(score) 
Targeting   
rank (score) 
Organization  rank 
(score) 
Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes FR 1 (0.78) 1 (1.00) 16 (0.67) 3 (0.60) 
SkatteFUNN NO 2 (0.73) 23 (0.40) 61 (0.39) 1 (0.80) 
Accelerated amortization DK 3 (0.67) 66 (-0.10) 5 (0.78) 1 (0.80) 
SR&ED CA 4 (0.66) 3 (0.80) 50 (0.44) 14 (0.55) 
WBSO NL 5 (0.65) 8 (0.60) 48 (0.50) 3 (0.60) 
R&D Tax Credit IE 6 (0.61) 47 (0.27) 5 (0.78) 3 (0.60) 
Capital Investments IL 7 (0.61) 23 (0.40) 37 (0.56) 3 (0.60) 
R&D Relief UK 8 (0.60) 8 (0.60) 36 (0.61) 15 (0.50) 
Skattekreditordningen DK 9 (0.59) 23 (0.40) 50 (0.44) 3 (0.60) 
R&D tax allowance IL 9 (0.59) 23 (0.40) 50 (0.44) 3 (0.60) 
Note: a ranking of all instruments can be found in the Annex 
 
The Norwegian SkatteFUNN tax credit comes second, driven by its first place for 
organizational practice. The SkatteFUNN R&D tax credits are volume-based and apply 
to R&D expenditure as defined in the OECD Frascati Manual. While a preferential rate 
is offered to SMEs, the scheme does not differentiate across regions or sectors. Carry-
over is not possible, but firms receive a cash-back when they do not have taxable 
income or if the tax benefit exceeds the tax payable by the firm (in this case, the 
difference is paid out). In terms of organization, the application procedure for 
SkatteFUNN is based on self-declaration and can be carried out online. Advice and 
guidance throughout the application can be received from the relevant authorities. The 
online application form provides explanations for all covered questions, and an 
example of a filled application is available online. 
In order to decrease the uncertainty about eligibility for firms, Innovasjon Norge 
(Innovation  Norway) makes a pre-assessment of whether the project qualifies for 
support or not. Forskningsrådet (The Research Council of Norway) approves or 
disapproves the application. Skatteetaten (Skattedirektoratet, Directorate of taxes) 
finally makes the decision about the amount of the tax benefit.  In case of a positive 
response, the benefit is paid out in the year after the investment in R&D took place.   
SkatteFUNN has been evaluated on several occasions. There have been evaluations of 
its impact on R&D expenditure, its effect on innovative activity, and of the interaction 
with direct R&D policy instruments45 
Canada’s Scientific Research and Experimental Development Tax Incentive Program 
(SR&ED) rates fourth. SR&ED is a volume-base R&D tax credit that, in accordance 
with Frascati Manual, applies to experimental, applied and basic research. The novelty 
requirement of R&D activities is “new to the world”. As of 2014, the eligible costs 
include current expenditure such as wages, materials, outsourced activities (limited to 
80 percent) and some overhead. Capital expenditure incurred after the end of 2013 
does not qualify as eligible expenditure (Canada Revenue Agency (2014), Who can 
claim SR&ED tax incentives and what are the benefits?). For “Canadian-controlled 
private corporations” (CCPC) the tax credit is 35 percent refundable up to CAD 3 
                                           
45See, for example, Hægeland and Møen (2007a; 2007b) and Cappelen et al. (2012) 
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million. Above that line, the tax credit is set at 15 percent and refundable only for 
small CCPC. Generally, the tax credit can be carried backward for 3 years and carried 
forward for 20 years.  
Canada has a very thorough organization system. Firms are required to file the 
specific SR&ED claims along with income tax forms electronically. Different sorts of 
application assistance is available (First-time advisory service, SR&ED Self-assessment 
and Learning Tool, Preclaim Project Review, Account Executive Service (assign a 
contact person that assists in the process) and an assistance to resolve the claimant’s 
concerns in case the entity does not agree with the results of a review). Furthermore, 
it is possible to subscribe for the SR&ED mailing list that informs about the different 
policy changes. The maximum time limit within which the claims should be processed 
is set out in “Service standards”; 120 days for refundable tax credits and 365 days for 
non-refundable. In practice, the response time is half of the planned time (Canada 
Revenue Agency (2014) SR&ED Program Service Standards). R&D tax credits in 
Canada have been evaluated both academically and by the government on several 
occasions. The impact on wide set of outcome variables have been assessed, including 
analysis on general welfare effects.46  
The fifth position is taken by the Dutch payroll withholding tax credit (WBSO), which 
performs well in terms of scope and organization. The WBSO offers companies to 
reduce the wage bill of R&D personnel by lowering social insurance contributions and 
the wage tax. The R&D tax credit is also available for self-employed that are carrying 
R&D activities. The payroll withholding tax credits explicitly target human resources 
part of the innovation chain, where the largest externalities can stem from. 
Furthermore, the amount of the tax credit is not linked with the profitability position of 
the firm, as it is not set against the corporate tax. For non-personnel costs, a 
complimentary scheme (RDA) is available. WBSO provides support to development 
projects; technical and scientific research; analysis of the technical feasibility of in-
house R&D; and process-oriented technical research. The rate of benefit decreases 
with the amount of expenditure (two brackets are set), which indirectly targets to firm 
size, as generally large firms tend to have larger R&D budgets. Additionally, for start-
up companies the rate in the first bracket is higher than for the rest of firms.   
In terms of organization, when firms complete the application, they are automatically 
guided through the process, with consultations available at the Netherlands Enterprise 
Agency, which administers the scheme. The description of the projects must be 
precise and measurable. The decision is made within three months. When a firm has 
been granted the tax credit, it is required to keep the administrative records of the 
relevant projects. Netherlands Enterprise Agency may hold an inspection within the 
firm to assure the validity of claims. In case the claims cannot be validated, the 
agency will correct the amount of benefit offered. Evaluations of the R&D tax credits 
are planned, and have been carried on regular bases. The evaluations have looked at 
wide set of impacts, both using quantitative and qualitative approaches.47  
The top ten of R&D tax incentives is dominated by R&D tax credits: six tax credits are 
accompanied by two accelerated depreciation schemes and two enhanced allowances. 
Table 6.3 compares types of R&D tax incentives by their average scores. R&D tax 
credits, the most popular type of tax incentive for R&D, have a higher overall score 
than other types of instruments (with the exception of the small category of hybrid 
instruments). Tax credits distinguish themselves from enhanced allowances and 
                                           
46See, for example,Baghana and Mohnen (2009), Czarnitzki et al.(2011), Parsons and 
Phillips (2007) 
47See, for example,Lokshin and Mohnen (2008, 2009, 2012), Verhoeven et al. (2012), 
Cornet and Vroomen (2005) 
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facilities for accelerated depreciation primarily because of their higher scores on 
scope. Patent boxes, with an average overall score close to zero, are on the bottom of 
the list. The reason for this is the strongly negative score on the scope of the incentive 
type. 
All types of tax incentives have relatively low average scores on organization, which 
mostly stems from not having (planned) evaluations and public consultations, as well 
as long decision period. This suggests that there is substantial room for improvement 
across all instrument types. The outcomes for targeting are relatively high (schemes 
are rather generic and many offer a carry-over facility and a ‘negative tax’ option), 
while the results for the scope seem to vary systematically with the type of 
instrument. 
Table 6.3 Average benchmark score per type of tax incentive  
Type of tax incentive Overall  Scope Targeting Organization 
Hybrid: enhanced allowance 
and accelerated depreciation 
0.40 0.60 0.72 0.20 
Tax credit 0.38 0.47 0.54 0.25 
Enhanced allowance 0.30 0.33 0.53 0.19 
Accelerated depreciation 0.28 0.34 0.60 0.15 
Reduced tax rate 0.14 -0.20 0.30 0.20 
Patent box 0.08 -0.35 0.52 0.11 
 
Figure 6.3Figure 6.3 compares the overall scores for all R&D tax credit schemes. The 
high average score of tax credits is due to a large number of well scoring instruments: 
about half of the R&D tax credits have a score exceeding 0.4.  
Figure 6.3 Benchmark scores for R&D tax credits 
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Enhanced allowances also score relatively high across the board (Figure 6.4). British 
R&D Relief and the Israeli R&D tax allowance are the most highly ranked enhanced 
allowances (see Table 6.4). United Kingdom’s R&D tax relief is a tax allowance that 
reduces taxable corporate income by an amount that is proportional to R&D 
expenditure. For tax purposes, the enhanced allowance either reduces the firm’s 
profit, or increases its losses. The definition of R&D is similar to the one in OECD 
Frascati Manual; only activities that seek advancement in the overall knowledge 
qualify. Eligible costs include current expenditure, while for capital expenditure an 
accelerated depreciation is offered. The R&D relief is separated into scheme for SMEs 
and large companies, being more generous for the former group.48 SMEs are offered a 
higher rate of the enhanced allowance, and they are able to receive the tax allowance 
in cash in case they do not have taxable income.  
The R&D schemes in United Kingdom also perform well in terms of organization. 
Similarly, as in other good practice cases, an online application and a one-stop agency 
is available. Information about the design of the scheme, eligibility and application 
requirements, as well as policy changes, is easily accessible online. The schemes are 
reviewed through public consultations, and necessary amendments are taken place 
after the views have been received. This encourages schemes to be up-to-date and to 
offer better value for tax money. Furthermore, the government has also carried an 
evaluation of the scheme, using both quantitative and qualitative approach.49 Every 
year Office of National Statistics (ONS) publishes a bulletin with information about the 
number and type of beneficiaries. 
Figure 6.4 Benchmark scores for enhanced allowances for R&D 
 
                                           
48The current enhanced allowance for large companies will be fully replaced by the 
new ‘Above the line’ tax credit in 2016 
49 See: HMRC (2010) 
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More detailed discussions of selected good practice R&D tax schemes are provided as 
good practice cases which are supplied in the Annex. A complete ranking of 
instruments can also be found in the Annex. 
Figure 6.5 displays the scores for accelerated depreciation. The accelerated 
depreciation scheme with the highest overall score is the Danish Accelerated 
Amortization, followed by the Israeli Capital Investments scheme. For both schemes 
the high ranking stems from the good organizational practice. In both cases, the 
decision time for applications of R&D tax incentives is very short (less than two- three 
months). A one-stop agency and an online application are available. More detailed 
discussions of selected good practice R&D tax schemes are provided as good practice 
cases contained in the appendix. A complete ranking of instruments can also be found 
in the appendix. 
Figure 6.5 Benchmark scores accelerated depreciation 
 
6.4 Data availability 
Evaluation of an individual policy instrument requires high-quality firm-level data. The 
Expert Group on R&D Tax Incentives Evaluation concluded that both data and 
methodologies need to be comparable across countries in order to be able to assess 
the effectiveness of policy instruments (European Commission, 2008). Otherwise, it 
will remain difficult to assess whether differences in outcomes reflect differences in the 
effects of policy instruments. Access to firm-level data for researchers is a first step in 
this direction.  
Currently, firm-level data can be accessed in 24 of the analysed countries (see Table 
6.4). For comparability of results it is important that all countries use the same 
definition of variables. At the most basic level this requires that countries align with 
Eurostat or OECD norms. This seems to be the case for all countries. 22 countries 
participate in the Community Innovation Survey (CIS), a survey that collects firm-
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level data on innovation and R&D, including expenditure on innovation and public 
support. 
Although basic ingredients for firm-level evaluation studies seem in place, few 
countries perform regular evaluations. For about half of the countries, an evaluation of 
an R&D tax incentive has been performed in the past. 
Table 6.4 Data availability per country 
Country Firm level data  Eurostat/ 
OECD norm 
CIS survey Evaluation 
planned 
Evaluation 
done 
Austria x x   x 
Belgium x x  x x 
Bulgaria x x x   
Canada x x   n.a.  x 
Croatia x x x  x 
Cyprus x x x   
Czech Republic x x x   
Denmark x x  x  
Estonia x x x n.a. n.a. 
Finland x x x x  
France x x x x x 
Germany x x x n.a. n.a. 
Greece   
 
x
a
    
Hungary  x x x   
Ireland x x x  x 
Israel x x  n.a.   
Italy x x x  x 
Japan x x  n.a.  x 
Latvia x x x   
Lithuania x x x   
Luxembourg x x x   
Malta  x    
Netherlands x x x x x 
Norway x x x x x 
Poland  x    
Portugal x x x  x 
Romania x x x   
Slovak Republic x x x   
Slovenia  x x   
Spain x x x  x 
Sweden x x x   
United Kingdom x x   x 
United States x x  n.a.  x 
Notes: n.a. is not applicable; 
a
breaks in the data from 2008 to 2010 
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6.5 Limitations of benchmarking 
The benchmarking procedure has various limitations. First, the number of variables 
available for benchmarking is limited and those variables only partly contribute to the 
success of the scheme. They cannot capture such aspects as the ‘easiness’ of 
application in terms of how much paper work a firm has to do to apply to the scheme. 
It also cannot capture the general perception of the government or public program as 
such that may influence the take-up rates (e.g., it can be perceived that applying to a 
scheme is too complicated process or simply there is no broad information of the 
availability of the scheme).  
Second, no systematic information is available on the accuracy of the administration: 
proper auditing of firms is needed in order to safeguard the scheme’s effectiveness 
and efficiency. Those aspects, among other things, can be essential for the impact of 
the instrument. The benchmarking exercise should be viewed only with respect to the 
elements analysed.  
Third, as the best practice principles are based on empirical evidence as well as 
theoretical considerations, future evidence might lead to different judgements. The 
benchmarking results should be taken as a first indication. 
We have chosen a straightforward way to compute an overall score, but more 
advanced techniques are available, such as Data Envelopment Analysis. Decancq and 
Lugo (2013) give an overview of different techniques. Also, different choices can be 
made on how to weigh the scores per principle. A robustness analysis for the 
weighting scheme has been added to the Annex on Methodology. Different weighting 
schemes do not lead to very different outcomes. Probably the largest challenge lies in 
collecting more data on how schemes work in practice, rather than employing more 
advanced techniques. 
6.6 Summary of good practice cases 
In order to provide a more in-depth overview of what constitutes good practice, ten 
R&D tax incentives were studied in more detail. The selection criteria are a mix of the 
following three elements: (a) the tax scheme has a high benchmarking score; (b) it 
represents a novel (and promising) approach in view of the “principles for good 
practice” discussed above; and (c) different combinations of R&D tax incentive 
schemes and innovation systems are represented. The reasons of selecting each 
specific scheme is discussed in more detail below.  
The schemes that were selected for the good practice case studies are: Canada’s 
SR&ED, the United Kingdom’s R&D relief, the Danish Skattekreditordningen, Norway’s 
SkatteFUNN, France’s Jeune Entreprise Innovante, the Dutch WBSO, Ireland’s R&D tax 
credit, Spain’s Incentivos fiscales a la I+D+i50, Croatia’s Enhanced allowance for R&D 
and France’s Crédit d'Impôt Innovation. A summary of key points is provided in Table 
6.5, the ten full case studies can be found in the Annex. 
SR&ED tax credit (Canada) 
Canada’s SR&ED tax credit was one of the first R&D tax credit systems in the world. It 
has undergone various reforms and currently is a volume-based R&D tax credit, which 
offers a preferential rate to local small companies.  
The scheme has one of the most comprehensive administration practices. The tax 
measure has been evaluated both academically and by the government on several 
occasions (including an analysis on general welfare effects). Additionally, the design of 
                                           
50In benchmarking, named separately as “volume credit”, “incremental credit” and 
“credit for R&D personnel”. 
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Canada’s R&D tax credit has been very stable, which greatly increases the firms’ 
familiarity with the tax credit.  
R&D tax relief schemes (United Kingdom) 
Another example of good practice is the United Kingdom’s R&D tax relief schemes. All 
relevant information is easily accessible online and several “help points” are available, 
where firms can turn for advice on their R&D claims. The policy is reviewed through 
public consultations, and government has also carried an evaluation of the tax policy.  
In addition, United Kingdom has a good practice in terms of “novelty requirement” for 
R&D activities, which is new to the world: only those activities that promote the 
overall knowledge or capability are supported. This approach is also adopted in other 
good practice cases discussed (Canada, France, Ireland, Spain and Croatia). 
Enhanced allowance for R&D (Croatia) 
Croatia’s Enhanced allowance for R&D stands out because it links the super deduction 
rate with the type of R&D (fundamental, industrial or applied research). Projects that 
have higher level of novelty receive a higher relative tax benefits and vice versa. The 
option to receive a tax benefit for technical feasibility projects (first stage of an R&D 
project) can be important for more financially constrained firms that see opportunities 
for R&D.  
The R&D tax allowance in Croatia also has adopted a good practice for evaluation. 
While the scheme was introduced only in 2007, it has already been evaluated several 
times, both using quantitative and qualitative analysis. To our knowledge, Croatia is 
the only new EU-member state that has undertaken such evaluation. 
Skattekreditordningen (Denmark) 
Several schemes provide the option to receive a tax benefit even when a firm makes a 
loss. The aim of this approach is to provide benefit to younger R&D companies that 
generally do not make profits in the first years of operations. In this category 
Denmark’s Skattekreditordningen is a unique scheme , as it targets support only to 
those R&D firms that have negative gross profits. Skattekreditordningen is intended to 
be a temporary measure in times of economic recession when access to finance is 
more limited. In this way, the policy instrument intends to compensate for a 
temporary lack of access to external finance.  
Skattekreditordningen  presents a good administration practice. The application 
procedure can be settled online and a one-stop agency is available. Another positive 
aspect of the general organization practice is that the Danish tax policy instruments 
are assessed regularly. Less positive is the long period of before actual reimbursement 
of the tax credit that can take up to two years.   
Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes (France) 
An example of an explicit targeting towards young innovative companies is France’s 
Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes (Young innovative enterprise-JEI) R&D tax credit. It 
provides generous support to young SMEs for which R&D expenditure represents at 
least fifteen percent of total costs. The novelty requirement of R&D is according to 
best practice (“new to the world”).  
The immediate refund option and short response time means that firms can obtain the 
funding faster. Firms can enjoy the benefits only for eight years, assuring that the 
generous support is given only at early stages of business development.  
JEI has been evaluated, with studies concluding that the scheme had a positive impact 
on R&D activities and the general performance of firms. 
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WBSO (The Netherlands)  
Another scheme that provides additional support to start-ups is the Dutch WBSO. The 
WBSO is a volume-base payroll withholding tax credit. The rate of the credit decreases 
in expenditure claimed, with two brackets set. Within the first bracket (up to EUR 
250,000), young companies receive a 50 percent tax credit, while all other firms 
receive 35 percent. The rate in the second bracket above EUR 250,000 is homogenous 
across groups.  
WBSO also presents a well-developed administration. Application is carried online, a 
one-stop agency is available and the decision of the refund is made within three 
months. Additionally, the evaluations for WBSO are planned and frequent, and studies 
involve both quantitative and qualitative assessments. 
SkatteFUNN (Norway) 
Norway’s R&D tax credit SkatteFUNN is largely generic and only offers a preferential 
rate to SMEs. In the benchmarking exercise, SkatteFUNN ranks especially high in 
terms of organization. The application procedure of the R&D tax credit is quite simple: 
firms can apply online, one-stop agency is available and several guides are available.  
Furthermore, the introduction of the policy involved a public consultation and it has 
been evaluated various times. Due to those evaluations, a special database with time-
series data on firm level was constructed, which promotes replication of results and 
further studies, which is a good practice that other countries should consider 
implementing. 
R&D tax credit (Ireland) 
The R&D tax credit in Ireland has a generic nature, covering a wide scope of eligible 
expenditures and offering a common rate to all types of firms, including foreign 
companies. This is important for a small and open economy like Ireland, as it 
maintains a level playing field for foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and 
facilitates knowledge transfer from innovative multinationals.  
The scheme’s organization conforms best practice. The application procedure is 
relatively simple, offering an online application, a one-stop agency and guides. Even 
though an econometrical evaluation of the effects of the R&D tax credits was deemed 
impossible, consultation and survey of firms indicated that the R&D tax credit system 
is viewed as beneficial to motivating more R&D in the private sector. 
Incentivos fiscales a la I+D+i  (Spain)The high ranking of Spain’s R&D tax incentives 
in the benchmarking exercise have largely been induced by recent policy changes, 
which are the main reason for highlighting Spain’s experience. Currently, Spain’s R&D 
tax credit system is one of the most generic. It is not explicitly targeted to any 
particular size of the firm, region or activity, which is an advisable approach. The 
recently introduced option to receive a cash-refund and to carry over all or part of the 
R&D expenditure, gives firms more flexibility in their investment decisions, which is 
especially important for young firms.  Entities can apply online and receive a pre-
validation of the qualifying expenses that lowers the compliance costs of firms. Annual 
guides on the tax incentive and a one-stop agency are also available.  
Crédit d'Impôt Innovation (France) 
The tenth good practice case is France’s Crédit d'Impôt Innovation (Innovation tax 
credit, CII) which has a new approach in terms of eligible expenses. CII exclusively 
offers a tax benefit for downstream R&D activities (e.g., prototyping and pilot assets). 
Such costs may not fit into the general definition of R&D and normally would be 
excluded from the eligible expenditure of R&D tax incentives, but creation of 
prototypes and pilot studies are part of the innovation process. A strong capacity for 
prototyping is cost- and time-efficient way for firms to try and experiment new ideas 
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before actually launching them in the market. Building a prototype or a pilot project 
can also be used as a demonstration tool for investors, which is especially useful for 
young start-up companies. 
Table 6.5 Summary of selected good practice cases 
Name Type Novelty  Target  Cash 
refund 
Carry 
over 
Application Evaluation 
R&D Relief (UK) volume 
enhanced 
allowance 
new to 
world 
size yes cf online; one-stop; 
refund within 
year 
yes (gov.) 
Skattekreditord
ningen (DK) 
volume tax 
credit 
new to 
firm 
liquidity  yes no online; one-stop; 
refund next year 
planned 
SkatteFUNN 
(NO) 
volume tax 
credit 
new to 
firm 
size yes no online; One-stop; 
refund within 
year 
yes (gov. 
& acad.) 
Jeune 
Entreprise 
Innovante (FR) 
volume tax 
credit 
new to 
world 
size/age yes  paper; pre-
approval < 3 
months, 
immediate refund 
Yes (gov.) 
WBSO (NL) volume 
payroll 
withhold. 
tax credit 
new to 
firm 
implicit 
size, 
explicit 
age 
n.a. n.a. online, one-stop; 
pre-approval < 3 
months; 
immediate refund 
yes (gov. 
& acad.) 
R&D Tax Credit 
(IE) 
increment
al / volume 
tax credit 
new to 
world 
No yes cb & 
cf 
online, one-stop, 
refund within 
year 
yes (gov.) 
SR&ED 
(Canada) 
volume tax 
credit 
new to 
world 
size, local 
firms 
yes cb & 
cf 
online; one-stop, 
decision < 120 
(365) days 
Yes (gov. 
& acad.) 
Incentivos 
fiscales a la 
I+D+i (ES) 
volume & 
increment
al tax 
credit 
new to 
world 
No yes cf online, one-stop, 
pre-approval, 
immediate refund 
yes (acad.) 
Enhanced 
allowance for 
R&D (HR) 
volume 
enhanced 
allowance 
new to 
world 
size, 
novelty  
No cf paper, refund 
next year 
yes (gov.& 
acad.) 
Crédit d'Impôt 
Innovation (FR) 
volume tax 
credit 
new to 
world 
size yes cf paper; pre-
approval < 3 
months, 
immediate refund 
planned 
Notes: Carry forward (cf); carry back (cb); government evaluation (gov.); academic evaluation; (acad.); not 
applicable (n.a.). The full description of the good practice cases is provided in the Annex. 
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7 Conclusions 
As part of the Europe 2020 strategy for growth, European investment in R&D should 
reach at least three percent of GDP by the year 2020. The financial crisis has impacted 
the course for reaching the target in two ways. First, the financial crisis obliged many 
governments to introduce tough fiscal consolidation measures, prioritizing other issues 
over R&D. Second, the drop in economic activity put even more emphasis on the need 
to find new sources of growth. Both developments have spurred interest in the 
effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. 
What kinds of R&D tax incentives are being used? 
The overview of R&D tax incentive schemes presented in this report reveals that 26 
EU member states currently have some type of fiscal encouragement for R&D. R&D 
tax incentives are also offered by the OECD countries analysed in this report: Canada, 
Israel, Japan, Norway and the United States.  
Tax incentives for R&D differ substantially across countries, with the majority of 
countries having more than one type of incentive. Most tax incentives apply on 
corporate income taxes. In eight countries the benefit is also set against social 
contribution and/or wage taxes. 
Tax credits for R&D expenditure are the most common type of R&D tax incentive, 
enhanced allowances for expenditure on R&D come second, and accelerated 
depreciation third. Tax benefits for income from innovation, patents boxes, are 
becoming more popular as well. 
Most tax incentives apply to the total amount of R&D expenditure (volume-based R&D 
tax incentives). Currently, only seven countries offer incremental R&D tax schemes, 
for whom tax benefit applies only to the increment of the R&D expenditure. In Ireland 
and the United States this design element is being phasing out. 
R&D tax incentives often target specific groups of firms. Targeting on the size and age 
of firms are the most common approaches: in ten countries more generous support is 
offered to small- and medium-sized enterprises and in six countries- to young firms 
(e.g., Belgium, France and The Netherlands, among others). Most countries put a 
ceiling on the amount that firms can receive and in five countries the generosity of the 
scheme decreases with the size of a firm’s R&D expenditure. This approach indirectly 
provides more generous support to smaller firms, which typically have smaller R&D 
budgets. 
Cluster analysis showed that some countries are more similar with respect to their 
policies than others. The most similar pairs of countries were Denmark and Norway, 
Portugal and the United States, and Ireland and Spain. Sweden has an R&D tax 
incentives scheme that is the most different from other schemes.   
Do R&D tax credits work?  
Impact on R&D expenditure, innovation and productivity 
The report covers a large body of literature assessing the impact of R&D tax credits. 
The vast majority of studies surveyed concludes that R&D tax credits spur investment 
in R&D. The estimates of the size of this effect are widely diverging and not always 
comparable across methodologies. The wide range of results probably reflects 
differences in methodology as well as differences between countries and policies, but 
is difficult to disentangle those effects. Studies that are more rigorous econometrically 
and yield more precise estimates find that one euro of foregone tax revenue on R&D 
tax credits raises expenditure on R&D by less than one euro (Cornet and Vroomen, 
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2005; European Commission, 2008; Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012; Mulkay and Mairesse, 
2013).  
The impact of R&D tax credits on R&D expenditure is informative on the effectiveness 
of R&D tax credits, but this is only a part of the puzzle. A second piece of the puzzle is 
the answer to the question whether R&D tax credits make firms more innovative and 
productive. The impact of R&D tax incentives on innovation and productivity by firms 
receiving those benefits, however, is less studied. R&D tax incentives appear to have a 
positive impact on innovation, although none of the studies has used exogenous 
variation to verify the causality of the relation. As the most profitable R&D projects are 
likely to be performed regardless of tax benefits, it might be the case that R&D 
projects induced by tax incentives are project of below average quality. Another 
possibility is that projects are less profitable because they generate large knowledge 
spillovers. In this situation, R&D tax incentives might stimulate projects with above 
average knowledge spillovers. 
Payroll withholding tax credits may have an upward effect on the wages of R&D 
workers (Cornet and Vroomen, 2005; Lokshin and Mohnen, 2013). Goolsbee (1998) 
found the same effect for total government expenditure on R&D. This is additional 
evidence of the effectiveness of tax credits: a rise in demand is expected to lead to 
higher prices in most markets.  
Impact heterogeneity 
The effects of R&D tax incentives vary across sub-groups of firms, with most studies 
focusing on firm size. The results seem to differ across countries, which makes it 
difficult to draw clear conclusions. In some of the countries analysed, SMEs tend to 
respond more strongly to the support for R&D, while the reverse was found in other 
countries. These seemingly contradictory results make it difficult to draw general 
conclusions. There is some evidence that the impact for start-up firms can exceed the 
average impact, but in general, there is not much evidence on how effectiveness of 
tax incentives varies with firm age. There is a clear literature gap in identifying 
whether the impact differs across firms with different legal status.  
What are the welfare effects? 
Estimates of the social rate of return to R&D are variable and imprecise but tend to 
exceed estimates of the private rate of return to R&D (Hall et al., 2009). This indicates 
that there is a scope for innovation policy to raise welfare. Recent evidence suggests 
that knowledge spillovers of large firms exceed those of small firms (2013). This 
finding provides an argument against targeting tax incentives towards SMEs. On the 
other hand, SMEs tend to respond more strongly to R&D tax incentives, which 
suggests that targeting on SMEs still could be efficient. 
Social cost-benefit analyses for The Netherlands, Canada and Japan showed that R&D 
tax credits can have positive welfare effects but that this outcome is highly sensitive 
to assumptions (Parsons and Phillips, 2007; Russo, 2004; Ghosh, 2007; Mohnen and 
Lokshin, 2008; Cornet, 2001; Diao et al., 1999). 
Design and interaction between instruments  
The impact of R&D tax credits may be highly sensitive to their design and 
organization. The different results found for SMEs across countries are indicative of 
this. However, evidence on the effects of design features is inconclusive for some 
features, while for evidence is lacking altogether for other features. An important 
aspect of R&D tax credits is whether they apply to incremental R&D expenditure or 
whether they are “volume-based”. Both kinds of designs have been evaluated, and 
both of them have been found to result in additional R&D expenditure. The variation in 
estimates across studies is too large to be able to conclude that there is a statistically 
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significant difference between the effectiveness of incremental and volume-based 
schemes.  
The optimal generosity of a tax credit is ambiguous. A small government budget for 
the tax incentive might not provide sufficient incentives for additional R&D due to 
compliance costs. Also large budgets might be ineffective. The marginal impact of a 
tax incentive might decrease as the budget gets large. Very generous schemes might 
lose their focus and will effectively only reduce the corporate income tax rate. More 
generous R&D tax incentives also appear to be associated with narrower growth 
distribution in R&D intensive sectors, that may lead to an enhancement of incumbent 
firms (Bravo-Biosca et al., 2013). This also shows that the design of R&D tax 
incentives should necessary consider the needs of young firms. This may include an 
option for cash-refunds when profits and carry-over provisions are absent. 
Findings from studies that looked at the interaction between tax incentives for R&D 
and subsidies, showed that tax incentives and direct subsidies need to be well 
balanced and integrated. As such, perverse incentives through “double counting” of 
R&D expenditure could be avoided. If the subsidies and R&D tax incentives are 
designed in a way to complement each other, this may also provide additional support 
to activities that, from the government’s perspective, have the highest social returns. 
Whether R&D tax incentive schemes targeted at cooperation between firms or public 
research institutes lead to higher additionality, is understudied. Research cooperation 
between competitor companies is shown to lead to collusive outcomes in the product 
market (Duso T. et al., 2014). 
Do patent boxes work? 
A large body of literature has identified that multinational firms increasingly engage in 
profit-shifting activities in order to decrease the overall tax liabilities. Intangible 
assets, like patents, play an important role as they are relatively easy to move from 
one location to other. In addition, for large firms innovation often is an international 
activity: firms may perform R&D in one country, patent the product in another and 
commercialize it in a third one. Studies show that a strong negative relation persists 
between corporate income tax and the number of patents registered in a country. 
Patents with a higher potential profitability appear to be especially sensitive to 
corporate income taxes. 
Simulations show that tax competition using patent boxes will result in large 
decreases in tax revenue for all governments engaging in such a policy (Griffith et al., 
2014). Furthermore, it is hard to make the argument why a patent box would reduce 
market failure caused by knowledge spillovers: patent boxes introduce a preferential 
rate for income from innovations that are already protected by IPR. The impact on 
innovation of patent boxes is difficult to evaluate empirically as tax planning and tax 
competition induce measurement error in innovation indicators. 
Other issues 
Several innovative countries have no R&D tax incentives or implemented them only 
recently. Germany and Estonia - the country with largest increase in innovative 
performance between 2006 and 201351 - do not have R&D tax incentives. This 
indicates that R&D tax incentives are not required for an innovative economy, but they 
might support it. 
R&D tax incentives are essentially designed to promote R&D, as defined in statistical 
offices (OECD, 2002). However, many innovating firms invest in activities that are not 
                                           
51 Innovation Union Scoreboard (2014). 
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considered as R&D, including investments in software, large data sets, designs, firm-
specific human capital, and new organizational processes. This implies that fiscal 
support for innovation biased against innovative companies without formal R&D 
activities. 
Methodological and data limitations remain substantial and high-quality evaluation 
studies are unavailable for many countries. This leads to gaps in the literature on how 
the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives depends on their design and organization as 
well as on country characteristics. Replication of studies for multiple countries can help 
to close these gaps. 
Best practices 
Comparing the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives across countries is a challenging 
task. Most R&D tax incentives have not been evaluated quantitatively, making it 
impossible to compare them directly. When an evaluation study is available, it is 
difficult to compare the results with other evaluations as evaluation studies differ 
wildly in their methodology. Moreover, similar R&D tax incentives might have very 
different impacts due to differences in framework conditions. 
In the absence of comparable evidence on the performance of specific R&D tax 
incentives, more than 80 tax incentives in 31 countries have been benchmarked. The 
benchmarking is based on twenty principles of best practice. 
The scores of tax incentives on the twenty best practice principles have be used to 
compute an overall index. The instrument that has the highest overall benchmarking 
score is the French tax credit for young innovative enterprises (Jeunes Entreprises 
Innovantes), due to high scores on scope and organization. The Norwegian 
SkatteFUNN tax credit comes second, mainly because of its first place for organization. 
The third position is taken by the Accelerated amortization in Denmark, with high 
scores on targeting and organization. 
Overall, the eighty R&D tax incentives show substantial heterogeneity in their designs 
and organizational practice. Tax credits distinguish themselves from enhanced 
allowances and facilities for accelerated depreciation primarily because of their higher 
score on scope. Patent boxes have the smallest average score on scope. The 
heterogeneity of practices not only is present between types of tax incentives; 
differences among schemes of the same type are also large. 
Heterogeneity in the features of tax incentives is likely to reflect differences in country 
characteristics (like innovation systems and tax rates), but also within countries there 
is sometimes a large discrepancy between the highest ranked instrument and the 
instrument with the lowest rank. This suggests that there are substantial opportunities 
for improving R&D tax incentives across the European Union - in particular with 
respect to the organization and scope of the tax incentives. 
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Annex 1. Methodology 
Hierarchical Clustering  
The country/features matrix is an incidence matrix (also called a biadjacency matrix of 
a bipartite graph) that shows which instrument features (the columns) are present in 
which countries (the rows). The entry in row i , column j  is 1 when the country i  has 
an R&D tax incentive instrument for a particular scope, targeting or organization 
feature j , and 0 otherwise.  
The objects that are to be clustered are countries represented by the 30 rows of the 
matrix. The distance between each pair of countries was calculated using the Jaccard 
similarity coefficient as the metric. More precisely, the Jaccard distance (= 1 - Jaccard 
coefficient) measures the dissimilarity between objects; it is defined as the fraction (or 
percentage) of nonzero coordinates that differ from each other. Thus the Jaccard 
distance between two country row vectors 
Ar  and Br  is given by 
[ ( )]
( , ) ,
[max( , )]
A B
Jacc A B
A B
sum abs r r
d r r
sum r r

  
where abs  and max  are row vectors of absolute and maximum values respectively, 
and sum  is the row sum. 
For example, the Jaccard distance for the rows representing Portugal and the United 
States  = 4/14 = 0.2857. This is in fact the lowest distance between any two countries 
in the sample, and corresponds to the “lowest” branch (or leaf) of the dendrogram. 
The pairs of countries separated by the next lowest distances are likewise identified. 
The distance of a country (or countries in a leaf/branch) from another already formed 
leaf/branch is the average distance from each of the branch’s members. When the 
next least great distance is found to be between a country and other countries already 
identified as being in a branch then this tree branch is ‘grown’ by inclusion of the ‘new’ 
country or countries.  (see the dendrogram Figure 5.11), Japan is joined with Portugal 
and the United States, Italy with the pair Spain and Ireland, then these two branches 
are joined to form a larger branch). The tree structure is thus increased 
agglomeratively from bottom to top until all countries are linked by branches of one 
tree i.e. dendrogram.  
In a further step the visual display of the dendrogram assists in identifying useful 
clusters that are chosen as a result of balancing the internal distances of cluster 
members and distances between separate clusters. The result is a judgement based 
on the quantitative information contained in the ‘height’ at which new clusters are 
‘grown’ or ‘pruned’. In the analysis here, colours are used to distinguish the different 
clusters identified in the course of ‘tree cutting’. 
Robustness of benchmarking results to choice of weights 
The formula used to compute the overall score of an instrument is given by: 
21 2
4 4
i i i
i
s t o s t o
t
s t o
   
     
  
 
Here, it  is the overall score of instrument i , and , ,  s t o  are the scores on scope, 
targeting, and organization. Variables with a bar are mean values over instruments. 
The two primary features of this formula are 1) the correction for differences in means 
between the categories scope, targeting and organization and 2) the double weight for 
organization. 
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In order to assess the impact of these features on the ranking of instruments, we have 
computed two alternative scores, one with uniform weights for all three categories, 
1
3 3
i i i
i
s t o s t o
t
s t o
   
     
  
 
and one without corrections for differences in means, 
2
4
i i i
i
s t o
t
 
 . 
The table below shows the spearman rank-correlations for the three types of scores. 
The correlation coefficients range from 0.96 to 0.99, which suggests that the three 
formula’s lead to highly similar rankings. 
Spearman rank correlations for alternative weighting formula’s 
 Baseline Uniform weights No mean correction 
Baseline 1.00   
Uniform weights 0.96 1.00  
No mean correction 0.98 0.99 1.00 
 
In the second table the baseline top ten of instruments is displayed together with their 
ranking under alternative weighting choices. No instrument in the baseline top ten 
reaches a position below fifteen under alternative weighting choices. The top ten of 
instruments varies with the choices made for weighting, but this variation is not very 
large. 
Robustness of top ten instruments to weighting choices 
Instrument Country Baseline Uniform weights No mean correction 
Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes FR 1 1 1 
SkatteFUNN NO 2 3 2 
Accelerated amortization DK 3 14 6 
SR&ED CA 4 2 3 
WBSO NL 5 4 4 
R&D Tax Credit IE 6 10 7 
Capital Investments IL 7 11 10 
R&D Relief UK 8 7 8 
Skattekreditordningen DK 9 15 14 
R&D tax allowance IL 9 15 14 
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Annex 2. Detailed scores on scope 
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AT Forschungsprämie TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
BE In-house R&D inv. deduction AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
BE In-house R&D inv. deduction TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
BE Patent Income Deduction  PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.2 
BE Payroll tax deduction for R&D TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.6 
BG Accelerated tax depreciation AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
BG R&D expenditure write-off AD 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 
BG Remission of the CIT TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 
CA Provincial R&D tax incentives TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 1.0 0.8 
CA SR&ED AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
CA SR&ED TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
CY Enhanced allowance EA 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 
CY Patent box PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 
CZ R&D centers CIT relief RR 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 
CZ R&D super deduction EA 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
DK Accelerated amortization AD 0.0 0.0 1.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.1 
DK Skattekreditordningen TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
EL Enhanced allowance for R&D EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
EL Outcome incentive PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 
ES Credit for R&D personnel TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.6 
ES Incremental credit TC 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
ES Innovation Tax Credit TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
ES Patent box PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 
ES R&D equipment credit TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
ES Volume credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
FI Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
FI Deduction for R&D wages EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
FR Crédit d'Impôt Innovation TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
FR Crédit d'Impôt Recherche TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
FR Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
FR Patent box PB -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.4 
HR Enhanced allowance for R&D EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
HR Technical feasibility EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
HU Enhanced allowance EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
HU Patent Box PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 
HU Reduced soc. sec. contrib. HY 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 
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HU Wages Tax Allowance EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 
IE R&D Tax Credit TC 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.0 -1.0 0.3 
IL Capital Investments AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
IL Priority Areas RR 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 
IL R&D tax allowance EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
IT Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
IT Decreto Destinazione Italia  TC 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 
IT Tax credit researchers TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
JP ABLL EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
JP CSZL AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
JP CSZL EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
JP CSZL TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
JP General tax credit system TC 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 -1.0 0.3 
JP R&D tax incentives for SMEs TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
LT 300% super deduction EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
LT Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
LU Tax exemption IP income PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.2 
LV Enhanced allowance  EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
MT R&D tax credit TC 1.0 0.0 1.0 -0.5 -1.0 0.1 
MT Royalty Income from Patents PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.6 
NL Innovatiebox PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.2 
NL RDA EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
NL WBSO TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.6 
NO SkatteFUNN TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
PL New Tax Relief  HY 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
PL New Technology Tax Relief EA 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
PL Tax Deduction R&D Centers EA 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.2 
PL Tax Exemption R&D Centers RR 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 -0.2 
PL Tax Exemption SEZ RR 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 
PT Patent box PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.2 
PT SIFIDE II TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
RO Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
RO Super deduction EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
SE Reduced soc. sec. contrib. TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.8 
SI Allowance for investment EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
SI Depreciation allowance AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
SI R&D tax relief EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
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SK R&D Tax credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
UK R&D Allowance AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
UK R&D Relief EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
UK R&D Relief TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
UK The Patent Box PB -1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.2 
US Credit for Incr. Res. Act. TC 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 
US Orphan drug research credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
US Section 174 tax deduction AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
US Special tax credit schedules TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
US State R&D tax incentives TC 1.0 1.0 -0.3 0.0 -1.0 0.1 
* AD = accelerated depreciation; EA = enhanced allowance; HY = hybrid; PB = patent box; RR = reduced tax 
rate; TC = tax credit 
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Annex 3. Detailed scores on targeting 
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AT Forschungsprämie TC 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.5 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 
BE In-house R&D inv. deduction AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.7 
BE In-house R&D inv. deduction TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 
BE Patent Income Deduction  PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
BE Payroll tax deduction for R&D TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
BG Accelerated tax depreciation AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
BG R&D expenditure write-off AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 
BG Remission of the CIT TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
CA Provincial R&D tax incentives TC -1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.5 
CA SR&ED AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
CA SR&ED TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 
CY Enhanced allowance EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.4 
CY Patent box PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.4 
CZ R&D centers CIT relief RR 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.3 
CZ R&D super deduction EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
DK Accelerated amortization AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
DK Skattekreditordningen TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.4 
EL Enhanced allowance for R&D EA -1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.3 
EL Outcome incentive PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.4 
ES Credit for R&D personnel TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
ES Incremental credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
ES Innovation Tax Credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 
ES Patent box PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
ES R&D equipment credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
ES Volume credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
FI Accelerated depreciation AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
FI Deduction for R&D wages EA 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.1 
FR Crédit d'Impôt Innovation TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.4 
FR Crédit d'Impôt Recherche TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
FR Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 
FR Patent box PB 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.1 
HR Enhanced allowance for R&D EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
HR Technical feasibility EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
HU Enhanced allowance EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
HU Patent Box PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
HU Reduced soc. sec. contrib. HY 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
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HU Wages Tax Allowance EA 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 
IE R&D Tax Credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 
IL Capital Investments AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
IL Priority Areas RR -1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
IL R&D tax allowance EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
IT Accelerated depreciation AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
IT Decreto Destinazione Italia  TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
IT Tax credit researchers TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.3 
JP ABLL EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.7 
JP CSZL AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.4 
JP CSZL EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.7 
JP CSZL TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.7 
JP General tax credit system TC 1.0 1.0 -0.3 1.0 0.0 0.8 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.5 
JP R&D tax incentives for SMEs TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.4 
LT 300% super deduction EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 
LT Accelerated depreciation AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.4 
LU Tax exemption IP income PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
LV Enhanced allowance  EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
MT R&D tax credit TC 1.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.2 
MT Royalty Income from Patents PB 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
NL Innovatiebox PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.3 
NL RDA EA 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
NL WBSO TC 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 
NO SkatteFUNN TC 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.5 -1.0 0.4 
PL New Tax Relief  HY 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.7 
PL New Technology Tax Relief EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
PL Tax Deduction R&D Centers EA 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.2 
PL Tax Exemption R&D Centers RR 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.3 
PL Tax Exemption SEZ RR 1.0 1.0 -0.3 1.0 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.3 
PT Patent box PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
PT SIFIDE II TC 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.6 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
RO Accelerated depreciation AD 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.3 
RO Super deduction EA 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.3 
SE Reduced soc. sec. contrib. TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 
SI Allowance for investment EA 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
SI Depreciation allowance AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 
SI R&D tax relief EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
SK R&D Tax credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 
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UK R&D Allowance AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.6 
UK R&D Relief EA 1.0 1.0 -0.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
UK R&D Relief TC 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.6 
UK The Patent Box PB 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.6 
US Credit for Incr. Res. Act. TC 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 
US Orphan drug research credit TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
US Section 174 tax deduction AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.7 
US Special tax credit schedules TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
US State R&D tax incentives TC -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.3 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.4 
* AD = accelerated depreciation; EA = enhanced allowance; HY = hybrid; PB = patent box; RR = reduced tax rate; 
TC = tax credit 
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Annex 4. Detailed scores on organization 
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AT Forschungsprämie TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.2 
BE In-house R&D inv. deduction AD -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
BE In-house R&D inv. deduction TC -1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
BE Patent Income Deduction  PB 0.0 -1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
BE Payroll tax deduction for R&D TC 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 
BG Accelerated tax depreciation AD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
BG R&D expenditure write-off AD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
BG Remission of the CIT TC 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CA Provincial R&D tax incentives TC 0.6 1.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 
CA SR&ED AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
CA SR&ED TC 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.6 
CY Enhanced allowance EA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CY Patent box PB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CZ R&D centers CIT relief RR 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
CZ R&D super deduction EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
DK Accelerated amortization AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
DK Skattekreditordningen TC -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 
EL Enhanced allowance for R&D EA 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 
EL Outcome incentive PB 0.0 0.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 
ES Credit for R&D personnel TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ES Incremental credit TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ES Innovation Tax Credit TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ES Patent box PB 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ES R&D equipment credit TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
ES Volume credit TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
FI Accelerated depreciation AD -1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 
FI Deduction for R&D wages EA -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 
FR Crédit d'Impôt Innovation TC 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 
FR Crédit d'Impôt Recherche TC 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
FR Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes TC 1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.6 
FR Patent box PB 0.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 
HR Enhanced allowance for R&D EA 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
HR Technical feasibility EA 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
HU Enhanced allowance EA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
HU Patent Box PB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
HU Reduced soc. sec. contrib. HY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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HU Wages Tax Allowance EA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
IE R&D Tax Credit TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.6 
IL Capital Investments AD 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
IL Priority Areas RR 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
IL R&D tax allowance EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 
IT Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.3 
IT Decreto Destinazione Italia  TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
IT Tax credit researchers TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 
JP ABLL EA 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
JP CSZL AD 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
JP CSZL EA 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
JP CSZL TC 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
JP General tax credit system TC 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
JP R&D tax incentives for SMEs TC 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
LT 300% super deduction EA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LT Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LU Tax exemption IP income PB 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
LV Enhanced allowance  EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 
MT R&D tax credit TC 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 
MT Royalty Income from Patents PB 0.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 
NL Innovatiebox PB 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.4 
NL RDA EA 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
NL WBSO TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 1.0 0.6 
NO SkatteFUNN TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.8 
PL New Tax Relief  HY 1.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
PL New Technology Tax Relief EA 1.0 0.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.0 
PL Tax Deduction R&D Centers EA 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 
PL Tax Exemption R&D Centers RR 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 
PL Tax Exemption SEZ RR 0.3 -1.0 1.0 -1.0 -0.3 -0.2 
PT Patent box PB 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
PT SIFIDE II TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
RO Accelerated depreciation AD 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.4 
RO Super deduction EA 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 
SE Reduced soc. sec. contrib. TC 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 0.2 
SI Allowance for investment EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
SI Depreciation allowance AD 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
SI R&D tax relief EA 0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 
SK R&D Tax credit TC -1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -0.2 
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UK R&D Allowance AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
UK R&D Relief EA 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.5 
UK R&D Relief TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
UK The Patent Box PB 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.4 
US Credit for Incr. Res. Act. TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
US Orphan drug research credit TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
US Section 174 tax deduction AD 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
US Special tax credit schedules TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
US State R&D tax incentives TC 0.0 1.0 1.0 -1.0 0.0 0.2 
* AD = accelerated depreciation; EA = enhanced allowance; HY = hybrid; PB = patent box; RR = reduced tax 
rate; TC = tax credit 
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Annex 5. Complete ranking of R&D tax incentives 
Instrument name Country Overall     
rank   (score) 
Scope         
rank   (score) 
Targeting   
rank (score) 
Organization  
rank (score) 
Jeunes Entreprises Innovantes FR 1 (0.77) 1 (1.00) 16 (0.67) 3 (0.60) 
SkatteFUNN NO 2 (0.73) 26 (0.40) 61 (0.39) 1 (0.80) 
Accelerated amortization DK 3 (0.67) 66 (-0.10) 5 (0.78) 1 (0.80) 
SR&ED CA 4 (0.66) 3 (0.80) 50 (0.44) 14 (0.55) 
WBSO NL 5 (0.65) 9 (0.60) 48 (0.50) 3 (0.60) 
R&D Tax Credit IE 6 (0.62) 49 (0.27) 5 (0.78) 3 (0.60) 
Capital Investments IL 7 (0.61) 26 (0.40) 37 (0.56) 3 (0.60) 
R&D Relief UK 8 (0.60) 9 (0.60) 36 (0.61) 15 (0.50) 
R&D tax allowance IL 9 (0.59) 26 (0.40) 50 (0.44) 3 (0.60) 
Skattekreditordningen DK 9 (0.59) 26 (0.40) 50 (0.44) 3 (0.60) 
Credit for R&D personnel ES 11 (0.57) 9 (0.60) 1 (0.89) 16 (0.40) 
R&D Relief UK 12 (0.57) 3 (0.80) 37 (0.56) 16 (0.40) 
RDA NL 13 (0.56) 50 (0.20) 37 (0.56) 3 (0.60) 
SR&ED CA 14 (0.55) 9 (0.60) 5 (0.78) 16 (0.40) 
Provincial R&D tax incentives CA 15 (0.55) 2 (0.82) 47 (0.53) 32 (0.38) 
Deduction for R&D wages FI 16 (0.54) 26 (0.40) 82 (0.11) 3 (0.60) 
New Tax Relief  PL 17 (0.54) 9 (0.60) 16 (0.67) 16 (0.40) 
R&D Allowance UK 18 (0.52) 9 (0.60) 37 (0.56) 16 (0.40) 
R&D super deduction CZ 19 (0.52) 62 (0.00) 37 (0.56) 3 (0.60) 
Volume credit ES 20 (0.51) 26 (0.40) 5 (0.78) 16 (0.40) 
R&D tax relief SI 20 (0.51) 26 (0.40) 5 (0.78) 16 (0.40) 
R&D equipment credit ES 22 (0.48) 50 (0.20) 1 (0.89) 16 (0.40) 
Allowance for investment SI 23 (0.47) 26 (0.40) 37 (0.56) 16 (0.40) 
Decreto Destinazione Italia  IT 24 (0.46) 9 (0.60) 76 (0.22) 16 (0.40) 
Crédit d'Impôt Recherche FR 25 (0.46) 3 (0.80) 5 (0.78) 34 (0.20) 
Incremental credit ES 26 (0.46) 50 (0.20) 5 (0.78) 16 (0.40) 
Innovation Tax Credit ES 27 (0.44) 50 (0.20) 16 (0.67) 16 (0.40) 
Payroll tax deduction for R&D BE 28 (0.43) 9 (0.60) 1 (0.89) 34 (0.20) 
Reduced soc. sec. contrib. SE 29 (0.42) 3 (0.80) 37 (0.56) 34 (0.20) 
Priority Areas IL 30 (0.42) 67 (-0.20) 76 (0.22) 3 (0.60) 
ABLL JP 31 (0.39) 9 (0.60) 16 (0.67) 34 (0.20) 
SIFIDE II PT 32 (0.39) 9 (0.60) 35 (0.62) 34 (0.20) 
R&D centers CIT relief CZ 33 (0.38) 76 (-0.40) 62 (0.33) 3 (0.60) 
Accelerated depreciation IT 34 (0.38) 26 (0.40) 16 (0.67) 33 (0.25) 
CSZL JP 35 (0.35) 26 (0.40) 16 (0.67) 34 (0.20) 
Super deduction RO 36 (0.34) 9 (0.60) 62 (0.33) 34 (0.20) 
The Patent Box UK 37 (0.33) 67 (-0.20) 37 (0.56) 16 (0.40) 
Patent box ES 38 (0.31) 76 (-0.40) 5 (0.78) 16 (0.40) 
R&D tax incentives for SMEs JP 39 (0.31) 26 (0.40) 50 (0.44) 34 (0.20) 
 
 
 A Study on R&D Tax Incentives 
 
October 2014  119 
Instrument name Country Overall     
rank   (score) 
Scope         
rank   (score) 
Targeting   
rank (score) 
Organization  
rank (score) 
CSZL JP 40 (0.30) 50 (0.20) 16 (0.67) 34 (0.20) 
Section 174 tax deduction US 40 (0.30) 50 (0.20) 16 (0.67) 34 (0.20) 
General tax credit system JP 42 (0.29) 48 (0.30) 48 (0.50) 34 (0.20) 
Orphan drug research credit US 43 (0.29) 26 (0.40) 62 (0.33) 34 (0.20) 
Innovatiebox NL 44 (0.29) 67 (-0.20) 62 (0.33) 16 (0.40) 
Forschungsprämie AT 45 (0.28) 26 (0.40) 75 (0.28) 34 (0.20) 
Reduced soc. sec. contrib. HU 46 (0.27) 9 (0.60) 5 (0.78) 52 (0.00) 
CSZL JP 47 (0.26) 50 (0.20) 50 (0.44) 34 (0.20) 
Wages Tax Allowance HU 48 (0.25) 9 (0.60) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
Credit for Incr. Res. Act. US 49 (0.25) 62 (0.00) 16 (0.67) 34 (0.20) 
State R&D tax incentives US 50 (0.25) 60 (0.13) 50 (0.44) 34 (0.20) 
Special tax credit schedules US 51 (0.24) 50 (0.20) 62 (0.33) 34 (0.20) 
Patent box PT 52 (0.22) 67 (-0.20) 5 (0.78) 34 (0.20) 
Accelerated depreciation LT 53 (0.22) 9 (0.60) 50 (0.44) 52 (0.00) 
Patent box FR 54 (0.21) 76 (-0.40) 82 (0.11) 16 (0.40) 
Enhanced allowance HU 55 (0.20) 26 (0.40) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
Depreciation allowance SI 55 (0.20) 26 (0.40) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
Accelerated tax depreciation BG 55 (0.20) 26 (0.40) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
300% super deduction LT 58 (0.20) 9 (0.60) 62 (0.33) 52 (0.00) 
Tax credit researchers IT 58 (0.20) 9 (0.60) 62 (0.33) 52 (0.00) 
Enhanced allowance  LV 60 (0.19) 26 (0.40) 37 (0.56) 52 (0.00) 
In-house R&D inv. deduction BE 61 (0.16) 3 (0.80) 16 (0.67) 70 (-0.20) 
Enhanced allowance for R&D EL 61 (0.15) 26 (0.40) 62 (0.33) 52 (0.00) 
New Technology Tax Relief PL 63 (0.14) 50 (0.20) 37 (0.56) 52 (0.00) 
In-house R&D inv. deduction BE 64 (0.11) 9 (0.60) 16 (0.67) 70 (-0.20) 
Technical feasibility HR 65 (0.10) 26 (0.40) 1 (0.89) 70 (-0.20) 
Enhanced allowance for R&D HR 66 (0.08) 26 (0.40) 5 (0.78) 70 (-0.20) 
Tax exemption IP income LU 67 (0.06) 67 (-0.20) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
R&D expenditure write-off BG 67 (0.06) 67 (-0.20) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
Patent Income Deduction  BE 67 (0.06) 67 (-0.20) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
Remission of the CIT BG 70 (0.04) 62 (0.00) 76 (0.22) 52 (0.00) 
Patent Box HU 71 (0.01) 76 (-0.40) 16 (0.67) 52 (0.00) 
R&D Tax credit SK 72 (0.01) 26 (0.40) 62 (0.33) 70 (-0.20) 
Accelerated depreciation FI 73 (-0.01) 50 (0.20) 37 (0.56) 70 (-0.20) 
Crédit d'Impôt Innovation FR 74 (-0.02) 3 (0.80) 50 (0.44) 80 (-0.40) 
Enhanced allowance CY 75 (-0.02) 76 (-0.40) 50 (0.44) 52 (0.00) 
Patent box CY 76 (-0.07) 82 (-0.60) 50 (0.44) 52 (0.00) 
Tax Exemption SEZ PL 77 (-0.09) 62 (0.00) 74 (0.30) 70 (-0.20) 
Accelerated depreciation RO 78 (-0.14) 26 (0.40) 62 (0.33) 80 (-0.40) 
Tax Exemption R&D Centers PL 79 (-0.14) 67 (-0.20) 62 (0.33) 70 (-0.20) 
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Instrument name Country Overall     
rank   (score) 
Scope         
rank   (score) 
Targeting   
rank (score) 
Organization  
rank (score) 
Tax Deduction R&D Centers PL 80 (-0.15) 67 (-0.20) 76 (0.22) 70 (-0.20) 
Outcome incentive EL 81 (-0.17) 76 (-0.40) 50 (0.44) 70 (-0.20) 
R&D tax credit MT 82 (-0.23) 61 (0.10) 76 (0.22) 80 (-0.40) 
Royalty Income from Patents MT 83 (-0.39) 82 (-0.60) 76 (0.22) 80 (-0.40) 
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Annex 6. Average benchmark score per country 
 
Note: The benchmark scores for countries were computed as the simple average over 
the instruments in a country. This implies that small instruments were given the same 
weight as instruments that have large budgets. Weighting instruments by their 
budgets or by the number of firms using them would give a more precise 
representation of how well a country performs, but this approach is not feasible due to 
a lack of information. 
  
 
 
 A Study on R&D Tax Incentives 
 
October 2014  122 
Annex 7. Ratings for 10 countries ranked highest by 
overall score 
Country Overall Scope Targeting Organization 
 rank (score) rank (score) rank (score) rank (score) 
Norway 1 (0.73) 8 (0.40) 23 (0.39) 1 (0.80) 
Denmark 2 (0.63) 23 (0.15) 9 (0.61) 2 (0.70) 
Ireland 3 (0.61) 17 (0.27) 3 (0.78) 3 (0.60) 
Canada 4 (0.59) 2 (0.74) 10 (0.58) 7 (0.44) 
Israel 5 (0.54) 19 (0.20) 21 (0.41) 3 (0.60) 
United Kingdom 6 (0.50) 7 (0.45) 11 (0.57) 8 (0.43) 
Netherlands 7 (0.50) 19 (0.20) 17 (0.46) 6 (0.53) 
Spain 8 (0.46) 19 (0.20) 2 (0.80) 9 (0.40) 
Czech Republic 9 (0.45) 28 (-0.20) 18 (0.44) 3 (0.60) 
Sweden 10 (0.43) 1 (0.80) 13 (0.56) 13 (0.20) 
 
